Foreword

We are witnessing an extraordinary wave of uprisings that began in Tunisia and Egypt at the start of 2011 and have unleashed a democratic fervor for basic political rights all across the North Africa and the Middle East - a region which, for so long and by so many, had been considered hopeless as regards fundamental democratic change. Yet, this is a political development of global, not just regional, importance. Notwithstanding the vital geopolitical as well as geo-economic importance of the region, the uprisings are pregnant with governance implications whose potential significance extends beyond North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, the unprecedented "bottom-up"upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt have inspired new forms of popular activism and public dissent in some mature democracies. Their example of self-empowered, barely coordinated, momentous peaceful protests, with no visible leadership, organization, or specific political program, besides expressing angered dissatisfaction with the status quo, has been emulated by protesters in the United States, Western Europe and Asia.

Much that is both new and important has been gleaned from the uprisings about the challenges for authoritarian stability, as well as, opportunities for democratic progress, but much more awaits examination.

The stunning success registered by grassroots movements in Tunisia and Egypt have shaken confidence in the presumed phenomenon of "durable authoritarianism", whose stability and resiliency is underwritten by well-crafted and highly developed institutional forms. Moreover, and perhaps, more importantly, the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East lend support to the conclusion that economic growth and development in and of themselves do not guarantee political stability, and that, to this end, issues of democratic governance cannot be sidestepped. Hence, a new approach is required for the political analysis of countries that have achieved notable economic growth, yet continue to show a flagrant governance deficit.

IAG
InterAfrica Group
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Conference on the Implications of North Africa Uprisings for Sub Saharan Africa

2-3 April 2012
Nairobi, Kenya

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Dr. Martin Kimani, Director, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), took his seat as the first moderator of the conference. Professor Helmi Sharawi, former Director of the Arab-Africa Research Center and a member of the executive committee of CODESRIA, who also served as a consultant for the Arab League, was the first to present his paper. He said that he was active in the opposition movement against former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, before the current uprising. The Arab Spring, he said, got off to a good start but adopted a negative connotation because of external involvement. He emphasized that there should be no differentiation between North African and Sub-Saharan African movements, as the movements that are currently being witnessed in North Africa may be compared to uprisings in Soweto in South Africa in 1976. The revolutions in Sudan in 1964 and 1985 also are examples of popular movements for change. There have also been other popular uprisings from 1989-1991 which swept the entire African continent. Since the primary focus of the current uprisings in North Africa express mass expressions of discontent, it would be futile arguing over the success or failure of the movements. Debates over the characteristics, influences and diffusions of these movements only dilute their significance.

The presenter argued, further, that durable authoritarianism is equated with despotism which marginalizes people socially, economically and culturally. The phenomenon needs to be analyzed through the lens of political sociology rather than political science; political science is inadequate because it fails to incorporate social processes.

The movements in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have different characteristics. In Tunisia, the movement spread from rural areas to cities. In Egypt, it spread from cities to rural areas. Uprisings began in the heart of Cairo in Egypt, which is indicative of the nature of governance itself which was as centralized as it was despotic. The nature of the discontent also differed. Tunisia had a repressive regime despite a constitutional process, while the Libyan system was an outright dictatorship. The security in Egypt focused on maintaining spheres of influence regionally and internationally. Hence, protesters demanded dignity and justice, including Egypt's standing in the international arena, particularly the Arab world.

In this, and many other ways, the uprisings have created many questions that need to be analyzed and addressed. These questions are of particular relevance to both North and Sub-Saharan Africa which have recently achieved striking economic growth, yet still seek remedies to governance deficit.

In view of the above, it is imperative that due attention be given to the possible implications of the complex uprisings for Sub-Saharan Africa, where there is considerable potential for growing opposition and demand for political rights of citizens. The issues deliberated at the InterAfrica Group (IAG) conference on the North African Uprisings have profound implications, not only for the concerned Sub-Saharan countries, but also for the African continent in general. They also impact on the international community, the major global powers, and international and multilateral institutions of governance and finance such as: the United Nations, NATO, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the World Bank, IMF and the African Development Bank .

It is against this backdrop that IAG organized a conference to provide a platform whereby the various implications and lessons learned from the North African uprisings would be thoughtfully examined and deliberated. To this end, six papers were presented that closely addressed various aspects related to the following thematic questions:

1. Based on the experience of the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East region, the indicators that signal political vulnerability.
2. The political challenges to assumed legitimacy and stability derived from economic success.
3. The future policy issues that need to be considered on the part of multilateral and bilateral assistance under the new dominant public demand for liberal democratic governance.
4. The future African Union response to growing citizen demand for democracy and change of government in Sub-Saharan member countries.
5. The political dynamics behind the precedence of the NATO intervention in Libya and the implications of such interventions on the issue of sovereignty.

I am confident the six papers that were presented by the knowledgeable experts, and the conference proceedings presented in this publication will offer vital insights about and lessons from the North African Uprisings. IAG hopes they will shed light on policy and strategy inputs to be considered by governments and Civil Society Organizations in Africa and major global powers, as well as by continental, international and multilateral institutions.

In closing, I wish to thank: Professor Helmi Sharawy, Dr. Deredje Alemayehu; Dr. Mohamed Salih; Dr. Samuel Assefa; Dr. Mehari Tadele Maru; and Dr.. Alex DeWaal for sharing with us their valuable research papers and expertise.

TamratKebede
InterAfrica Group Executive Director

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PROCEEDINGS

A conference on the *Implications of the North Africa Uprisings for Sub-Saharan Africa* was organized by the Inter-Africa Group (IAG) at the Pan Afric Sarova Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya, from 2-3 April 2012. Issues discussed ranged from the relationship between economic growth and governance, to the evolving definitions of state sovereignty, as well as legal frameworks that address movements for democratic change.

Ato Tamrat Kebede, executive director of IAG, made the opening remarks at the start of the conference. He pointed out that the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings unleashed a democratic fervor throughout North Africa. Political developments arising from those events, he said, are of global and regional significance, their implications for governance extending far beyond the confines of North Africa. According to Ato Tamrat, the events have ushered in new forms of political activism devoid of leadership and political programs, and yet with an empowered citizenry exercising peaceful protest -- in the United States, Western Europe and Asia. The uprisings pose challenges to authoritarian rule and stability while underscoring the need for democratic systems. The success of grass-roots movements in Tunisia and Egypt has shaken confidence in the so-called durable authoritarianisms, with the uprisings being proof that economic gains alone are no guarantee for stable governance. This issue is especially pertinent to North and Sub-Saharan Africa that are experiencing high rates of economic growth while being democracy-deficit. Ato Tamrat emphasized that the conference would provide a platform to examine the outcomes of the uprisings. It will also identify indicators that signal vulnerability, challenges to the political legitimacy of institutions, future policy issues that need to be considered regarding multilateral and bilateral assistance in line with the new demands for liberal democratic governance, response by the African Union (AU) to demands for democracy, the political dynamics and precedence of NATO's intervention in Libya, and the future implications of such interventions in general. Ato Tamrat concluded his remarks by thanking those presenting papers at the conference, the Danish government for providing funding, and Christian Aid for their logistical support.

assumption seems to be that the ultimate goal has not been reached, so that since the direction and nature of the change remains unknown, gauging the success or failure of the movement is difficult. This is partly due to ill-defined or unknown targets. Change is best achieved when the process is planned and cautious. The rise of fundamentalism may be countered if movements are centered around organizational structures. A participant noted that the slogan of the revolution included dignity, which does not necessarily imply democracy. In Italy, it gave birth to fascism, while in Germany Nazism was the result of such slogans.

A fourth participant said that one cannot know the implications of the Arab Spring with regard to Sub-Saharan Africa without including Syria. There were strong associations between the Tunisian and Egyptian youths, which included coordinating tactics and sharing pertinent information. A fifth participant questioned whether a second uprising is possible due to the continued presence of despotic forces, and the coalition of fundamentalist groups in Egypt.

Professor Sharawi responded by saying that there is a growing fear of fundamentalism, which may be related to the lack of redress in the economic sector. It is likely that there might be a counter-revolution if there are no improvements in the socio-economic conditions of the Egyptian masses. Economic disparities need to be resolved. Overhauling the economic system has not been given thought, but the presidential election scheduled for July, 2012, may create an opportunity for the masses to express their dissatisfaction. The focus at the moment is on political bartering, particularly between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military.

In terms of their regional implications of the revolutions, and responses to them, the Arab League may be said to have been under the influence of Gulf States. The African Union (AU) has done better in responding to the events in Libya and Egypt, although their response have not gone far enough. Professor Sharawi then raised the possibility of a second uprising in the context of the presidential election in July. There have been examples of similar revolutions in Africa during the 1990s in places such as Mali, Benin and Madagascar, he said. The aims of the revolutions were often thwarted within a few years as a result, according to Professor Sharawi, of the

The movement in Egypt arose from an accumulation of discontents and disgruntlements. In the past five years, approximately 2,000 protests have been carried out. The number of protests grew following the appointment of Mubarak's son as successor. The first protests were met with a strong security response. The movement of January, 2011, saw the confluence of diverse elements and methods, such as the use of Facebook as a mobilizing tool. More recent protests in January, 2012, were indicative of a stronger base which encompassed segments of society, such as the youth and the Muslim Brotherhood. Participation by the middle class in the January and post-January, 2011, movements was limited. The middle class become increasingly involved beginning in January of 2012. Marginalized groups, including women and the youth, have also been incorporated. The movements now emphasize socio-economic rights. Traditional political parties and civil society organizations, who were abrogated from involvement in political processes due to donor demands, became involved in negotiations for compromises throughout the movement against the wishes of protestors in Tahrir square.

The presenter next described political mobilization by Islamists in Egypt. There are four groupings in this regard, he said. The Muslim Brotherhood is primarily a socio-economic force which is guided by a global program and led by the elite; financially, it is a well off group. The Salafists are Islamic fundamentalists who believe that the *halifa* (ruler) should not be contested. The Sufis are anti-Salafist and constitute a well organized political force. The fourth group are the Jihadists, or the Jemaah Islamiyah who carried out terror attacks in the 1990s; they have since attained the status of a legitimate political movement. There appears to be division between the Islamists and secular elements, as witnessed in disagreements over constitutional amendments.

Professor Sharawi asserted that external powers should revise their relationship with Egypt. External influence has diminished the country's role in the Arab world as well as on African issues. In addition, democracy in Egypt has not been defended appropriately. This is partly due to the inability of the left to properly compete for political space. The Muslim Brotherhood has been more successful in this regard, managing, as it did, to win some seats in parliament.

The bureaucracy in Egypt has a pronounced influence, with its leadership having largely police or military background. The military is an institution which is associated with nationalism, particularly due to their primacy during the Nasser period. The institution commands high respect in Egypt. It should be noted that, while they did not prevent the uprising, they did not support it either. The weight of the military is worrisome because of its pervasiveness, not least because the military industrial complex accounts for between 10-20% of the national economy.

The presenter said, further, that the Islamic coalitions that emerged following the North African uprisings will be of concern, because each group will be competing for domination. The Libyan case should be seen separately, as there continues to be sympathy for Muammar Gaddafi and criticism of the West for its rampant intervention and brutality. There is also the perception that external intervention has increased Western influence, as well as created precedence. For example, the Mali government requested for external intervention during the Tuareg rebellion. The assertion for national sovereignty and calls for intervention are also evident in Syria.

After the presentation, participants were invited to ask questions. One participant asked the difference between the Kefaya movement and the protest of January 2011 in Egypt, and why the latter succeeded while all previous attempts failed. A second participant asked about the role of social media in the uprising. A third participant asked how the Arab Spring will influence Arab-Israeli relationship. A fourth participant questioned why the presenter failed to highlight the role of counter-revolutionary forces who appear to be winning in Egypt, pointing out that Islamist forces are beginning to dominate the political landscape.

Professor Sharawi responded by saying that the Kefaya movement was initially elitist in nature and was rejected by political parties. Therefore, it had no grass-roots in the January movement. Political parties had no influence and provided no leadership during the February movement due to the sheer size of the populist movement. The movement may be said to be suffering at present because of friction between factions of the left and democratic parties. This is evident in the presidential election as well. Competition for power is also evident between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Military

Council. Although the Brotherhood initially decided not to participate in presidential election, they have now reversed that decision. The social media were a strong tool in organizing the youth. From 28-30 January, 2011, the Egyptian government (Ministry of the Interior) curtailed media access, using methods such as shutting down internet connections.

In terms of the Arab-Israeli issue, the fact that there was no confrontation with Israel has been frustrating to the Egyptian masses who are of the view that the Egyptian government deserves respect form the Israeli government. There is a need to establish a clearer, and better, delineated channels in terms of international relations. This is especially important considering the many issues that are arising due to the uprisings. For example, there are large amounts of arms circulating throughout North Africa. Interesting dynamics are also emerging from the Gulf, where support for fundamentalist tendencies has resulted in a paradoxical confluence of Western and Islamist interests. Strangely enough, states like Qatar, who also have strong ties with the West, support the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a more intellectual and liberal group in comparison to the Salafists or the Sufis. A counter revolution is expected from pro-Mubarak groups, not only among the Islamists but also reactionary social forces who are more worrisome than the Islamists. A participant rebutted that the conservative forces, i.e. Al Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have attained majority seats in the assemblies. The effects of the uprising on Sub-Saharan Africa should be contextualized within the framework of realities in Sub-Saharan Africa. The presenter responded by saying that despotism dissipates gradually, and that expecting immediate results may be unrealistic. The movement towards democratization seems to be progressing. For example, the youth in the Muslim Brotherhood have been contesting the decisions of the top brass. The fact that no less than 50 youth coalitions have been created in the post-January period is proof of the attitude of the youth within the Muslim Brotherhood.

A participant asked whether there were debates about democracy in the pre-revolutionary period in Egypt. Another participant said that two facts are evident in the Arab Spring, caution and enthusiasm. The prevailing

considered beyond its core functions, while depending on relief and development aid to fund what would traditionally be considered core sectors. A participant stated that this might indicate the dawn of a new age of state formation, which is influenced both by international and national entities. A fourth participant referred to the Maslow hierarchy of needs which claims that once basic needs are met, people's needs will continue to grow. However, in oil-based economies, the provision of services is linked to silencing democratic issues. This reward system may have run out of steam in the Arab region.

The presenter responded by saying that the state is a necessary construct that should be mended and maintained. The functions of non-state actors should not be to "de- responsibilize"; rather, it should ensure that the state fulfills those functions. Non-state actors have taken on the role of state building in some instances. One example of this type of interference was the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in Africa, which delegitimized the state. State-society relations need to address entitlements and obligations. Interventions by non-state actors do not have those components clearly outlined. Dr Dereje added that China should not be used as an example of a successful authoritarian state, since the absence of protests should not be linked with widespread satisfaction. According to Lenin, "…it is not enough that people are unsatisfied with status quo for revolution to occur, it is necessary that the rulers are incapable of ruling the way they used to rule." Poverty and inequality in the economic realm will ultimately result in inequality in the political and social realms as well. A healthy state-society relationship needs to be pursued to amend inequality and attain legitimacy.

A participant correlated the events in pre-revolutionary Egypt with those in China, where there are many social protests. Another participant stated that most states deal with coercion and consent in various forms, while consensus is the norm in democratic states. Maghreb societies had previously been typified as passive, which is not a correct characterization, considering that there have been numerous instances of revolts in the mid-20th century, e.g. the Algerian revolution, the Egyptian revolution, etc. The participant asked if consent in non-democratic societies is achieved through coercion and intimidation, and the point at which the populace may seek to change the status quo. The participant related this to the Arab Spring; the

imposition of IMF prescriptions, which weakened the revolutionary spirit. Socio-economic conditions have an important influence on the sustainability of democratic progress. The focus right now is on ensuring the secularization of Egyptian politics. Thus far, it has been successful, which is evident in the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood who have maintained secular rhetoric. The Tunisian state, which was often viewed as modern, has seen the Salafists develop strong political clout, while in Egypt, they have less political influence, though they continue to have a strong cultural influence. Professor Shawari concluded by stating that dignity is a moral value, which has been associated with the Nasser era.

A participant stated that the conjecture that the revolution has been hijacked is rather hasty, stating that a journey may be said to have began whose outcome is still uncertain. A second participant said that the middle class has had a strong and consistent influence in Egypt and Syria. This is because of the spread of secondary and tertiary education. This may imply that revolutions of the type and scale witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia can only occur when these conditions are met. Another participant stated that the movements marked the disruption of continuity by emphasizing secular issues, which is atypical as far as the region is concerned.

The second presenter was Dr. Dereje Alemayehu. His paper was entitled: "Challenges to Assume Legitimacy through Development Success." Dr Dereje began his presentation with a definition of the state, followed by the essence and role of the state. The reasons for the uprisings, he said, are rooted in dysfunctional state-society relations. State legitimacy can be derived from legitimate expectations of citizens. He said there is no common or established definition of the state among scholars, adding that the elusiveness of the state relates to a lack of empirical value. The state has no intrinsic value; it is only a structure to ensure the safety of the population within it. The state can be conceptualized as a site of compromise, where interests of diverse segments of society are aggregated. The state can be the site of paradox as well, due to the clash of its inherent duality. On the one hand, it is an institutional setup, and on the other, it is endowed with an oversight over all institutions. It is liable to be captured by particular interests as opposed to societal interests, due to the slightly detached nature of its relationship from society, being both part of it and above it.

Contradictions over the nature of the state extend to the modern state as well.

The state also has a predatory nature; this is particularly visible during state formation, which society aims to tame. The role of the state needs to be contextualized in an historical time period, and societal makeup. In the African context, this means recognizing the effects of rampant poverty, and marginalization of the continent in international relations. The attainment of state legitimacy through economic growth was recognized as a viable option for states. When President Chirac of France was visiting Tunisia as president, he expressed approval for the regime in power on the premise that it was carrying out equitable economic and social development for its populace. A Tunisian human rights activist described the statement as "eat up, and shut up".

There were other justifications for the belief that economic growth will lead to state legitimacy. The trickle down effect asserts that money will trickle down from the rich to the rest of society. However, economic growth alone may not solve problem such as poverty and inequality. Economic growth can actually aggravate inequality in both absolute and relative terms, due to the uneven distribution of the benefits of growth. Economic growth should be seen as just one aspect of addressing development related deficiencies, but not as the only tool. Often, scholars view poverty alleviation as being relegated to a specific segment of society as compared to inequality, which is a more important consideration in relation to its political and social impact. Inequality is not limited to the economic realm; inequality in terms of political representation and access to social services can arise as a byproduct of income inequality. The mobilization of citizenry over a broad consensus through consultative and transparent processes would allow states to ward off suspicions that they are being influenced by interest groups. Development should be conceived of as national and holistic. So far, however, many regimes in Africa have been seeking to stifle dissent by maintaining passive acquiescence through coercion instead of seeking active consent. Dr. Dereje concluded his presentation by stating that, hopefully, the uprisings will allow for a re-evaluation of state-society relations in Africa, so as to base them on a right holder, duty bearer relationship. This includes building an institution that can promote social transformation.

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Discussions began with a participant stating that consensus and consent can be extracted through illicit means. The relationship and definitions of consent-consensus, voice and participation need to be modified. Well informed, and free consent and consensus, should be the ultimate goal. A second participant said that one of the causes of the uprisings is the perception that the state is enriching itself. If issues of poverty are not properly addressed, revolutions or uprisings are likely to occur again and again. The issues of growth and inequality need to be addressed simultaneously by investing in sectors involving as many people as possible. The nature of the state needs to be changed, both conceptually and structurally. A third participant added that growth and development as concepts need to be defined. This is because, as framed currently, it may be deduced that neither growth nor development will lead to legitimacy. The participant asked whether there are mechanisms for legitimizing consent, and whether there are legitimate mechanisms for discontent.

Dr. Dereje responded to some of the questions. Acquiescence can be achieved in different ways -- acquiescence by intimidation, passive acquiescence, etc. Development is often viewed as a technocratic process. Institutions are fundamentally inactive, their role being primarily ritualistic in the sense that they are implementers of decisions of the state. The overriding characteristic of legitimacy is when the government asks for consent from the population. Dr. Dereje added that the distinction between growth and development is that the former does not necessarily lead to the latter. Issues of development need to be dealt with politically; economic growth will not sufficiently address development related matters. Inequality needs to be looked at from a relative standpoint; if the rich are getting richer at a faster rate than the poor, it only increases inequality.

A participant questioned whether a regime can bring about transition from authoritarianism to a fairer rule while still retaining legitimacy. A second participant stated that, in developing states such as China, even if there are some expressions of discontent, they are mostly found on the margins of society and do not grow into movements. In Africa, civil society or non-governmental actors are capable of providing the services usually associated with the state. The state has been concentrating funding and efforts in areas

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In the context of the effective state, political accountability emerged as a new area of concern, i.e. participation of citizens to be matched by responses to citizens' concerns. Ownership was also transferred to the recipient countries. The term democracy was not used in the new conditionalities, because the IMF is not supposed to get involved in political processes. Professor Salih criticizes this process because it attempts to fortify the state, yet does not address political processes. The process was depoliticized and contained to the technocratic level.

The transition to the era of aid effectiveness began in 2005 following the Paris Declaration and the European consensus. This is not a big shift, in comparison to SAPs' good governance shift. Aid effectiveness concentrated on national development strategies aligning aid with partner countries' priorities, and a growing emphasis on public finances. Professor Salih outlined progress in the aid agenda, specifically the aim to eradicate poverty via sustainable development. Economic partnerships agreements that were offered to Africa were unfavorable to African states; consequently, countries did not want to participate in the partnerships that were being offered.

Presently, the EU works in five-year chunks and is developing the post-2015 development cooperation policy. It is currently framed as "increasing the impact of EU development policy, defining a future approach to EU budget support to third countries." The Agenda for Change states that basic policy principles will not change, i.e. the overarching objective of poverty eradication via sustainable development. Greater reciprocity with partners with mutual accountability of results is one of the aims of the new strategy. The Agenda for Change states that the European Commission will pursue human rights, democracy and other key elements of good governance with incentives for results-oriented reform and meeting people's demands and needs. The document also ties fragile states with undemocratic ones. The Agenda rests on a large number of items, including gender equality, public sector management and service delivery, corruption and transparent management of natural resources. The EU will be tighter on direct budget support, and policy dialogue would be a key part of package. It would strengthen contractual linkages between the EU and partner countries.

timing and confluence of issues that led to the revolutions must be studied. A third participant mentioned that a recent study on inequality in different regions at the local, national and regional levels over a thirty-year period was conducted by UNESCO. According to the study, the rate of inequality had not changed in the Arab region, and that there was relative income parity among countries in the region. This contradicts assertions that inequality was a major contributing factor to the uprisings. The study also shows that inequality is decreasing in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the conclusion of the study, factors leading to the uprisings need to be re-evaluated.

A fourth participant stated that voice and participation should be considered as basic needs. This is especially applicable to the Tunisian uprising, where demands were centered around those issues. The Ben Ali regime was maintained with the assistance of international powers, which supported the attainment of economic needs at the expense of democratic ones. During the Ben Ali period, there were 9,000 associations, which maintained the façade of democracy. A participant asked the plenary whether growing equality as opposed to inequality may contribute to social disruption, and whether this can be seen as the case in Tunisia.

A participant stated that Sub-Saharan African governments are all illegitimate, according to the criteria listed by the presenter. Thus, uprisings are inevitable in Sub-Saharan Africa because states are illegitimate. The issue of concern becomes whether one should support uprisings or not. Uprisings are movements arising from frustrations. However, unless they are well organized, they can have disastrous consequences. A disorganized movement can lead to disintegration instead of change. For example, the take over by the Derg in Ethiopia was a fragmented and ill-organized event that resulted in 17 years of harsh rule. A second participant stated that the majority of people do not seem to want or approve of similar movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ultimately, the expectations of societies change over time, and the state needs to address changing dynamics. A participant stated that many of these events should be viewed incrementally. Seventeen years of the Derg rule in Ethiopia resulted in what came after. A fourth participant stated that uprisings are spontaneous, so that attempting to predict whether or not one will occur is bound to be futile. Some of the underlying factors that create a conducive environment for uprisings include

unemployed youth, the presence of frustrated and voiceless medium- to-large middle class segment, access to knowledge facilitated by access to the internet, and growth of functional civil society organizations which empower the people.

The presenter stated, in response, that he did not want to single out one factor as the most deciding element in establishing legitimacy. However, growing inequality is the biggest challenge to the global system. Although levels of inequality may have not increased in the Arab region, they were still there. States need to facilitate interactions with their social base, and when consent is not possible, consensus should be attempted. The citizenry needs to participate in government policy. Uprisings are unwelcome events and the preferred scenario would be the prevention of such disruptions through the creation and maintenance of proper state institutions.

A participant stated that governance in Sub-Saharan Africa is not wholly negative as depicted by most participants. Another participant stated that factors legitimizing governments work in coalescence and should not be viewed separately. The participant added that the role of international actors in the uprisings in North Africa should not be undermined; he also said that the Egyptian uprising should be viewed as an example.

A third participant stated that the presence of a significant middle class contributed to the uprisings. The majority of the youth who took part in the movements have their roots in this segment of society. The participant added that the disparity between political and economic development can cause discontent, especially when political developments lag far behind economic growth. Revolutions are innately unpredictable, which is related to the unpredictable nature of triggers. Short- and long-term goals of revolutions need to be identified. In the case of the uprisings in North Africa, the removal of the regimes imply that short-term goals have been met. However, long-term democratic aspirations may be facing a setback due to the domination of Islamists in the political arena. A fourth participant stated that the Egyptian uprising was not completely spontaneous. Young revolutionaries received some instructions and adopted methods described in Eastern European manifestos outlining non-violent protest. The

participant added that uprisings are necessary when democratic avenues are blocked for achieving change.

The third paper, "Development Aid Conditionality & Popular Demands for Democratic Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implication for North Africa" was authored by professor Mohamed, who is professor of the politics of development at the department of political science at the University of Leeds. The presenter of the paper was Sally Healy who has worked as a fellow at the Africa Program of Chatham House. She worked at the Foreign Commonwealth Office as a specialist and undertook research on political and developmental issues in Africa with focus on countries of the Horn and East Africa.

Ms Healy began by stating that the paper looks at the political economy of aid and criticizes donor behavior and policies in relation to a deeper struggle of how states and societies in Africa can be improved. The implementation of SAPs by the IMF and World Bank in response to the economic crisis in Africa in the 1980s resulted in the rolling back of the state. State intervention was put aside in preference for SAPs. African states lost control of vital public policy decisions. The failure of SAPs was linked to the failure to recognize that public and popular participation was vital to the process. But the failure of SAPs was also linked to the democratic failings of the African states due to factors such as corruption. This led to a shift in SAPs' conditionalities.

The shift to good governance conditionalities was driven by three political developments that occurred across Africa: an agitation for popular participation in development, the so- called triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm following the end of the cold war, and people's demand for democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law. The basic creed of good governance was spelt out in the 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa. Governance is defined as encompassing institutional arrangements, the processes for formulating, policy decision making and implementation, information flows within governments, etc. Good governance called for an effective state as opposed to rolling back of the state.

through economic growth is no longer a fool proof system. However, most of the preemptive measures in the MENA region have been economic measures, e.g. Gulf States. Considering the evidence, this appears to be a short- term solution, with limited credence for the longer term.

- The concept of durable authoritarianism, which was exemplified by Egypt, has been dealt a considerable blow. The pre-emptive value of using coercion instead of reform is questionable.
- The erosion of state sovereignty in favor of human rights and humanitarian intervention was especially evident in the case of the Libyan uprising. Adjustment in the policies of the superpowers towards the continent can be linked to this change in sovereign-human security dynamics.

The major conclusion from the uprising in North Africa and the Middle East is that economic development is not a substitute for democracy. Performance legitimacy can no longer compensate for democracy-deficit. Under the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia experienced significant economic and social development. The country's gross national income per capita based on PPP almost tripled during the three decades of his rule. The 2010 UN Human Development Report which ranks a country's progress in that category rates Tunisia highly. Five MENA countries including Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are amongst the top ten of that list. All these countries have seen protests to some degree.

The phenomenon of jobless economic growth and an unemployed educated populace in countries with a non-agricultural base did contribute to the initiation of the movements. Growth in the MENA region was primarily linked to the availability and increasing price of oil; consequently, it did not correlate with job creation. However, while it is worthwhile to identify these factors as contributing to the uprising, they should not overshadow the root causes of these movements. The primacy of liberty and political rights over economic growth was a central theme in the movements, as exhibited in Bahrain and Oman where street protests intensified following the announcement of economic concessions. This was despite high youth unemployment in both countries. Claims that the young bourgeoisie were a

The shift from governance conditionality based on ownership and mutual accountability to contracts may be faced with challenges, but the popular demands for democratic governance are being addressed in the post-2015 strategy. The paper lastly deals with North Africa where donor-recipient relationship was markedly different. The containment of radicalization and limiting the number of migrants going to Europe were the EU's political objectives in North Africa. Development in those countries was seen as a way to ensure that they do not leave in search of a better life elsewhere. Development cooperation with North Africa was based on trade, which was different from the cooperation with Sub- Saharan Africa. The laxity of donor conditionalities in relation to North Africa has been brought up during the uprisings in North Africa. Issues like terrorism, socio-economic uprisings and emigration have also re-emerged as concerns following the upheavals. Some see the uprisings as an opportunity to re-evaluate future flows of aid to North Africa. EU has produced a joint communiqué on the revolution in North Africa emphasizing the need to build and consolidate democracy.

Professor Salih pinpoints some challenges that may impede the application of conditionalities in the region. Europe's incentives may clash with the incentives of other actors. Gulf States are investing heavily, and China is showing increased presence in the region. In addition, conditionality is not easily applicable in non-democratic states, and is easier to apply in countries which are moving towards democracy. The EU will be applying conditionalities on a country-by-country basis.

Ms Healy concluded the presentation by making a few points of her own. The good governance agenda has been applied erratically in Sub-Saharan Africa. The changes in Europe should be recognized, and the establishment of a foreign policy has allowed for the inclusion of political actors and rhetoric in the development sector. Prior to this, development was concerned with performance legitimacy, while political actors had a more multi-dimensional perspective of legitimacy. It appears that both approaches are converging. Managing donor demands and disparate realities may also be more complex, in comparison to the way it is presented in the paper. The governance needs of North and Sub-Saharan Africa are different; for

example, Tunisia was first in the human development category of the Mo Ibrahim index of Africa governance summary.

Discussions began with the chair alerting the plenary on the data aggregation process and how reliance on overarching categories may undermine diversities. A second participant divulged views of the EU delegation to the AU. The participant added that the relationship is now a partnership in that both sides are getting benefits from remaining in that relationship. The issues of concern--controlled migration, trade and security--were stipulated in the presentation. Theoretically, if African governments do not want aid money, the European continent would lose access to the stated areas of concern. Continued partnership is still in the interests of the European contingent. Following the operationalization of the Africa Standby force in 2015, questions will arise as to how the relationship will proceed. A third participant stated that there should be a differentiation between foreign aid and policy conditionality; the latter disrupts the aims of foreign aid. There is no political legitimacy for conditionality. Aid is distributed according to geopolitical importance, not need. Thus, conditionalties are selective and patronizing. The participant also stated that an unequal relationship between two entities cannot be called a partnership. David-Goliath's motif is evident in the Africa-donor relationship.

A fourth participant pointed out that there are other options available for Africa. By 2050, trade with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) will be 13 trillion USD, while trade with China will increase to 300 billion USD from 107 billion in 2008. So, why would African governments want conditional aid, since non-conditional aid is emerging as a readily available alternative. A fifth participant stated that aid may be a symptom of a guilt complex. Things like the common agricultural program and unfair market access have created an unlevel playing field. These distortions have denied Africa access to the global market, creating a cycle of dependency. The participant questioned why these issues had not been addressed in the paper. Ms Healy responded that there is a section on trade in the paper that addresses issues mentioned above.

A participant asked what state building contracts entailed. The establishment of donor criteria can be problematic because recipients sometimes tailor their proposals to match donor criteria, even if they do no match the state's priorities. A second participant stated that donor assistance has been erratic due to mixed motives and agendas. A third participant pointed out that the discussions are layered, asking whether aid is necessary at all. Democratization emanates primarily from within, with external actors playing only a supporting role. A fourth participant argued that there are no definite answers when it comes to the relationship between donors and recipients. There are examples of countries like Eritrea which practices self-reliance partly through the endless conscription of youth in national services. Since the total rejection of aid may not be the proper answer, a healthier partnership should be sought. Another participant stated that the EU has focused on bilateral engagements when a multilateral one would work as well.

The last paper of the day was presented by Ambassador/Dr. Samuel Assefa, who began with the premise that the future of authoritarian states in Sub-Saharan Africa will be influenced by the outcomes of the North African uprisings. The upheavals are particularly set apart by their uniqueness, which partly relates to their proximity; other movements have not had the same effects on Sub-Saharan Africa. The uprisings will have major ramifications throughout the continent. There is a heightened sense of susceptibility to contagion. However, although the impact is obvious, the outcomes are still unknown or unmapped. Governments' responses to these events will be one of the factors influencing the perceived outcomes of the uprisings. Governments will devise pre-emptive or preventative measures in order to counteract possible emulation. The presence of external powers and possible shifts in policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa is another factor that will affect outcomes.

The presenter identified three challenges for authoritarian states, which relate to the three uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
- Uprisings in Tunisia have generated widespread skepticism that economic growth and development are sufficient sources of legitimacy independent from a popular basis of authority (performance legitimacy). Compensation for the lack of democracy

Following the uprisings, the anti-democratic tide and authoritarianism have been questioned.

A participant stated that the socio-economic data on Tunisia may be misleading or possibly incorrect. The high level of unemployment among the educated class is one of the precedents for an uprising. Reaction to the uprising from different parts of Africa have pinpointed one aspect of African society which may make it problematic to emulate such movements, namely, the multiple divisions within society, which may aggravate violence if such uprisings were to occur. The participant added that the media exaggerated the social media element. The rural and poorer segments of society did not have access to those platforms. A second participant stated that the role of Facebook should not be downplayed. The news of the death of a young businessman in Alexandria was posted on Facebook during the initial days of the revolution, and served as a galvanizer. The participant added that the uprising in Egypt was inspiring, but subsequent events have been disappointing. There seems to be a preference for stability over democracy which may have slowed progress towards the adoption of democratic systems. A third participant stated that the Syrian uprising invalidates Dr. Assefa's thesis in that the regime has been resilient despite the ongoing upheavals.

A fourth participant asked whether there could be a dialogue among stakeholders in order to make uprisings superfluous. A fifth participant raised the possibility that the regimes may have ended as part of a natural life cycle as opposed to a fundamental downturn in the legitimacy of authoritarian states.

Dr. Assefa responded to some of the queries. The costs of suppression and cost of liberalization are based on a model for democratic change. The assertion that ethnic and sectarian cleavages serve as deterrence to an uprising occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa falls under the general skepticism that seems to dominate when the question of emulation of the uprisings in Sub-Saharan Africa arises. Ethnic and sectarian divisions were also present in the MENA countries, and they were able to mobilize around concepts of citizenship rights by circumventing questions about identity.

crucial part of the uprising can be countered, because of countries such as Yemen, which is a considerably poorer country.

Economic disparity among the different countries of the MENA region dispels notions of an underlying socio-economic factor for the uprisings. The common denominator was grievances in relation to dignity and governance. Despite this evidence, most pre-emptive activities concentrated on economic dispensation. The example of the Gulf States, which used economic concessions to quell potential upheavals, may not reverberate with the African context because the economic leverage of those states far exceeds those of most African states. The pre-emptive measures taken by Morocco and Algeria may be more applicable for Sub-Saharan Africa. There was a two-pronged effort by the two countries - job creation and space for public dialogue. Both have been able to assuage their youth population. However, it is still questionable whether job creation is a temporary tool or a long-term solution in uprising prevention. Job creation and price controls are tools that are more in the realm of crisis management rather than crisis prevention, since both are utilized in response to catalysts such as unemployment. This is a difficult approach because volatilities preceding catalysts are difficult to identify, since catalysts are inherently unknown until events in relation or due to them occur. It is also unrealistic to deny that some of the grievances that may be construed as catalysts will not be expressed through some form of dissent. Instead of denying expressions of dissent, political sustainability is more likely achieved through the creation of an internal system to redress these consequences.

Citizens must feel a sense of allegiance to the state if they view it as a guarantor of their basic rights. States that deny their citizens' rights are, in turn, denied their shield of impunity. Though a necessary factor, democracy-deficit is not the only factor contributing to state collapse. China is the best example of economic success alongside being democracy-deficit, and they have had to increase security measures in recent months. This buttresses the point that preventative measures in the economic arena are not sufficient.

Dr. Assefa returned to the concept of durable authoritarianism and argued good crafting was seen as the central component for maintaining a durable state. This view was shattered following the downfall of Mubarak. Whether

the heightened awareness of the weaknesses of authoritarian state will lead to reform or tightened controls depends on perceived costs and benefits of either option. It is difficult to allot probability values to the extreme costs of revolutions. Revolutions and uprisings of this nature are very unpredictable. Although the uprisings had the element of surprise, they did not come out of nowhere. They were a reaction to continued repressive rule. The simultaneous generation and dispersal of political power in the uprisings marked a new type of revolution. This harkens back to a classical form of anarchism, with the celebration of spontaneity and self organization.

The uprisings showed that bottom-up and lightly coordinated groups can have regime ending consequences. This model for resistance allowed for protestors to circumvent issues of ethnicity and religion .The lack of a rallying ideology, and of a leadership structure, indicate that there was a minimization of pre-requisites for staging a successful resistance. It also minimizes the need for public space in the pre-revolutionary period. The lack of pre-requisites or pre-conditions allows for the easy communicability and replication of the movement across countries and contexts. Self-organizing processes are not dependent on the public spaces, communication medium and political parties that movements would traditionally rely on, and therefore are harder to shut down or control. Technology was an important factor in both the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings; it amplified the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes and served as revelations of atrocities. However, the conflict in Syria shows that showcasing atrocities is not enough; the allegiance of national militaries has a conclusive effect on the efforts of protestors. Limiting access to technology may be futile, due to the wide variety of available technologies.

The uprisings as self-organizing pre-conditionless phenomenon would not have occurred without the backing of modern technology. The influence of technology in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited in comparison, for example, to internet penetration which is limited. Technological determinism dictates that bottom-up revolutions are unlikely in the region. There are examples that contradict this assumption. Protests occurred in Yemen despite the fact that the country lags behind Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of internet access (2% versus 7%). The dependence on technology for horizontal coordination and bottom-up creative strategies is contestable. Communication technology

is more important in public relations aspects, which requires limited infrastructural support. Moreover, other sectors of society can assist in that process, for example, the Diaspora and sympathizers in countries with abundant technology can serve as mediums.

Dr. Assefa concluded by positing the costs of democratization versus costs of suppression for authoritarian rulers. The favorability of democratization depends on keeping the costs of democracy lower than the costs of authoritarianism. Therefore, the move towards democracy will rely on lowering the costs of democracy. A high cost of democr

Discussions began with a participant stating that both authoritarian and democratic regimes are attempting to catch up with the spread of technology. The disparate approaches in contending with the use of technology in social movements has been seen in instances like the London protests, where the British government shut down social networking sites, yet praised the usage of technology in the North Africa uprisings. A second participant asked whether contagion/contamination, i.e. emulation is inevitable. The movements in North Africa were unprecedented in many ways. Most questions have been about how the movements will progress, and how they will end. But the question of how they started needs to be addressed. Thus far, there have been Western examples in emulation, e.g. "Occupy Wall Street". However, they lacked the spontaneity of the Arab uprisings. This indicates the more original an event the more difficult it is to replicate. Certain aspects can be replicated, but not all.

Dr. Assefa responded by saying that uprisings are unpredictable. They cannot be started, rather they happen. The kind of considerations that should be highlighted for authoritarian states is, firstly, that atrocities are no longer tolerated. Consequently, the capacity of a state to intervene once uprisings begin is very low. Secondly, the bottom-up self-organized uprising is even more difficult to shut down because there are no leaders to target or public spaces to shut down. These are bad times for authoritarian leaders. Prior to this period, democracy was not a priority due to the war on terror which allowed for the suspension of democratic goals, and the rise of China which led to a devaluation of democracy. Due to these developments, democracy was tagged with many prerequisites, e.g. economic growth.

Egyptian economy, implying that they have some interest in maintaining the status quo. The military has emerged as the extra-constitutional guarantor of the constitution and has partly used the threat of Islamists to maintain power.

The AU's response to the Libyan uprising was different, because it was viewed as a civil war. The AU responded fastest to the situation in Libya. The uprising began on 16 February, 2011, and the AU issued a communiqué by 21 February 2011, calling on Gaddafi to stop using force against protestors. An *ad hoc* committee composed of heads of state with the mandate to implement an AU roadmap was also established. A similar process was used by the Arab League in response to the Syrian conflict. The Libyan case was treated differently for two reasons: it developed into a civil war between rebel groups and Libyan authorities, and it had elements of mercenarism. The retention of power by a mercenary group would invalidate the will of the people. It is believed that the AU was marginalized in the course of international response to the conflict. A UN Resolution (1973) was adopted on 17 March 2011, which established a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace, with NATO given control over the no-fly zone on 24 March 2011. The exclusivity of NATO control is an indication of this marginalization.

The presenter stressed that it is important for the AU to remain engaged in the democratization processes in Egypt and Libya. This would ensure that the aspirations of the people are met. Even if contextual realities matter, the incidents are inspirational and will have an affect on dictatorial tendencies in the continent. AU's engagement in Libya remains limited; The AU has yet to open an office or engage with the UN in Libya. It has resorted to playing the victim due to the marginalization of the organization during international response.

Dr. Mehari concluded his presentation by indicating the way forward in utilizing AU's normative frameworks. The AU needs to stop producing norms and focus on implementing existing norms. There is also a need to address triggers and accelerators, as a preventive measure against uprisings. Dr. Mehari next presented the "Tensions between Responsibility to Protect(R2P) and the Protection of Sovereignty." States were traditionally endowed with sovereignty over their internal affairs. Massive violations of

There are liabilities to spontaneous movements. The non-Libyan examples provide greater hope, because non-violent means of self-empowerment are enduring. However, consistent enforcement of human security is impractical because realpolitik has an important influence as well. For example, Bahrain has been able to get away with calculated and implemented atrocities because the superpowers have no vested interest in helping protestors. Yet, the majority of the evidence back the assumption that the validity of authoritarian states is weakening. It is unclear what kind of preemptive policies could work in abstaining uprisings because of the unpredictable nature of the movements. Since they do not use traditional political spaces or political systems, legal systems or traditional media, the state has a reduced capacity to shut them down.

Dr. Martin Kimani provided closing remarks to the first day of the conference. He concluded that in preparing for such an event a state is ultimately preparing for the past, and will be met with new variables and methods. He thanked the plenary for their input and discussions. Mr. Tamrat added that social science remains an elusive and ever- changing discipline.

The second day of the conference was chaired by Dr. Peter Robleh. The fifth paper, entitled "The North African Uprisings under the AU Normative Framework", was presented by Dr. Mehari Taddele. The paper addresses the many issues surrounding the uprising in Libya, including whether it was authentic or a *coup d' etat*, and who influenced the process. The paper attempts to explain the compatibility of the North Africa uprisings with AU norms. A slightly altered version of his paper was presented by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) to a joint plenary session of the Permanent Representatives Committee in July, 2011, upon the request of the Peace and Security Council of the AU.

Dr. Mehari began by identifying the AU as a multilateral institution with 54 member states. The criticisms, ideals and values associated with the institution are well known. In the past ten years, the institution has produced more than 200 policy frameworks, instruments, norms, treaties, charters, etc. It conducts more than 300 meetings per year. In relation to the Libyan

revolution, there are three areas that need to be addressed to identify the relationship between the events in Libya and AU normative frameworks.

1. The key elements of the AU instruments: democracy, governance and unconstitutional change of government.
2. How the different normative frameworks define unconstitutional change of government.
3. AU's responses following revolutions in the past, particularly *coups d' etat*.

Dr. Mehari added that he views revolutions as extra-constitutional events, where limitations of legal apparatus are apparent, although the movements may be embedded in the will of the people. People have the right to revolution, yet they are beyond constitutional mechanisms. Dr. Mehari stressed that there is a difference between unconstitutional and extra-constitutional civil disobedience. Three major instruments that are relevant to the events in North Africa include:

1) The AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. It is a compilation of universally accepted principles on the three elements. It has been ratified by 15 countries as of January, 2012.
2) The Lome Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. It started in Algeria with a declaration in response to increasing *coups d' etat* in Africa. It was partly a marriage of inconvenience with some rulers using it to validate their regimes.
3) OAU's Conventions on Mercenarism.

The main legislative intentions of the instruments include the establishment of constitutional democratic regimes in Africa to end unconstitutional replacement/change, or injections through constitutional manipulations, and reinforcing a sense of popular will and sovereignty of the people. The Lome Declaration addresses the illegal accession to power, which was a major concern during the time of its formulation because more than ten countries were facing *coups d'etat*, for example, Algeria. The case of Niger was also mentioned, where the president was attempting to remain in power for a third term, and a *coup d'etat* led by the military replaced him. This case presented a dilemma, because despite the support for the *coup d'etat*,

mercenary interventions and rebel insurgency were looked upon as illegal for accession to power.

Provisions against the illegal retention of power are included in the Lome Declaration and Addis Charter. Emplacement of oneself without term limits and without free and fair elections is considered unconstitutional and liable to different kinds of sanction regimes in the AU. Tampering with constitutions outside of the appropriate realm is also abrogated. Constitutional amendments via national consensus or a referendum, if necessary, is acceptable. Interventions by mercenaries is considered as crime against peace and security, and against the self determination of the people. These instruments also provide different types of sanctions. States that have ratified these conventions are to prevent conditions for unconstitutional changes of government preventing citizens and foreigners from engaging in mercenarism and armed conflict affecting other member states. Unconstitutional changes of government carry penalties.

The Addis Charter is also a compilation of universally accepted principles on election, democracy and governance, but it is a binding charter which provides claimable rights for citizens. The ultimate objectives of the Charter include a representative government, pluralistic and multiparty democracy, and regular and credible elections. It also provides three elements of constitutionalism. All instruments support democratically elected governments and provide institutional support from the AU and RECS to maintain the democratic make up of states. They support broad-based popular demands for change. The credibility of broad-based movements, i.e. revolutions, is established through three criteria: the violation of substantive rights (gross and systemic violations), violation of the trust of the people, and the absence of constitutional mechanisms for redress. The credibility test also includes the assumption of internal, broad-based frustrations.

The AU made varied responses to the uprisings. In the case of Tunisia, it provided sluggish support, while in the case of Egypt, the AU made a faster response. However, there were concerns over the transfer of power from the president to the military council, which was not completely legal/constitutional. There is suspicion that the process was hijacked to ensure the military's continued dominance, which has a large stake in the

Oftentimes, revolutions are elite driven, but elites may not be visible. Consequently, it may not be easy to differentiate between mass- or elite-driven movements. A fourth participant stated that instead of trying to identify levels of constitutionality in movements, it would be better to ascribe constitutionality to governments. There should be constitutional standards at the continental level with associated penalties when states fail to meet them. A fifth participant stated that African states are multi-cultural and multi-faceted with numerous interests and state-society dynamics at work. The use of legal mechanisms to resolve unhealthy dynamics has been seen in some cases, such as the peace process between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan.

A fifth participant stated that while the AU should be commended for becoming more assertive, there have been inconsistencies in the application of normative frameworks. In the case of Niger, there were attempts to amend the constitution to increase the president's term limit. The move was seen as unjust by the citizenry and the courts. Despite the broad-based support the coup enjoyed, the AU imposed sanctions on Niger. The Niger scenario was similar to that in Egypt, yet the Egyptian uprising was condoned while Niger was penalized. One influence of the North African uprisings is that there may be adjustments to the AU normative frameworks, so that they may address popular uprisings. A sixth participant stated that R2P defines the groundwork for intervention, with four criteria associated with intervention on humanitarian grounds. In the post-Cold War period, human rights and citizenship rights have become prioritized over state sovereignty, partly due to a rise in intra-state conflicts. However, this raises a question as to who can decide if a state is unwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibilities.

A seventh participant returned to the debate over the definition of revolutions. Some started as *coups d'etat while* others were initiated by small elite groups that eventually gained broad-based support. The participant asked how the AU gauges whether a popular movement is revolutionary or not. Another participant questioned whether the current leadership change in the AU will be influenced by events in North Africa. A participant raised a point regarding the process of constitution formation in Egypt as compared to that in Somalia. The Egyptian state in the post-revolutionary

human rights have led to a re-conceptualization of state sovereignty. Sovereignty needs to coincide with responsibility, i.e. human rights, protection of minorities, and ensuring that the will of the people is the main basis for assuming power. The re-conceptualization of sovereignty alters the responsibilities of the state, in that the primary responsibility of the state has become the protection of its people. R2P now precedes state sovereignty. It allows internal state matters to fall under the purview and judgment of the international community if the state is unable to protect its citizens. Dr. Mehari stressed that changes in prioritization are linked to changes in the conceptualization of responsibility. The international community plays a complementary and subsidiary role when a state is unable to provide protection for its citizens.

R2P has three components: the responsibility to prevent, react and rebuild. Military intervention is considered when six criteria are fulfilled: the just cause threshold which was established by an international commission for R2P, pre-condition principles, the right intentions which relate to motive and is difficult to prove, military intervention as the last resort, proportional use of violence, reasonable exit strategy, and having the right authority (mandate.)

Discussions began with a participant stating that the impacts of the North African uprisings have gone far beyond Africa with their effects being felt worldwide. He argued that the Military Council in Egypt is a legal entity, endowed with the power of the presidency in accordance with the 1971 constitution, despite the fact that they were considering suspending the 1971 constitution. In an increasingly paradoxical situation, there are now attempts to amend the constitution. The participant questioned why the AU did not use the R2P mechanism to intervene in Libya. A second participant stated that what is listed under the rubric of credibility test is not part of the declaration. The paper seems to attempt to reconcile what is irreconcilable, i.e. attempting to validate revolutions. For example, the Iranian revolution was considered legitimate since it occurred in accordance with popular will. However, the outcome of the revolution, an Islamist government led by a supreme leader, has been controversial. It is highly unlikely that there is a legal instrument that can endow it with legitimacy. A third participant questioned whether neutrality can be maintained in such interventions.

Other considerations may override the impetus to protect civilians. A fourth participant asked whether R2P has been incorporated into the evolving practices of the AU.

A fifth participant questioned the credibility test which includes internal and external dimensions. The necessity of the external dimension is questionable if popular will is strongly in support of change. The participant asked what recourse is available when there is a divergence between internal and external dimensions. The participant also asked at what point a movement can be considered to have popular support, and whether the use of violence renegades this status. A sixth participant questioned the methodology of the study in that it confuses between moral theory and law. The conclusions, based as they are on instruments and attempts to establish compatibility between revolutions and the AU framework, are far fetched. The distinction between extra-constitutional and unconstitutional movements is also ill-conceived. The distinctive features described in the presentation cannot be found in the international body of law, which indicates that the characteristics mentioned in the paper are issues that should be considered in the re-evaluation of international law, rather than being an existing component of the law.

Dr. Mehari responded by pointing out that the main purpose of the paper is to investigate whether the North African uprisings were compatible or incompatible with the AU frameworks. The fundamental conclusion is that they are not. The Lome Declaration and the Addis Charters were responses to circumstance, such as the proliferation of *coups d' etat*. He added that the uprising process applies to the pre-revolutionary period and not the post-revolutionary period. Some broad-based revolutionary movements that had attempted to topple constitutionally supported governments have been labeled by the AU as *coups d''etat* for not using constitutional redressing mechanisms. The applicability of credibility tests needs to be seen in the context of AU's decision making capacity. During revolutionary processes, the concept of the separation of powers is removed and people's power pervades. Consequently, legal frameworks are difficult to apply during this period.

Dr. Mehari added that the handover of power to the Military Council in Egypt was unconstitutional, because it was not in accordance with existing procedures. The application of R2P in relation to Somalia is problematic. The AU has been calling for broad-based collaboration in dealing with Somalia which, as a failed state, makes intervention a difficult choice. R2P does not operate in a vacuum, as actors are guided by their own interests. Normative frameworks cannot be implemented without actors being interested.

Internal and external dynamics are co-dependent in the framework of assigning credibility. External checks can aid in re-evaluating the internal dynamics. In addition, AU's decisions are binding by law. Since legal connotations are already pre-determined, the paper presents an analysis of a legal framework, so that what is not clearly disallowed can be allowed. The AU could provide guidance on the road to good governance/good practices.

Discussions continued with a participant requesting an expansion on R2P. The concept is a re-conceptualization of the well established limitations on state sovereignty following a major shift in international law after World War II. The Nuremberg trials, where officials from the Third Reich were prosecuted, set a new precedent in that a state could no longer enjoy absolute sovereignty in the treatment of its citizens. The participant questioned whether R2P increases the rights of citizens, as well as the burden on the state, or whether it increases the right of intervention by states. A second participant stated that, in the Tunisian uprising, protestors were unconcerned about external support for the movement. The participant asked whether there were historical reasons for time differences regarding AU's response in relation to the various uprisings.

A third participant questioned whether rules can be delineated for revolutions. The participant returned to the case of Somalia, stating that interventions in that country are best led by an AU force, which has a broader mandate than UN peace keeping forces. A no-fly zone in Somalia would be impractical because there are no military flights in that area. Controlling civilian flights is an expensive procedure and the requisite resources are not available in Somalia. A third participant stated that credibility is established by whether a movement is elite or mass driven.

...ountry, while in Libya, the revolt began in Benghazi but gradually spread to ...e capital city, Tripoli. It should be noted that, in countries such as Egypt, the ...prising was preceded (and influenced) by widespread protests during the past ...ecades, and those protests heightened the public's political awareness. The ...bsence of an "organized leadership" might have been a cause for concern, but ...t turned out to be really worth it, after all!

...his paper attempts to address such questions as: (1) the nature of the ...prisings and their implications for other countries in Africa and the Arab ...orld; (2) were the uprisings spontaneous or did they result from historically ...ccumulated social movements and protests that preceded them?; (3) what ...pecific problems were the uprisings expected to face in toppling the ...uthoritarian regimes, and can they succeed?; (4) the nature of the new powers ...hat will replace authoritarian regimes and their legitimacy; and (5) the ...elationship of the new powers with the outside world. The paper will end ...ith some concluding remarks.

Between Spontaneous Uprising and Accumulated Movements/Protests

...he former ruling regimes in North Africa may be characterized as "security ...ate" in the case of Egypt, despotism in the case of Tunisia and extreme ...ictatorship in Libya. There is no need here to go into the scientific definitions ...f such terms; what matters is to identify factors that led to the revolutionary ...prisings. The Egyptian regime resorted to "suppression by security forces" by ...iving ultimate authority to the president and his security system, thus ...witching from reliance on the army (as was the case with the regime in power ...n July, 1952) to reliance on secret services known as "the State Security and ...nvestigations Service (SSIS)", plus about half a million young policemen who ...ere assigned the task of deterring any popular gatherings. According to most ...stimates, the SSIS and the police are over one million. The regime concealed ...his behind what may be referred to as "smart power" that was typical of both ...adat and Mubarak regimes.

...he Egyptian population enjoyed access to the largest media system in the ...iddle East, but also a large number of opposition newspapers. However, the ...opulation lived in the shadow of laws that restricted individual freedom,

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period created an amended version of the constitution within one month while, in Somalia, it has taken approximately 23 million USD and several years with no concrete results. The participant stated that R2P based intervention seemed to be carried out in defense of a state's self interest as opposed to concerns over citizens' rights. A participant added that AU provisions are based on the assumption that existing governments are constitutional. Revolutions start by suspending the constitution, so that, consequently, current AU frameworks appear to be insufficient for addressing revolutionary changes.

Another participant responded to the question about the changes in AU leadership, stating that there is continued paralysis along Anglophone and Francophone lines. The current AU chairperson has been ridiculed because of AU's response to the Libyan uprising. South African candidates have been discounted due to the powerful stature of the country, which will create an imbalance of power if a South African becomes a chairperson. A candidate from a smaller, less powerful country may be preferred to ensure a balance of power.

Dr. Mehari stated in response to some of the queries that the protection of internally displaced persons is one example of an international mandate extending to internal affairs. The progression of revolutions varies; hence responses must vary as well. He said that while external views on ongoing movements may not carry a significant weight, regional concerns should be taken into consideration because movements can diffuse into neighboring countries. Dr. Mehari concluded by stating that, considering the high number of existing frameworks, the implementation of current frameworks should be the most pressing issue for the AU.

Professor Andreas Eshete synthesized the numerous issues that had been raised during the conference. Variations between grass-root and elite driven processes have been one of the more notable issues brought up during the discussions. The recalibration of the definition of legitimacy in contrast to performance legitimacy has also been mentioned, with moral and realist notions associated with the terms. The moral notion of legitimacy looks at ethical considerations. Realist notions of legitimacy pinpoint economic

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growth as a necessary factor. The focus on free and informed consent as the cornerstone of legitimacy may overstretch the boundaries of legitimacy.

Professor Andreas commented on Dr. Assefa's presentation, stating that it highlights the very original nature of the events in North Africa, although claims to uniqueness have been tempered by linkages with "Occupy Wall Street", etc. movements. Previous movements such as Civil Rights were also recognized for their originality, but they eventually became incorporated into the mainstream. In consideration of this historical backdrop, it may be noted that originality is not the most crucial element of these movements.

A possible outcome of the uprisings is that they will be in favor of popular democracy in its many forms. The degree will vary from one setting to another. However, favoring popular democracy is not necessarily favoring democracy. Procedural democracy (elections, etc.) will not necessarily result in regimes that appreciate democracy. According to a recent survey, 65% of Egyptians are inclined towards conservative Islam. There is a higher probability of fundamental change coming about from movements occurring in a democratic setting. Professor Andreas concluded by stating that skepticism about the Arab uprisings or the "Occupy" movements needs to be combined with a sense of appreciation for those movements.

Ato Tamrat made the closing remarks for the conference. He identified three major themes. First, stability cannot be taken for granted solely because there is economic growth. So long as there is governance-deficit, state-citizen relations are bound to be at risk. Secondly, the quest for popular governance cannot be sidestepped, and third, although uprisings are geographically and contextually similar, there are elements of uniqueness that need to be examined. The final results of the North African uprisings are yet to be seen. He concluded by stating that IAG will continue to provoke dialogue on the issue, and thanked the presenters and participants for their input, and for making the conference a success.

Popular Uprisings and the Durable Authoritarianism in North Africa
Helmi Sharawiy[i]

Introduction

A year has now elapsed since the uprisings, dubbed the "Arab Spring", broke out (January- February, 2011) in North Africa and the Arab region at large. Legitimate questions are being raised regarding not only their repercussions on Africa and the Arab world, but also apparent differences between terms such as "uprisings", "revolutions" and "revolts". This paper attempts to answer these questions while indicating gains, if any, that have been made since the uprisings which are, as yet, unsettled, as well as promises of change -- total or partial, real or imagined that may be expected from the uprisings. It should be kept in mind that the "revolutions" did not break out in the face of political oppression or forms of despotism only; they were, and are still, linked to economic discontent and social differentiation.

The author believes that issues raised in this paper may open up new avenues for the reader to arrive at conclusions about the future of the revolutions, as well as their relevance and implications for other countries in the region, especially with regard to the evolution of the revolutionary process, on the one hand, and the persistence of despotism and social differentiation on the other. Events relating to the North African uprisings, particularly those relating to economic conditions, for example, Egypt will be more transparent over the coming years, as more reliable and objective information emerge, in contrast to the prevailing state of "uncertainty" resulting from "international" and "strategic" reports.

Another issue has to do with how far the uprisings were spontaneous. In Tunisia, protestors rushed in torrents from Sidibozid to the capital city. In Egypt, there were millions of protesters at Tahrir Square, and across the entire

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movements in general. We will not go into details, but will only highlight the situation.

Studies revealed that the protests involved large numbers of the working class and professionals in all spheres. One of these studies sums up the situation as follows:

- In the past ten years, workers' protests approximated 2600, varied between gatherings, sit-ins, strikes, or wide demonstrations; the strongest was in Mahala - that involved 50,000 protestors in 2006 – Shebin El-Kum, and Shubra Al-Khaimah that all house textile factories that underwent a period of recession.

- 1,330 protests were tracked down on the part of professionals of the middle class; they included physicians, engineers, commercials, journalists, and lawyers. The most famous was the strike of the Real Estate Tax Authority (RETA) that involved 55,000 employees and their sit-in outside the Prime Minister's office for two weeks demanding rise of salaries and equality between their various sects. Their attitude went as far as demanding an independent unionist organization and it was only answered after the January 2011 Revolution.

- Peasants–despite their traditionally rare participation in public movements–got engaged in that phenomenal protest over the amendments effected to the laws of land rents or because of their dismissal from the lands they were granted by the Agrarian Reform laws. Thousands of peasants reached the Egyptian capital city and confronted the police in more than 8 villages round the country.

- Demonstrations of poor urban habitants for lack of provisions occurred almost on daily basis. This drove some capitalist figures to declare their awareness that these demonstrators might proceed towards the capital city; that announcement was made to the media some few months before the Jan. 2011 events.

granting the whole power to the ruling "National Democratic Party (NDP)". The party controlled legislative authorities with 80-95% of the parliament being members of the party (2005- 2010), local councils and similar authorities. The regime boasted about Egypt having 24 political parties acknowledged by a governmental committee, seven major professional syndicates, 22 workers syndicates all of whom were united under the Trade Union Federation, and over 30,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) all united likewise under one union. These bodies, both of the state and civil society, all lived in the shadow of the Emergency Law which was promulgated in 1981. The law banned all general meetings outside the headquarters of the parties concerned. There was a similar law restricting the activities of NGOs which, much like trade unions, also witnessed repeated onslaughts including the dissolution of professional syndicates' boards of directors when the regime's candidates failed to win in elections! Consequently, the ultimate authority was concentrated in the hands of the state that entirely controlled all political activities in the country. Even the basic rules of political liberalism were nonexistent. All other political parties, be they Islamists, Nasserites or Marxists were brutally suppressed.

Restrictions in political activities were compounded by the regime's "open door" economic policy after disposing of public sector concerns beginning in the 1980s in accordance with the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) , which placed the economy under the control of external influence The measure was taken was propagated as "economic liberalism" by the regime. The regime's internal security was buttressed with American military aid amounting to an estimated 2.3 billion US Dollars annually.

The ousted president made it his business to spread fear regarding Islamists such as the Muslim Brothers who were prevented from parliament, while the "Jamaa Islamia" was branded as a Jihadist terrorist group. This was in the same way as Mubarak's predecessor, Anwar Sadat, persecuted those who were considered communists and leftists, all in the name of the US war against "communism" before the 1990s. Not only did Mubarak suppress politicians and liberals, but he went to the extent of threatening them. He reinforced his threats by giving the military full powers. Because of the fear of losing their limited gains, existing parties, whether liberal or leftist, were forced to acknowledge Mubarak's "individual decision-making policy".

Perhaps Mubarak's most authoritarian step since the beginning of the 21st century was his decision to make his son, Gamal Mubarak, heir to the presidency. Gamal was presented by the ruling party as a legitimate heir, after amendment of articles of the constitution (Article 76 in particular). The heir, in preparation for replacing the old ruler in 2011, adopted what was known in Egypt as the marriage between "wealth and power", by forming an alliance with businessmen. He dismantled the old bureaucracy and technocracy of the Abdul-Nasser era, which was led by the middle class. The aim was to abolish the power of the "national state", or "deep-rooted state'", which had been in existence from 1952-1980. At the same time, the conflict over power persisted between the army and the security forces who were supposed to guarantee consummation of the inheritance process. The ousted regime depended on this tense situation in its attempt to stay in power. However, the security forces did not have the ability to protect the state that had been weakened in the last years of the Mubarak era. This was best shown during the eighteen decisive days of the uprising (January- February 2011). Mubarak thought that the armed forces would guarantee his power and ignored the police, who became incensed by his attitude. Nevertheless, the army refrained from suppressing violent reactions, because it had not played that role in its history.

With the aim to suppress the revolt by attacking the Tahrir masses, Gamal Mubarak (together with compradors) resorted to violence -- the "Camel Battle" of 2 February 2011. However, the revolutionaries successfully confronted the attack and "overthrew the leadership of the regime". The absence of the police during and subsequent to the Tahrir uprising captured world attention. The army took a balanced stand by refusing to interfere, mainly because of its rejection of power inheritance. Thereafter, the power of the state was at stake and the regime became perfectly ripe for being toppled. The situation remained confused for a year, with questions being raised whether the military represented by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) would assume power through traditional military *coup d'état,* or otherwise. At any rate, Egypt appeared poised for a new form of despotism and not for a democratic change.

In Tunisia and Libya also, situations were similar to that in Egypt, though different in degrees. The security forces in Tunisia were stronger than the

army, while in Libya, the army itself constituted the security force. They did not withdraw as in Egypt and Tunisia but fought alongside the regime, particularly in Libya. Had it not been for the millions who demonstrated during the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, the uprisings would have been violently suppressed, as was the case in some other Arab or African countries where revolutionary movements were violently suppressed.

Revolutionary movements suffered setbacks for years both in Egypt and Tunisia because of violent suppressions by the state security This resulted in isolating the society from the state, and even from the regime itself, which caused the state to be separate altogether engaged in rivalry over power against Islamists, while the policy of economic exclusion led to gradual marginalization of the majority of the population. Under the circumstances, the demand of the population was economic at first, but eventually became politically crystallized.

At this point, a question may be asked whether the uprisings were spontaneous with millions taking part, or whether they was emotional reactions to the murder of 'Khalid Sa'id' by the Egyptian police or to the self-immolation of 'Bozeedi' in Tunisia, after he was humiliated by a Tunisian female police officer. In my opinion, the Egyptian uprising is a good example of the culmination of social movements and popular protests that have gone on for several years before the uprising itself.

II. Social Movements and Protests

The years preceding the Egyptian uprising were full of events with actions at all levels, which became instrumental for raising public awareness still further and inflamed the protest. There were disclosures of the former ruler's failed economic policies and his submission to US pressure, which isolated Egypt from its Arab and African friends. This isolation coincided with the publicly rejected transfer of power to his son. The regime's total disregard of the causes of Iraq, Palestine, Sudan and Somalia, for example, laid its foreign policy bare. In addition the state's abandonment of its economic and social roles, the intensification of suppression by the security measures laid bare the true face of the regime. The revelations enhanced the political awareness of the social

associations (Al-Azhar and the Church) showed their conservative stand by saying that religion forbids to demonstrate or disobey the ruler; some even prayed that God come to his aid in managing affairs of the state! Revolutionaries, in turn, speedily declared their stand against dialogue or accepting the new Prime Minister. They burnt the head office of the NDP, near Tahrir Square, and raised the slogan: 'the army and people are one' expressing their appreciation to the armed forces for their refusal to use violence against the Tahrir masses.

Undoubtedly, the Tunisian experience had meanwhile been learned by the youth as an example of popular power that could topple the head of the regime – Bin Ali – by fighting security forces employing tear gas and bombs. The Tunisian movement confirmed the revolution could be weakened by the violence of the unemployed youth against the bourgeoisie surrounding the president's family. However, other factors strengthened the Tunisian movement, i.e. intervention by the General Trade Union and the civil society's human-rights bodies. While these two powers were vital for the democratic process in Tunisia, they were absent in the Egyptian case. Also, the Islamic Renaissance Movement in Tunisia was not an opportunist political power as is the case in Egypt. The progress of the two revolutions after a year raises a controversial question of concern for national unity – in its general sense - because of social diversity (due to different factional, ethnic, or geographic circumstances). Counter-revolutionaries immediately used such concerns to their advantage, propagating disorder, endangering national unity. They employed issues of culture, identity, religion and geography as posing obstacles to the revolutions and its aims. In Egypt, for example, the conflict between Islamism and secularism, in Tunisia, that of Arabism and Franco-phonism, and in Libya Salafism are being emphasized.

IV. The Difficulty of Dissolving Old Regimes

Naturally, revolution is a creative act, but it is always determined by its ability or inability to topple the preceding regime. It seems there is an old heritage that might hinder creativity. In Egypt, we have boasted about the role of popular uprisings since the 19th century and until the middle of the 20th century. We have inherited the despotism of the Mohamed Ali dynasty, the totalitarianism of Abdul-Nasser's era, and most catastrophic of all, the eras

- Meanwhile, the forms of popular solidarity with external events spread on a large scale. It manifested itself in demonstrations that advocated uprisings of the Palestinian people, or especially condemned occupation of Iraq. Such demonstrations were linked to popular action that involved raising donations for Palestinian victims or attacking western, Israeli and US embassies especially in Cairo. That phenomenon continued in different forms after the January Revolution, and this confirms that true social demands in sectoral demonstrations were not totally separated from their 'political signification' in the recent years.

It is a sad fact that such movements always reflect the degree of isolation of traditional political parties from popular movements. Political parties remained confined to a few parliamentary seats allowed them by the regime. The Muslim Brothers - who won popularity by their community projects among "politically-absent populations", and who did not support strikes ended up "competing" with the ruling party instead of being opposed to it. Nevertheless, mention should be made of those parties who protested against their leaderships, and independent of the parties themselves. In this regard, I recall 'the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya, i.e enough)', 'the National Association for Change', 'the National Coalition for Change', 'the Egyptian Movements against Power Inheritance' (2007), 'the Movement for supporting Al-Barad'i' (2009) and 'the March-9th Movement for the Independence of Universities'. While the middle class complained about its deteriorating conditions, women seemed more capable of combining political and social actions. There also was an obvious tendency by workers and unionists towards independent organizations, thereby isolating those in the "the state sector" that emerged some decades ago.

Demonstrations continued, and even accelerated, involving different segments of the population who completely ignored the regime's repressive measures. This contributed much to the success of the revolution, which spread over a larger geographic space, extending from Cairo to Alexandria, from Suez to Damietta and even to Arish in Sinai. Causes ranged from jobs for the unemployed to pensions, demand for rights and better working conditions for physicians, removal of legal restrictions on syndicates of

lawyers, engineers, journalists, etc. Civil society and human-rights organizations excluded themselves from the movement by claiming (legitimately) that they are professional, rather than political, bodies. The movements gave rise to human rights organizations which, while enjoying the same legitimacy as NGOs, began to raise cases of torture.

III. The Uprisings and the Toppling of the Authoritarian Regimes

Questions regarding who played the main roles in the North African uprisings are becoming controversial in many intellectual and political circles in these countries. The notion that the youth played a unique role is central to this controversy. Even though the role the youth played in the movements using social contact means such as Facebook and email is well recognized, and points to the youthful characteristic of the uprising, the role of the youth may be exaggerated, due to some negative manifestations such as the lack of coherence or fanaticism that came to the surface a year later. It is reported that some loyalists of the ousted regime exploited the situation to their advantage. Moreover, the youth pretended to guide the uprisings by claiming that they represented the silent majority. However, no one can deny the "youthfulness of the revolution" and the fact that they had contributed to the uprising. The youth rushed in torrents demanding their rights. It is essential to point out here that the youthful nature of the uprisings at the beginning helped in articulating and channeling the demands of the revolution for ousting the regimes with the slogans: 'bread, dignity and social justice'. The overthrow of the Tunisian president on Jan 14th served as a precedent for galvanizing the revolution in Egypt, so that it will not be true to say that the youth alone played the major role.

Despite the fact that security systems suspended all means of communication, starting the evening of January 28th, the third day of the uprising, known as "the Friday of Anger", witnessed the largest number of protesters. The "Friday of Anger" could have seen the end of the revolution, according to the expectations of the loyalists of the ousted regime who were plotting the "Battle of the Camel" at the Tahrir Square. The state organs made use of prisoners, thugs and the security militia in order to terrorize those demonstrating at Tahrir Square. Participation in the movement by a broad segment of the population turned the situation upside down, even

against the expectations of the youth themselves. The new participants were mainly made up of the Muslim Brotherhood youth who explicitly declared their disobedience to the political leadership. There were also the youth of other parties that were rather cautious about participating in the demonstration until that moment.

The movement was further enriched by Copts who took their turn to disobey their leadership, the church. Participation by the working class may be said to have been relatively weak in the early days of the uprising. Here, it is important to note the significant role played by the official General Federation of Trade Union and official syndicates. In addition, the "independent trade union" movement gained in importance. There were no religious or factional slogans; there were only slogans of "peace, liberty and democracy". Cities outside the capital contributed considerably to the uprising until their demand started to take shape. Alexandria – the second most important city in Egypt– was dominated by Salafis and Sufis. Suez, which has always been the city of nationalist militants, became known for its religious style. Port Said and Ismailia are relatively different from their neighbor, Suez and Mahalla, which in the center of the Delta, were known for workers' struggles even before the uprising. Damietta also witnessed a memorable struggle against multinational companies with the purpose of cleaning the city's environment on the coast of the Mediterranean from wastes of chemical industries. The people of Mansoura have historically been characterized by their political awareness among the agrarian and middle classes. As for the few cities south of Egypt, they were known for religious conflicts, which were predominant there; they moreover provided an example of utter poverty (that was common in villages of the South).

The youth were happy with the national unity that they managed to create; they insisted, alongside those who allied with them among politicians and intellectuals, on ousting the regime. They unveiled the deception of what was known during the early days of the uprising as "negotiable solutions" of the regime. The inconsistency of the political community included switching from dialogue with Mubarak before and during the revolution to dialogue with the military after the revolution Dialogue included old traditional parties, both leftist and rightists. Leaders of the Islamist Movement made an early attempt at winning the dialogue in their favor. Also, religious

At other times, they tolerate the conservativeness of the Salafis and support Islamist associations (who have won 25% of parliamentary seats) to win popularity. Meanwhile, they and the Salafis – despite their differences – are predominant regarding direct religious control over the population with the slogan "Islamic legal code", endangering "disbelieving" secularists and Copts. The slogan was used to win the battle of constitutional amendments in March, 2011, and to tailor electoral lists in favor of both parties in November, 2011.

V.   Reconstructing the Legitimacy of the Revolution

 It is so unfortunate that all those millions across Tahrir Square and throughout Egypt could not immediately declare a new leadership for the country on the night of February 11th, 2011, the day Hosni Mubarak stepped down. They only rejoiced at the transfer of power to the army that refused to use violence against them. Of course, the positive reputation the military earned played a role in building trust between it and the masses during the beginning of the transitional period. The shameful role played by political parties of the time and their negative image was further affirmed by their hasty dialogue with Mubarak's men . This further enhanced the army's power that was confined to just opposing Mubarak's policy of inheritance of power. Also, the organized power of Islamists increased, especially when they drew closer to the army and reassured it that it could control the public. It seems that those movements which could claim authority over the population were the associations calling for change – the'"Kifaya" Movement, the movement for supporting El-Barad'i, or radical leftist organizations which relatively confined themselves to the formation of old-style liberal democratic coalitions. Consequently, the dissolution of the former regime for implementing the revolution's demands could not be carried out. No statement was ever issued to declare the typical post-revolution demand of dissolving the corrupt organs or suspension of the old constitution, or the transfer of power to a presidential authority representing the revolution. What happened was that all seemed to approve the transfer of power to the SCAF, which began to amend some articles of the Sadat constitution of 1971. In March, 2011, a conservative professional legal committee was formed for this purpose with Islamist participation. Then, very limited amendments, restricting all the procedures of the transitional

of Sadat and Mubarak. In Tunisia, similarly, national liberation movements ended up with the "'constitutional" model of Borquibah that led to Bin Ali's despotism. In Libya, the heritage of the Sanusi Mahdism and its model of royal religious authoritarianism yielded the dictatorship of Kaddafi with his Green Book. The situation in Morocco or Sudan is not much different. According to all the cultural legacy in Northern Africa, we can imagine the "burden "of the historic "state systems", unlike many other peoples across the continent that are hindered neither by the illusion of modernity nor superficial modernization. In the Egyptian case, we can see the impact of the "wisdom of the elderly", manipulation by the strong bureaucracy and those in high places, or those advanced in age. Because of this phenomenon, there will be no room for the youth, let alone the revolution, to advance further.

Some ascribe sacredness to the military institution in Egypt, considering it as the symbol of the " nation", or that it is the" state" itself along with the police. This is what is being propagated since the revolution. There are modest attempts at limiting the authority of the Military Council in "the new constitution", or restructuring the police and putting its corrupt leadership on trial, or retiring them. Violence is associated with the youth or revolutionaries than with the cruel heritage of detention, or abuses by the police are being forgotten. It is that heritage that caused instances of police violence, such as the murder of Khalid Sa'id in Egypt, Muhsin Buzaidi in Tunisia, and the murder of prisoners in Libya.

The desire to create balance or adapt to the accumulated heritage of despotism in education, the media and values is what causes contradictions to persist. This might even be the reason behind the "religious inclination" that appeared as a new form of resistance to the heritage of despotism as inherited (Salafis here are more rigid than Muslim Brothers). We cannot leave this point without mentioning the impact of the bureaucracy in Egypt, which is supports authoritarianism along with its historic structure. It is made up of over five million cadres headed by ex-military or police generals as governors and directors in the civil services and municipalities. This established and institutionalized clientalism is another strong hand of the old regime in Egypt. It is known to have a "Special Fund" estimated at 25 billion USD. The bureaucracy is adamantly against any increase in the wages of

workers which is among the demands for social justice by revolutionaries and the masses.

Writers refer to revolutions in North Africa as models of change but not models of a revolution –like the one in Turkey-especially with respect to the military; others compare them with South Africa with regard to the reconciliation with former regime and its wealth! After a year of uprising, Egypt is still experiencing military or semi-military coup in a peaceful way, balancing the authoritarian legacy with formal democratic procedures.

- The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) committed itself to the legitimacy of the old constitution (1971) the moment Mubarak transferred presidential authority to it. Therefore, it had the legal right to make "constitutional amendments" within the limitations of the current system besides the right to form government and set a deadline for transferring power extending from six months to a year and a half.

- Because of the situation mentioned above, SCAF has been able to tempt old parties to accept their modest share in coordination with the Consultative Council and bureaucratic cabinets. In this way, the role of the youth was totally ignored in the formation of the Consultative Council. The SCAF has been so reluctant to "politicize" any action against the former regime, in the name of commitment to "legality" or "legitimacy". The implied purpose behind this is halting the progress of the youth and the demand for real change or social justice (this reluctance is manifested by the trial of Mubarak and loyalists of his regime in accordance with criminal law instead of being politically tried, leaving their wealth intact).

- The mechanism of "conducting deals" with Islamists is an excellent one on the part of both parties. This mechanism has been used as early as forming the committee for amending the temporary constitution, i.e. in March, 2011. However, a problem occurred between the two parties when Islamists started to move speedily towards the parliament and government. Now, there is a desire for

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achieving balance between reconciliation with the opposition from political and youthful elements with Islamists, promising to protect their interests in the future constitution. One should not forget the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood were always" rivals" of Sadat and Mubarak and not in conflict against them, as was the case with some old "terrorist Islamist groups" who finally accepted to share with Muslim Brothers their legitimacy.

- The deals mentioned above are manifested in the "consensual" attempts made in favor of traditional positions; such attempts have been made with respect to the nomination of the coming president, and to find comprises for enabling a military candidate to enter the competition. Such attempts are also made to restrict the role of the civil society (especially human-rights) to serve the interests of "traditional" political organs including NGOs or charity organizations, according to Islamist concepts. The civil society issue was no more than a scapegoat in the maneuver the SCAF launched with the US concerning its aid and its interests in the Middle East.

The Tunisian experiment seemed more balanced in preparing itself for the anticipated conflict. The Tunisian Revolution had already succeeded in making a relatively obvious roadmap, at least with regard to governance institutions. Despotism in Tunisia goes according to old traditions like the movement of Salafi parties to confine the "Islamic Renaissance Movement" itself. However, what is definitely worse is the Libyan scenario, as Europe targets the country's petroleum and feeds the ongoing conflict there.

The aforementioned parties did not send any messages promising "'radical change" in countries like Egypt and Tunisia. If it does not assert the continuity of despotism in the aforesaid absolute sense, it does not then lead to revolting against it in a way that can build the future. The present alliance between the military and Islamists is no chance for claiming a new sort of "legitimacy". After Islamists' victory in the parliamentary elections, moreover, this legitimacy has now been claimed, thus opposing the legitimacy of the revolution. The problem here is that Islamists try to create balance with other parties; they sometimes let their youth to speak for them.

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completely submissive to the prescriptions of the International Monterey Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization. This is shown by Egypt's experience in trade and industrialization, in standards of living, education, and health care, as recorded in regional and international reports are all testimony to this. Slogans during the uprising included national dignity, freedom, democracy and social justice are testimony to this. The slogan of "dignity" was particularly linked to Egypt's foreign practices and its isolation from the vital causes of the Nile Basin States, Palestine, etc. The youth even took such measures as forming delegations which visited East African states, invited Palestinian leaders to Tahrir Square and directly attacked the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. They also accused the ex-president, Mubarak, of downgrading Egypt's dignity and for its subordination to world powers. He imposed a disgraceful silence on Egypt concerning all regional and international causes and was content with the political hypocrisy of American and European media, who turned against him after the uprising. It is surprising that this situation repeats itself in many countries across Africa, both east and west.

Probably, the Tunisian Revolution sought stability faster in the framework of modernity and Francophonism despite attempts by Islamist organizations to reverse that situation. The Libyan Revolution, however, fell early into the trap of the NATO forces in spite of or in coincidence with Salafi influence! Of course, Egypt's situation is different due to its location and the conflicts mentioned earlier. Its relationship with Israel has gone for more than three decades in the shadow of an obviously illusionary peace, and Palestine suffered under the control of Islamists who have a complex relationship with the Arab world. The Egyptian public's opinion before and after the revolution was opposed to reconciliation with Israel without just peace. The post-revolution governments did not set a new basis for this relationship, considering that accusations cast against the ousted president are mainly in this connection.

This situation will be a major worry in regard to foreign relations, at least for some time, with Islamists and the military at the center of power. The conflict for power only leads to weakness on issues of the Nile Basin States as well as in the Sudan and the Gulf, especially because of the stand towards the former president and his family. Qatar itself tries to cease the

period, were made by SCAF. The referendum for the amendment got the support of Islamists to the tune of 70%. In my own opinion, this was an insult to, and the beginning of the reversal of the power of the revolutionaries in the name of "legitimate governance".

The repeated uprisings launched since January, 2011, in the form of demonstrations on Fridays whenever any crisis occurred with the ruling power conveyed powerful political and popular messages targeting the SCAF and its allies regarding the demands of the revolution. No measures had been taken concerning social services or the budget. The situation was such that there was fighting around Tahrir Square and the headquarters of the Prime Minister, the Parliament, etc. putting TAHRIR face to face with PARLIAMENT.

Tunisians were decisive when they included them in their roadmap as advocated by organized political parties as well as laborers and human-rights activists that established themselves in the early moments of the revolution. These parties promised stability in favor of the uprising. In Egypt, this was difficult. This might be behind the current 'social apprehension regarding political stability.

There is, however, strong awareness on the part the revolutionary movement to guarantee its continuity. Now, the question is about procedures taken so far in Egypt to activate the uprising, partially or gradually. We will review here in brief the other multiple steps which are baffling:

The formation of youthful revolutionary coalitions goes by several names, all echoing the revolutionary spirit; some of them emerged from old youthful organizations like the 'Sixth of April' (2008), while some are coalitions comprised of the old political parties' youth wings that preceded or followed the revolution. Some such coalitions have been established in regions outside Cairo. These coalitions of the youth reached over a hundred and fifty by the first anniversary of the revolution in 2012,; some of them formed larger coalitions that took the form of a political party to have the chance for the parliament.

These coalitions adhered to the demand of forming parties; the pressure they imposed with regard to this resulted in the formation of more than 30 new political parties. This enabled formerly banned parties (like the Muslim Brotherhood, Nasserites, Marxists) to win legitimacy. The new parties were multiplied by the inclusion of others like veterans of the former regime!, or renegades of already established parties. Aware of their own inadequacy, some of these parties entered into alliance with one another aimed at the general elections of Nov. / Dec. 2011 in the form of coalitions. There are now about 17 political parties in the current parliament (with the majority being Muslim Brothers (70%).

The revolution succeeded in dissolving the former parliament, local councils, and the NDP which was followed by the expansion of new political parties. Alliance between these new entities led to the emergence of a new power. Besides, the National Federation of Trade Unions that was subordinate to the state was reformed, with the official approval of independent trade unions being under study. We even saw other "national" organizations switching to quasi-sectoral parties such as students unions, professors, etc.

With this new democratic spirit, major professional syndicates (of physicians, engineers, pharmacists, etc.) began to be liberated after facing restrictions by the former regime. The principle of election in university leaderships at all levels was also endorsed, and leaders of journalist and media institutions that served as instruments of the ousted regime were also replaced. This took place by imposing direct pressure, which enabled the revolutionary bloc to carry on with the process of change.

What is surprising about this "democratic" phenomenon is that it coincides with the conservative Islamist parties' general elections, who brought rigid Islamists like Salafis who formerly rejected political participation to parliament, in rivalry even against the Muslim Brotherhood. This rivalry that was also against Sufis gave hope to liberals and leftist parties to gain some power due to inter-Islamist conflict. The military institution benefited likewise from the conflict between Islamists, Liberals and Leftists. It also manifested itself in the bargains they made over the formation of the national committee that will issue the final constitution after the upcoming presidential election (April-May, 2012). All this provides the military

institution plenty of opportunity to appear as the only power that creates balance between disputes, or as a power able to continue close to authority, if not already at the center of power. The military is a strong economic institution, as it is said to control from 10-20‰of the national economy.

Whereas the power of the military moves side by side - or in rivalry with Islamist powers - the other democratic parties are trying to establish a new formula on a modern and civil democratic basis. Because they have not yet crystallized their power, they sometimes seem as if they are in league with enlightened Islamists, among other things. Researchers have traced about ten documents prepared by civil and democratic associations, some affiliated to parties or standing independently. All those documents express considerable concern of Islamists' influence, whose documents reveal the possibility of excluding Copts, women, human rights activists, or even the youth. Thus, it is important to underline the efforts made by opposing democratic parties especially since 2004.

VI.   Interaction with the Outside World

Egypt's strategic location has numerous implications, some of which support the progress of the country, while some others might be considered as a burden if Egypt fails to manage conflicts or crises. Therefore, it has become important for Egyptian administration to be always fully aware of how to "play its part" both at regional and international levels. This was the situation in Egypt during the cold war and now at a time of a globalized war against terrorism. In this respect, the role played by Egypt in the Non-Aligned Movement and how it used the Soviet-American conflict in favor of its development may be remembered. Egypt's role in dealing with the Arab-Zionist conflict was no less significant, starting from the wars up to the Camp-David Peace Treaty. Egypt was providing strong support and advocacy for African liberation movements during the Nasserite era, but it became silent during the Sadat era. Egypt played a role with NATO during the first Gulf War in 1990, yet did not react to the invasion of Iraq. This was also the case regarding the Horn of Africa. In all those cases, Egypt incurred losses during its period of isolation imposed on it by Mubarak's policy, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. It was not a mere coincidence that its economy was facing setbacks, being

belief that they can now be reconciled with the Islamists in the context of economic globalization. Consequently, I do not think the attitude of the African media will be the same towards the Islamist movement. It should also be mentioned here that persistent violence as in Somalia or Nigeria, the tense relationship between the Western Sahara states, and Sudan serve only those regimes seeking justifications to continue with their authoritarian style, and also halts progress towards African reconciliation, which is contrary to the aims of the North African revolutions.

There are some important questions regarding parties having to do with intellectuals after developments in North Africa. Will African regimes give more space to civil society organizations to direct their efforts jointly at problems such as poverty, environmental issues, water resources, etc.? Will it be possible to promote regional associations in countries such as South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Egypt aimed at enhancing the roles of the African Union and Arab League independently from the influence of global powers? This requires that Africa should revise its attitude towards terrorism, the US-AFRICOM, as well as other issues in the best interest of restoring control over its wealth.

Can balanced dealings with the new rival powers – China, India, Malaysia, and Turkey – create the basis for building new nationalist parties in Africa the way they were built during the Cold War and during the first wave of liberation? Can this be possible regardless of the belief of some of us that we face no new colonial powers, but rather globalization?

opportunity, given the disorderly situation in Egypt, to establish itself as a rival in the region.

Islamist parties in Egypt are experiencing another form of Islamist "globalization" and trying to maintain a religious flavor. Clash with American activists working in advocacy was propagated as intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt. The case was highly exaggerated with attempts at casting accusations on youth organizations (like the Sixth of April Movement) and human-rights bodies with the aim to exclude them from the social and political scene. It all was for local consumption and contrasts with strong relationships the same regime has with the American military, diplomatic and commercial interests. When this issue extends to religious organizations involving external parties concerned with the provision of aid like the Gulf States, however, there are contradictions in the policies pursued by the regime towards the outside world.

The deteriorating situations in Libya and Syria are especially a cause for concern for the current regime in Egypt. The philosophy creating regional powers now in Africa and at the global level does not justify a regime led by a military council presenting itself as a nationalist regime, particularly following a popular revolution. These implications might well direct the attention of researchers to the situation in North Africa within the framework of the African policy at large.

The unification of Islamist policies and the predominance of Islamists in the region, and the extent to which this is linked to the idea of an Islamist Middle East, especially in the presence of Turkey and Iran, is the other problem. An important question here is the degree to which an Islamist Middle East conflicts with American schemes concerning the" Great Middle East" they envisage, according to Condoleezza Rice.

Complications regarding the political dimensions of the Egyptian case–unlike the Tunisian or Libyan cases–is subject to numerous analyses. Since there is no room here for reviewing them all, only two significant factors will be highlighted:

- One of them is the nature of the socio-economic policy resulting from the Egyptian revolution, and how far this can push the wheel of independent development and self-sufficiency. However, there is no sign of this in the declarations of the SCAF, or even the agenda of the Muslim Brothers-the party with parliamentary majority and power. This important factor is not even hinted at in the political documents issued by all organized parties after the revolution, with the exception of socialists who have the smallest share of authority and power. We must not forget that the absence of such a socio-economic policy resulted in "popular national conferences".

- The second factor is the nature of the surrounding regional powers. Egypt is at the center of the Arab world, and also at the center of the Nile Basin. At the Arab level, achieving unity and mutual cooperation is out of the question; economic cooperation is the only issue being raised. After the revolution, there have been Arab promises of aid amounting to 15 billion USD, but the promises have not been fulfilled, according to the Prime Minister who confirmed it early in January, 2012. Arab governments' promises of aid were conditional on the consent of the World Bank and the IMF, and does not depend on the mood of the rulers who do not hide their concern about the destiny of their friend, Hosni Mubarak. Meanwhile, the attitude of the Nile Basin States and the Nile water problem with Egypt can only be considered within the framework of the same international and regional Arab setting. It requires East-African policies in the context of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and states of the Great Lakes. While Egypt lacks the ability, Libya lacks the freedom, and Tunisia lacks African vision, which paralyzes dialogue between these regimes concerning real strategic issues.

- Does this mean that only the second wave of liberation by reviving peoples' participation is the only way forward? If so, how can it come about?

Conclusion

Despite all the difficulties Egypt has faced since the popular revolution, in which more than 15 million people in ten major Egyptian cities participated, there should be no doubting about its real benefits. It is a revolution which is full of hope, but also full of contradictions which are expected to persist for some time to come. The existing socio-economic condition is supported by organized economic parties, the military institution, the private sector as well as commercial capitalism led by Islamist parties, all of which are poised to reverse the gains of the revolution.

The slow and hesitant steps being taken in Egypt for over a year now, as well as measures being taken during the transitional period in Tunisia, are testing grounds regarding the sincerity of the new regimes and their capabilities to bring about social justice, which was among the demands of the uprisings.

The youth in Egypt still look forward to the constructive role they can play in the African continent similar to the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. However, I feel they are somewhat worried that there might be some hesitation on the part of the youth of other African countries, because of NATO's involvement in Libya or the murder of Gaddafi. These are important issues when considering national, regional and international policies relating to the African Union or the Arab League.

The politics of Islamist parties both in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as developments taking place in Morocco and Algeria, form the basis for viewing Islamists differently in contrast to their old image of equating them with terrorism, according to American in particular and Western perceptions in general. Whether one looks at them as conservatives, or whether their intention is to accede to power, Islamist parties are expected to either engage themselves in dialogue or make use of their veto power as a majority party. This is why the United States wanted to immediately enter into dialogue with them in Egypt, just as France did in Tunisia, while NATO is trying to subdue them in Libya. I believe the West, at large, has taken speedy measures at revising its "beliefs" about the Arab region wherever Islamists are present. The West is revising its attitude towards the Middle East in the

sustainable socio-economic development, as with state legitimacy, crucially depends on re-structuring the state-society relationship. The nation-state should both be a "rights holder", i.e. upholding and defending the right of the nation to develop; and a "duty bearer", i.e. safeguarding the "national interest" on the international arena. The paper concludes by arguing that state legitimacy in Africa can only be achieved by liberating the state from the grip of particular interests, such that it becomes accountable to its citizens; in other words, "making it owned by society" so as to make it function in the best interests and the needs and aspirations of its citizens.

Introduction

What follows is neither a theoretical treatise nor a résumé of research findings. It is an attempt to highlight the importance of political legitimacy as a basis for a stable reproduction of political stability[2], and for sustainable socio-economic development. I hope the paper will be of interest to civil society activists and those engaged in research pertaining to political and socio-economic transformation.

It is rightly recognised that the major endogenous factor accounting for poor socio-economic performance and political instability in Africa since independence is the poor performance of the state. While criticisms regarding the dismal performance of the state in Africa abound[3], those casting the role of the state in a positive light are rare. By positive, I do not mean being apologetic or accepting the status quo. I mean to say that the state should be considered as an institution which evolves and redefines its "being" and its roles in a protracted historical process. The "modern state" in the North, which is prescribed as a "role model" for states in Africa, is itself an outcome of a predatory state. In that sense, the whole process of

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[2] Reproduction of stability is different from, and more fundamental than "regime stability". The unexpected downfall of "durable authoritarianism", even after three decades of relatively stable rule is a case in point.
[3] "The state – once the cornerstone of development – is now the 'rentier state', the 'over-extended state', the 'parasitical state', the 'predatory state', the 'lame leviathan', the 'patrimonial state', the 'crony state', the 'kleptocratic state', the 'inverted state,' etc." (Th. Mkandawire: *Thinking About Developmental States in Africa*, 2001

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Challenges to the Assumption that Economic Success could Enhance State Legitimacy[1]

Dereje Alemayahu, PHD

"... My Lord, you can do anything you like with bayonets, except sit on them... ". (Talleyrand, Bonaparte's Foreign Minister).

"North Africa is about allowing inequalities to grow, allowing joblessness to grow. It is about a state that hasn't actually performed, about a minority that accumulates things for itself. If you want to follow that path for the next 20 years, we'll end up like North Africa."(Pravin Gordhan, Finance Minister of South Africa in his Budget Speech, 2011).

Abstract

Social upheavals are outbursts of latent political and socio-economic crises. Both the reasons for a societal crisis and solutions to them should be looked at from the perspective of state-society relationship. A perennially dysfunctional state-society relationship is bound to lead to the disgruntlement of citizens and the alienation of the state from its societal base. It thus entails a legitimacy crisis. This paper argues that even though economic growth is amongst factors determining the legitimacy of the state, it is by no means the major one. A political space that ensures participation by citizens, socio-economic policies which address inequality and injustice, as well as governance, transparency and accountability will be discussed as key factors determining state legitimacy. The paper further argues that

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[1] An outline of this paper was presented at a conference on "*Implications of North African Uprisings for Sub-Saharan Africa*" held in Nairobi on 2-3 April, 2012; it was organised by the Inter-Africa Group (IAG). I was pleased by the discussion it provoked at and around the conference. I would like to thank the IAG for the opportunity to present the paper at the conference, and the participants for their criticism and appreciation. This final version benefited from inputs I obtained during discussions at the conference.

discussed from the perspective of these "building blocks". The paper concludes by proposing that the solution is not continued state bashing, but the more onerous task of "state building" based on the continent's own human resources.[7]

I. The State, its "Essence" and Roles from a Legitimacy Perspective

1.1 What is the "Essence" of the "Modern State"?

The question of state legitimacy is intimately linked with the notion of what the state is and the role expected of it. Therefore, no legitimacy issue can be discussed without posing this question. State legitimacy can only be derived from legitimate expectations of citizens from the state. Legitimate expectations, in turn, are derived from an understanding of the roles and functions of the state. But these are, in turn, based on an understanding of what the state is, or what it is supposed to be. I will therefore begin with a brief discussion of the "essence of the state".

It is beyond the scope of this paper (and the ability of this author) to pose and answer the question "what is the state" from a phenomenological perspective. I raise the issue of the "essence and genesis of the modern state" with a modest ambition: to make the premises on which the arguments about the role of the state and the question of its legitimacy are based more explicit. I also want to highlight that, whatever "definition" is

civilisation may be summarised as: "the taming of the state". The process of "state building" is neither evolutionary nor without setbacks; nor is it an inevitably achievable goal within a prescribed time frame. African societies, like other societies, are going through this process with their own peculiarities, contradictions and setbacks[4].

The "diagnosis" that African states are not performing well has almost become platitudinous. During the first two decades after independence, efforts were made to "build modern states". Those efforts aimed at virtually transplanting "modern institutions" from the North with the help of indigenous technocrats and foreign advisors. It was as if citizens were considered either non-existent or irrelevant bystanders. This was followed by two decades of the "structural adjustment programme (SAP)", with its infamous "one-size-fits all" reform policies, to rectify "state failure". Evidently, the "governance reforms" have not brought about the required changes, nor did they succeed in addressing governance issues. If anything, they only worsened the problems.

Within the framework of the ubiquitous structural adjustment programme of the 1980s and 1990s, supposedly deep-rooted and far-reaching governance reforms were undertaken. Policy recommendations during this period were based on the dogma that states are doomed to fail if they assume leadership

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[7] A participant at the conference commented that I am too "etatist", when I presented an outline of this paper. Although he does not agree with it himself, Bob Jessop gives a succinct interpretation of the "etatist approach": "...there are distinctive political pressures and processes that a) shape the state's form and function, b) give it a real and important autonomy when faced with pressures and forces emerging from the wider society, and thereby, give it a unique and irreplaceable centrality in national life and the international order" (B. Jessop: State Power, 2008, p62-63). This gives a good summary of my position. However, this does not mean I consider the society side of the equation as any less important, or less "determinant". I deal only with the state side of the equation, because the scope of the paper does not allow treatment of the society part of the equation.

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[4] Discussions upon presentation of this paper at the conference compel me to insert a biographical note, which may be of interest. I belong to a generation that set out to "smash" the state which was perceived as an apparatus erected by the ruling classes to subjugate and exploit the toiling masses. I have not renounced the conviction that the state **was created** for this purpose and **still serves,** in most cases, dominating classes. As such, it is an instrument of domination and exploitation. My "conversion" from a militant revolutionary to a civil society activist came with a "revision" of my conviction about the state. My objective is no more to "kill" the beast but to "tame" it. This is because all attempts to "kill the beast" ended up invariably in conjuring up a worse monster. While the position that the state is an instrument of dominating classes is justified, the claim that the state **can only be** an instrument of dominating classes is tantamount to asserting that human beings will never be in a position to enjoy their rights as citizens, and thus would need the intervention either of a "revolutionary" god or a "goddess of the market" (who directs the 'invisible hand') for their salvation.

roles in socio-economic development where only market forces can succeed. It is "getting prices right", as it were, that does the trick. Only the "invisible hand" can be impartial and efficient. What Joseph Stiglitz calls "market fundamentalism" virtually wanted to get rid of the state as if it were a disposable gadget. The policy resulted in weakening states that were weak in the first place, and further de-legitimised states already lacking legitimacy. The policy made undemocratic regimes more authoritarian. "State failure", now being moaned throughout Africa, is the direct consequence of "state deformation" under SAP. Africa has yet to recover from the damage wrought by those "reform" policies.

It may be pertinent here to state explicitly why I use the concept "capable state" instead of the more conventional "developmental state". Aminya Kumar Bagchi gives a concise definition of the "developmental state", which captures its conventional use as well as the sense in which it is mainstreamed in current development discourse in Africa.

…a developmental state (DS) (…) in the era of the global spread of capitalism (…) is a state that puts economic development as the top priority of governmental policy and is able to design effective instruments to promote such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal and informal networks of collaboration among the citizens and officials and the utilization of new opportunities for trade and profitable production. Whether the state governs the market or exploits new opportunities thrown up by the market depends on particular historical conjunctures. One feature of a successful developmental state is its ability to switch gears from market-directed to state-directed growth, or vice-versa depending on geopolitical circumstances, as well as combine both market and state direction in a synergistic manner, when opportunity beckons[5].

Such a view of the role of the state provides valid arguments against protagonists of "market-led" or "private-sector-led" growth of the neo-

liberal school. However, it leaves out, or does not explicitly include, the "legitimacy preconditions" I present in this paper.[6]

The paper will proceed as follows: The first section deals with the general question: what is the state? The attempt is not to answer this as a phenomenological question, but rather to "demystify" the state and to point out that a pre-determined definition could be thought-stifling and politically disempowering. In the second section, the paper will highlight key responsibilities and roles of the state in the development process, after a brief discussion of the contentious positions on the role of the sate.

The third section attempts to answer the question whether economic progress can bring about state legitimacy. After a brief presentation of development theories, which state that economic growth is a priority goal and a precondition for political progress, other approaches which consider economic growth as, at best, a necessary but not a sufficient basis for social and economic development will be discussed. Reference will be made to some case studies which validate the latter approaches. It is argued that economic growth by itself cannot lead to the emergence of state legitimacy; on the contrary, it is a state which, from the outset, seeks to attain legitimacy by fulfilling its comprehensive role as guarantor of social wellbeing for all citizens that can lead society to achieve sustainable social and economic development. It is also here that state legitimacy is enhanced by policies and practices aimed at combating vertical and horizontal inequality, promoting inclusive growth, widening the policy and political space for voice and participation, ensuring transparent and accountable governance. The remaining sections deal with the "building blocks" of legitimacy, which serve as indicators of levels of equality and equity, voice and participation, accountability and transparency. The evolution of African states is briefly

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[5] Amiya Kumar Bagchi,: *The Past and the Future of the Developmental State*, in: Journal of World Systems Research, Volume XI, No 2, Special Issue: Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein, 2000

[6] This is not to deny, however, the similarity of my propositions to ideas developed, for example, by Omano Edigheji in: (*A Democratic Developmental State in Africa?* A Concept Paper, CENTRE FOR POLICY STUDIES, 2005, and Th. Mkandawire in: *Thinking About Developmental States in Africa*, 2001). The main difference is that I approach the issue from the perspective of legitimacy. A "developmental state" in the absence of democracy will not be any different from the development model criticised in this paper. But this is another topic for another paper.

citizens for state actions and policies became, at least as an underlying principle, the criterion for state legitimacy.

The "modern state" is an invention of Europe (especially France and England). It was emulated by rivals of France and England in the rest of Europe, and imposed on subjugated peoples all over the world. In most "late developers" as in Africa, which endured colonial rule, the "modern" state was not an outcome of an "organic" and endogenous process. It was a product of a process imposed by external and hostile forces. The purpose was not to serve, but to subjugate, the colonised population. Part of the "governance problems" in Africa is a result of this forced process. After independence, the question has been how to establish an "organic link" between "state building" and "nation building", and how to make this an endogenous process in a historically new internal context and a completely transformed international context.

The international context will impact on, but does not change, the dual process of "state building" and "nation building" in Africa. More than at any time in history, the "nation-state" has become the only form of political existence for peoples within a global context. However, this is not to suggest that "nation/state building" is an end in itself. It is to emphasise that it is a process which is absolutely necessary and inescapable through which national polity emerges, a polity which can "tame" "its" state and make it accountable to its citizens. In other words, people need to constitute themselves as citizens of nation-states in order to hold their rulers to account. There cannot be accountability without constituency. Nation-state and citizenship relation is, at least in the foreseeable future, the only "framework" for enforceable accountability.

State building in the current international context should be conceived of as a process linked with the process of socio-economic transformation to end poverty and attain equitable and sustainable development. It is building capable states able to spearhead social transformation, in the process of which they will also be transformed. This role and responsibility cannot be left at this point in history to "state builder" monarchs or autocrats *à la* Bismarck. Put differently, whereas the "modern state" was the outcome of "spontaneous" human action, at least in Europe, it is the product of

given to the "essence" of the state or its role, it should not be based on ahistorical interpretation of what the state is; and that the determination of its role should not be reduced to ticking a generic check-list. Its roles and functions in different constellations, contingencies and social contexts are, and have always been, different. Thus, there is no "model trajectory" for the evolution of its "essence" or its roles. Each society and each generation has the obligation to determine what the state itself is, and what its roles *ought to be*. This is based on the conviction that the approach will make it possible to "benchmark" its roles in a given social and historical context and how it should manage the welfare of societies.

Let me start by stating that there is no single notion of the state. Divergent answers were given to this question over the centuries, which are far from unanimous. I will cite two German philosophers of the 19th century. For Hegel, "the existence of the state is the presence of God upon the earth". For Stirner, "the purpose of the state is always the same: to limit the individual, to tame him, to subordinate him, to subjugate him".

Defining the state or providing a consensual definition of the state is elusive because, as all abstract expressions of societal relations, it has no empirical existence of its own history and social context. As David Runciman[8] remarks, the question "what is money for" is readily answerable compared to the question "what is money". The fact that money is in and of itself "valueless" can be "proved" by the simple fact that one cannot eat money. Money becomes "something" when it enters the realm of commodity exchange and when it fulfils its functions as store of value. The same can be said about the state; it is only in its relationship within a given social formation that it gains significance. The analogy with money can be taken further. As long as money fulfils its socio-economic functions well, people may not be bothered by the question "what is money". It is when it fails in its functions that the question is posed.

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[8] D. Ranchman: "The Concept of the State: the sovereignty of a fiction", in Q. Skinner and B. Strath, editors, State and Citizens. History, Theory, Prospects, 2003, p. 31

It should be clear from the preceding argument that the theoretical premise of this paper is that the state has no "intrinsic value" of its own; it is merely an institutional setup for the realisation of society's needs. That is why it has only duties and no rights in relation to citizens under its jurisdiction – the legitimate right holders. When the state t assumes a role that transcends its defined status, society will be in a problem.

The state can be conceptualised as a "site of compromise", where the interests of diverse segments of society are aggregated, and a compromise is facilitated through legitimised regulations, and implemented transparently through legitimised institutions.[9]

The state can also be conceptualised, in the words of Jessop, as a "site of paradox": On one hand, it is one institutional setup among others within a social formation; on the other hand, it is a unique setup charged with overall responsibility of maintaining the cohesion of the social formation of which it is a part[10]. This dual nature of being at once "within" and "above" society carries an inherent danger of the state establishing itself "above" society, i.e. "disclaiming" the "ownership" of society. When "it hangs" above society, it is inherently capable of being "captured" by particular interests. The core political issue linked with legitimacy is to prevent it from being "captured", or to reclaim ownership of the state by society if it is already "captured".

The concepts "dual nature" and the "danger" of the state being captured by particular interests indicate that state- society relation is not just a functional relationship that is "automatically" reproduced. It is a "site" where "contest of interests" takes place. To which side the state "tilts" depends on the relation of forces in society. The "autonomy" of the state in relation to particular interests in society is thus quintessential for it to be able to accommodate, aggregate and facilitate the interests of different groups[11]. Marginalised groups who cannot articulate their interests would be losers in this "contest of interests" if the state does not take on the role of being the agency to safeguard and promote their interests. How the state addresses inequality and marginalisation is thus one of the key indicators to determine its legitimacy.

1. 2. The "Genesis" of the Modern State

A brief look at the historical evolution of the modern state shows that it was anything but democratic. All states have been predatory, repressive and violent. Tally, an authority on state formation in Europe, reaches the conclusion that "preparation for war has been the great state-building activity"[12]. He states further: "Democracy", "rule of law", "social contracts" , etc. were not at the beginning of its evolution but the result of protracted taming process of a "coercive, exploitative and violent" state through popular resistance to … power holders to concede and constrain their own action".[13]

The process of state building in Europe took many centuries. A significant outcome of this dual process of "state-building and nation-building" was not only the gradual "taming of the predatory state". It was also, on the one hand, the emergence of nation-states, with citizens developing a sense of belonging to a given political community within a given territory; and on the other, the emergence of a political system under which "active consent" of

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[9] I concur with Jessup when he states that "there is never a general interest that embraces all possible particular interests" (B. Jessup: State Power, 2008, p. 11). Envisaging the state as a "site of compromise" helps to understand that the state is the "site" where "contest of interests" takes place and "enforceable compromises" are facilitated.
[10] B. Jessup, 2000, Bringing the State Back in (Yet Again): Reviews, Revisions, Rejections, and Redirections, Paper presented to IPSA Conference, Quebec, 2000, p.15

[11] There is a distinction between "embedded autonomy" under which the state is "owned" by society, and "isolated autonomy" under which it will fall prey to particular interests.
[12] Ch. Tally: War Making and State Making as Organised Crime, in: Bringing the State Back, edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich. Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, 1985
[13] Ibid. He warns not to read the future of developing countries from the past of European countries. The warning refers to the process, not to the outcome of the process.

between growth and equality, between authoritarian rule and democratic rule.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a comprehensive assessment of theories focusing on growth while neglecting poverty and inequality as well as other social and political issues. Only a few will be sketched here for the purpose of illustration.

Rostow's[17] "stages theory" has led to the tacit acceptance of the status quo at a certain stage of social development, i.e. to defer democratic rule and social justice to "a later stage of development". According to the "modernisation theory", of which Rostow was a pioneer, development was supposed to be an outcome of a high rate of investment and a rise in the productivity of capital. Since the productivity of capital was considered a technological variable, the policy was to attain an optimum saving/investment ratio. Under conditions of primitive accumulation, however, as in a country yet to come out of poverty, a high rate of saving could not be achieved. And since entrepreneurs were non-existent, only the state was assumed to initiate the process through "forced domestic saving". Given the concomitant assumption that "forced saving" could not be imposed democratically, only authoritarian regimes were considered more capable to raise domestic savings for investment to achieve higher and faster economic growth. Developing economies were therefore confronted with a "cruel dilemma" in choosing between democratic and authoritarian rule; they were tacitly expected to accept the inevitability of a trade-off between economic growth and democratic rule.[18]

Such "theoretical" justifications remained the basis for justifying this ambivalent attitude towards economic growth and democratic rule, which prevailed during the first three or so decades after World War II. There were those who even went to the extent of establishing a positive correlation between undemocratic regimes and development. Asserting that his

[17] W. Rostow: The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 1963

[18] J. N. Bhagwati: Democracy and Development: Cruel Dilemma or Symbiotic Relationship? *Review of Development Economics, 6(2), 2002151–162*

"conscious human design" for "late developers". It is an outcome of a process in which empowered citizens play an active part. This is so because, ultimately, only empowered citizens can ensure that the state is "tamed" to use its power accountably, responsively and responsibly.

Instead of looking at state building as an architectural undertaking to be "erected" by local ruling elite with the help of outsiders, it should be conceived as an endogenous process of socio-political transformation, a process in which empowered citizens build their own capable states. The concept "empowered citizens" refers to citizens who have taken "their destiny into their own hands", capable of claiming their rights and holding their state to account. Capable states are states that ensure inclusive development; inclusive democracy; the rule of law and human rights; the provision of essential services and human security – not as sequenced "policy priorities" elaborated by local elites and their foreign advisors, but as a "comprehensive development package" claimed and enforced by citizens.

1.3 The Role of the State in Development

After the decline and demise of theocracy and divine rule, the state needed a secular justification for its acceptance by society. Morris[14] sums up two categories: (1) a "consensualist" approach within the tradition started by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau which defines the justification for the acceptance of the state as a hypothetical social contract among citizens; and (2) the concept of "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" borrowed from Rawlings' characterisation of a society composed of heterogeneous interests. Both categories confirm the premise of this paper that the state cannot be given an *a priori* definition and pre-determined *raison d'être*.

Similar to the justification of the state's *raison d'être* after the demise of divine rule, its roles and functions had also to be re-defined. Not surprisingly, and analogous to the divergent answers to the question "what is the state", the functional role of the state is as controversial as the concept of the state

[14] Ch. Morris: An Essay on the Modern State, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 14-55

itself. . For the purpose of this paper, I will briefly mention the "functionalist" approach which dominates the "role of the state" discourse.

The "functionalist approach" reduces the role of the state to that of solving "collective action problems", i.e. ensuring the socio-political order, macro-level conditions for market forces, as well as the mitigation of "market failures". However, going through a checklist of "functions of the state" will not be helpful to analyse the complex issue of determining functions that are basic for its legitimacy. We need to ask what its roles **ought to** be in a given social context and at a given level of development. In other words, the instrumental and functional roles of the state should be considered from a normative perspective. Its instrumental role means that the state is a historically evolving political organisation of human collectivity in a defined territory to help society meet widely diverse and changing needs. As there is no "model trajectory" for the evolution of the role of the state, its functional role means "benchmarking" it normatively.

Much like placing the issue of "state building" within a given social and historical context, this approach will enable us to determine and influence state roles; to define certain basic functions; to demand accountability in the management of power; to monitor and check the influence of dominant classes; to "force" it to champion and ensure social justice and sustainable inclusive development; to ensure that it provides essential social services through adequate social policy formulation, and social protection measures; to ensure that it supports and regulates the private sector such that it creates conducive conditions for the economy to thrive; to protect if from being "captured" by vested interests to directly and indirectly "force" it to channel benefits of economic growth to dominant classes; and to make sure that it is a credible and effective agent of its citizens internationally.

As will be discussed below, poverty eradication should not be expected as a by-product, or left to the "trickle down" effect, of economic growth. Poverty cannot be treated as a malignant tumour that can be surgically removed out of society, but as a pervasive problem that can only be eradicated through political, social and economic transformation. In such a context, the role of the state cannot be limited to "correcting market failures". It is the role of the state to spearhead this transformation.

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Furthermore, the sate is not the sole depository of power in a society. What makes state power "special" is not only its unique obligation to use its "legitimate monopoly of power" responsibly. It has the obligation not to hinder, and the additional duty to use its power "to hinder hindrances" to equality. In other words, as much as the state is the main source of power imbalances in society, it is also the institution which has the obligation to see to it that imbalances of power among segments of the society are avoided.

Finally, the conceptualisation of poverty as proposed by Amartya Sen[15] and others as unfreedom and disempowerment has transformed the understanding of poverty and inequality and their causes. It has also extended the political and policy dimensions of poverty eradication, and combating inequality. It has made the "commissions" and "omissions" of the state in addressing unfreedom and disempowerment as key aspects of political legitimacy. Put differently, the legitimacy of the state should be tested against its role in combating unfreedom and disempowerment in all their manifestations.

1.4 Economic Growth and State Legitimacy[16]

That economic growth will ultimately enhance legitimacy was not only the hope and wish of many rulers, but also an assertion made by many economists and political scientists. There were various theoretical justifications for the "inevitability" of discrepancy, or assumed "trade off",

[15] In his now celebrated book "Development as Freedom" (1999) Amartia Sen describes his approach as "an attempt to see development as a process of expanding real freedom that people enjoy. He views expansion of freedom as 1) the *primary end* and 2) the *principal means* to development. They can be called, respectively, the "constitutive role" and the "instrumental role" of freedom in development" (P36; Italics in original).

[16] I hope this section will not be misunderstood as a polemic against growth as such. I can sign up to Paul Collier's statement: "Growth is not a cure-all, but the lack of growth is a kill-all" (P. Collier: The Bottom Billion, 2007, p. 190). The section is meant to highlight two interrelated issues; a) that growth should be considered a means to an end and not an end in itself; and b) prioritising and putting major focus on growth alone will not result in ending poverty and inequality, and that it cannot even be a basis for sustainable economic growth.

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exclusion, marginalisation and the exasperation of horizontal and vertical inequality.[25]

Because of the dismal failure of economic growth to address poverty and inequality, even those who propagated the "primacy of economic growth" have come to admit that "economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition" for development[26]. "Inclusive growth" is becoming the slogan of all major international and regional financial institutions (IFI) and governments. Nevertheless, there have been no fundamental changes in policies of international financial institutions or governments. So far, no visible departure from old policies has been made. In terms of policies in place, the practice is business as usual. "Market fundamentalism", i.e. the belief in unbridled market forces, continues to dominate mainstream economic thinking and economic policy. The fetishism of growth still underpins government actions and policy recommendations.

Reform in any sector needs pacing and sequencing. Prioritising economic growth to the detriment of other social development issues is not "sequencing"; it is ignoring the plight of the poor majority for the benefit of the wealthy and the powerful. Development can only be approached as a comprehensive political undertaking to bring about interlaced changes in economic, social and political spheres. As Milanovic states, "It is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high material standard of life"[27]. What is sad and unacceptable is the fact that it is often an avoidable, premeditated "mistake".

[25] See, for example: A.K. Fosu: Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries Recent Global Evidence, United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) Working Paper No. 2011/0, 2011
[26] "…growth by itself is not necessarily sufficient. It needs to be sustainable, sustained and inclusive. There is a risk that current commodity-based growth in many countries in Africa is
none of these" Andy Mckay, University of Sussex and Andy Summer, IDS: Economic Growth, Inequality and Poverty Reduction: Does Pro-Poor Growth Matter?, IDS in Focus, ISSUE 03
CONCERN FOR THE BOTTOM BILLION, MARCH, 2008
[27] Branko Milanovic: The Haves and the Have-nots: A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of Global Inequality 2011)

authoritarian rule enabled the country to sustain high rates of growth, Singapore's former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, stated: "I believe what a country needs to develop is discipline more than democracy. The exuberance of democracy leads to indiscipline and disorderly conduct which are inimical to development."[19]

The famous "Kuznets' curve" [20] also served as yet another "economic justification". Its main thesis is that, as a country develops, there is a natural cycle of economic inequality driven by economic growth itself, which at first increases inequality, and then decreases it after a certain level of economic growth, when an increased average income is attained". In terms of our discussion here, whatever its historical or empirical merit may be[21], these theories point to the "inevitability of increasing inequality" in a development process.

The "trickle-down theory" also argues that economic benefits provided by governments to businesses and the wealthy will, in the long run, have spill over effects on the poorer members of the society. This view is still widely held by neo-conservatives who argue in favour of reducing taxes on the rich; they oppose any sort of redistributive measures in favour of the poor. However, it is doubtful if, as the slogan of the protagonists of this theory intimates, what is good for General Motors is necessarily good for the US and the rest of the world. An even more preposterous notion in traditional economic theory claims that substantial inequality is a stimulus to growth, as it would have beneficial effects on saving, investment and incentives.

From a theoretical point of view, there are several factors accounting for variations in the economic performance of countries under different

[19] Quoted in: Bhagwati, 2002, p151
[20] D. Acemoglu, J.A. Robinson: The Political Economy of Kuznets Curve, in: Review of Development Economics 6(2), 2002, pp 183-202d.
[21] After an extensive study of literature on the subject, Wren-Levis and A. Cobham reach the conclusion that empirical findings to corroborate Kuznets' theory are not robust, and that there are "both 'good' and 'bad' ways to grow, rather than an inevitable path". (L. Wren-Lewis and A. Cobham: *Is 'more' enough? Reassessing the impact of growth on inequality and poverty*, Christian Aid Occasional Paper 5, April, 2011)

historical circumstances. This makes it impossible to causally link a set of variables as determining differences in development performance. For example, rule of law and property rights are stated as key variables for economic development. However, cases abound where positive economic achievements have been made in the absence of these variables. China is a case in point. Even corruption, the widely accepted corrosive obstacle to development, has not hindered the attainment of economic growth in some countries.[22]

Further, we know since Keynes that the transition from savings to investment is anything but automatic. What is more, the translation of public sector saving into productive investment is more uncertain. Cases of countries which experienced high but unsustainable growth show that "… a functional developmental state should not be considered as given when treating developmental problems. The "developmental state" can also be in the hands of 'hijackers' whose destination is not national development but the Swiss Bank"[23]

The experiences of many developing countries show that growth usually results in bringing disproportional benefits to the dominant classes. The "State of East Africa Report" which was recently published by the "Society for International Development (SID)" highlights that there is no link between economic growth and the reduction of poverty and inequality. According to this study, in the past decade, every economy in the East African Community grew at a faster pace than its population. Despite the attainment of net economic growth, however, the number of East Africans living below the poverty line actually increased from 44 million to 53 million during the same period.

SID programme director remarked upon launching the report that: "We should all be getting richer, but the reality is, we aren't. The reason for this is that inequality is both deepening and widening. Fewer people are enjoying the benefits of economic growth."[24]

The consequence of the concentration of growth benefits and income in the hands of the dominant classes is not limited to the economic sphere. It puts entrenched economic interests in a position to constitute a powerful political block which behaves like "a state within the state" and "captures" the state for its purposes. This cannot happen without undermining state autonomy as well as legitimacy *vis-a-vis* particular interests.

Growth which results in disproportional benefit to the dominant classes perpetuates and aggravates inequality. This has negative welfare implications as well as a corrosive institutional effect, since it inevitably leads to the lack of trust in and disenchantment with, the state by disadvantaged sections of society.

Theoreticians of the dependency school were amongst the first to point out the absence of linkage between economic growth and development. Studies they carried out on "development of underdevelopment" and "growth without development" were conceptualisations of experiences of unsustainable growth during the first two to three decades of development efforts in many countries of the South which focussed on the "growth first" approach in their development strategy. More recently, many empirical studies have proved that economic growth does not causally and necessarily reduce poverty.

Several empirical findings suggest that the prevalence of poverty is by itself a hindrance to economic growth, far from making economic growth a prerequisite for tackling poverty. In other words, economic growth cannot guarantee its own sustainability, let alone promote political legitimacy of governance. The outcome of "growth first, equality next" has been social

[22] See for example, Mushtaq H. Khan: Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s, DESA Working Paper No. 54, August, 2007
[23] D. Alemayehu: The Crisis of Capitalist Development in Africa: The Case of the Cote d'Ivoire, 1997, p 24

[24] http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/21372.html

often leads citizens in affected regions to shift their "primordial loyalty" to ethnic groups. The numerous ethnic conflicts instigated by rival elite groups and the unrelenting open civil wars are clear indications that no national cohesion has yet been attained in most African countries!

The history of all late starters in development shows that successful development has basically been a *politically* induced process propelled by *nationalism*. This presupposes national cohesion, characterised by the "primordial loyalty" of both the elite and citizenry to the nation-state. Lack of national cohesion should thus be addressed as a key problem of development, legitimacy and political stability. The success of sustainable development and political stability under conditions of horizontal inequality, and without national cohesion, is comparable to construction activities on an active earthquake site.

2.2. Voice – Participation

While on a visit in Tunisia, Jacques Chirac, the former French president, spoke of the Tunisian "economic miracle" and praised the regime's human rights record. He said "the most important human rights are the rights to be fed, to have health, to be educated and to be housed."[31] As a Tunisian human rights activist commented at the time, "this is a typical eat up and shut up" position which underlies the "performance legitimacy" approach."[32]

The major discourse on inequality has been about economic and income inequality. However, inequality in the economic sphere necessarily leads to inequality in the political sphere, i.e. inequality in each of the three major aspects of a political system: accountability of governance, adequate representation in vital political decision making processes; and voice and participation in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions that affect the lives of the majority of the population, especially the poor.

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[31]http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/68bef0c2-232a-11e0-b6a3-00144feab49a.html#axzz1qaXdTIMy
[32] Ibid

The uprising in Tunisia is a case in point; it confirms that not growth as such but its "inclusiveness" and its quality (in terms of a comprehensive socio-economic development) that matters. A recent report from the ILO sums it up all:

Tunisia has long been lauded as a star performer by the international community for its macroeconomic stability, economic competitiveness, and even the achievement of certain social goals. On the macroeconomic front, the country's fiscal position was stable – the public debt ratio fell significantly over the past decade and stands at around 43 per cent of GDP, on par with other emerging economies such as Argentina and Turkey. In terms of competitiveness, Tunisia had been given the highest ranking in Africa, and globally it was purported to be even more competitive than some European countries such as the Czech Republic and Spain. The 'doing business indicators' 2010 also reported Tunisia as among the top ten most improved economies in terms of changes to business regulation.… that economic growth was fundamentally inequitable. Opportunities to obtain good jobs, invest in dynamic sectors, and build a career have been unevenly distributed. Unemployment was high and rising, particularly among young people; regional development was unequal; and political clientelism, with the ruling Government having a commanding stake in key economic sectors, was widespread. Inequitable growth eventually led to an untenable social situation with spillover effects in other countries. Dubbed the 'Arab Spring', few had predicted such a rapid turn of events. The origins of the anger that developed into the Arab Spring must be sought elsewhere -- in the feelings of injustice that the existing distribution of income had generated, and the perception that inequality was higher than it really was[28].

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[28] International Labour Organization: Studies on Growth with Equity: Tunisia – A new social contract for fair and equitable growth, (International Institute for Labour Studies), 2011.

II.   "Benchmarks" of Legitimacy

2.1. Equality and Equity

The preceding section emphasised that poverty eradication and overcoming inequality can neither be expected to be by-products of economic growth nor be "postponed" until a certain stage of economic growth has been attained.

Poverty, more than inequality, has dominated the development policy discourse. In his book "The Haves and the Have-Nots", Branco Milanovic points out that securing funding for research on poverty is much easier than for research on income inequality.

"Yes, they would finance anything to do with poverty alleviation, but inequality was an altogether different matter. Why? Because 'my' concern with the poverty of some people actually projects me in a very nice, warm glow: I am ready to use my money to help them…But inequality is different. Every mention of it raises in fact the issue of the appropriateness or legitimacy of my income"

Growth can result in a disproportional share of the outcomes of growth both spatially and socially. A reduction in absolute poverty may be accompanied by growing inequality in absolute but particularly in relative terms. This is a very important aspect of "growth without development" because, in terms of state legitimacy and social cohesion, relative inequality matters more. [29]

Furthermore, "vertical inequality" is not the only aspect of inequality, although it dominates the inequality discourse. Horizontal inequality is more important in terms of political stability and national cohesion.[30] An unequal distribution of poverty in different regions of a country or among different segments of society is an indicator of what is termed "horizontal inequality". The prevalence of horizontal inequality signifies that different parts of a country or different segments of society are not benefiting equally and equitably from growth outcomes. A policy which causes, or is perceived to be the cause of an unequal distribution creates resentment and alienation. It will be a permanent source of tension in the political system and will, sooner or later, lead to political and social instability. A society is in many ways comparable to a large family. Indeed, a policy which discriminates between regions is like parents who feed only some of their children and let the others go hungry.

The prevalence of horizontal inequality is one of the reasons for the lack of national cohesion in Africa, if not the major one. Horizontal inequality

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[29] "A house may be large or small; as long as the neighbouring houses are likewise small, it satisfies all social requirements for a residence. But let there arise next to the little house a palace, and the little house shrinks to a hut. The little house now makes it clear that its inmate has no social position at all to maintain, or but a very insignificant one; and however high it may shoot up in the course of civilization, if the neighbouring palace rises in equal of even in greater measure, the occupant of the relatively little house will always find himself more uncomfortable, more dissatisfied,   more   cramped   within   his   four   walls."

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Wage_Labour_and_Capital.pdf

For those who may be "allergic" to Marx, Adam Smith, although misinterpretation of his "the invisible hand" metaphor makes him appear as the founding ideologue of "market fundamentalism", had the same perspective on relative inequality similar to Marx. "By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but what ever the customs of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even the lowest order to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote …disgraceful degree of poverty (one can fall into)… Customs, in the same manner, have rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them". (A. Smith: The Wealth of Nations, digital edition, 2007, book v, p 577)

[30] F. Stewart: *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development*, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE (University of Oxford), Working Paper No. 1

have the incentive to listen to what people want if they have to face their criticism and seek their support in elections…. The causal connection between democracy and the non-occurrence of famines is not hard to seek. Famines kill millions of people in different countries in the world, but they don't kill the rulers. The kings and the presidents, the bureaucrats and the bosses, the military leaders and the commanders never are famine victims. And if there are no elections, no opposition parties, no scope of uncensored public criticism, then, those in power don't have to suffer the political consequence of their failure to prevent famines. Democracy, on the other hand, would spread the penalty of famines to the ruling groups and political leaders as well.[36]

Several conclusions could be drawn from this long quotation. The lack of downward accountability in a country signifies that political freedom is either limited or non-existent; that the state leading such a country is not being forced to pay a political price for its commissions and omissions, and thus cannot be expected to serve the interests of the majority of its citizens and deliver inclusive and sustainable development; that any support the rulers of such a country claim to have from the population can only be a result of intimidation or manipulation; and finally, and more importantly for our topic, that citizens of that country have not yet succeeded in demanding and enforcing accountability by their rulers. (In reference to the last point, corruption is a major indicator of impunity. It is widely considered by many as the number one obstacle in the fight against poverty and injustice. It is the number one topic of discussion in most African countries. Yet, the ruling elite with its "collective strategy of private enrichment", appears to be unimpressed. Public outrage has not developed to put an end to this systemic evil, or at least, to ensure that it is not practiced with impunity).

Since accountability is a key issue of state performance and legitimacy, it is too fundamental to be taken out of the social context and addressed as an issue of bureaucratic and technocratic efficiency. It should not be conceived of as an outcome of "targeted interventions", but as a binding political and societal norm that governs the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Further, the state and its institutions can rule accountably only if state–

[36] Ibid

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Poverty is not only about hunger and the inability to meet material needs. Poverty is also about being powerless in relation to those with economic and political power; it is about being excluded from vital decision making processes. In short, it is about being disadvantaged in all spheres of social, economic and political life.

One important element of state-society nexus is whether a state seeks consent of its citizens for its actions and policies. Here, a distinction should be made between ritual participation and meaningful participation[33]. Passive acquiescence to state actions can be misleading. The litmus test of active participation is whether citizens' active and informed consent is required within a pluralistic setting, and a vibrant debate to legitimise state action.

A state which is content with passive acquiescence of its citizens can hardly tolerate dissent, and usually reverts to force when discontent manifest itself. Instead of seeking active consent, suppressing dissent and ritually ensuring passive acquiescence by intimidation or manipulation has become the *modus operandi* of most regimes which aspire to attain "political legitimacy" through "performance legitimacy".

It is often said that fair procedures, not policy outcomes, are the most important factors affecting legitimacy in a power relationship. Citizens may be willing to go along with policies they do not prefer as long as they are made according to a process they deem legitimate.[34]

[33] Under the Derg dictatorship in Ethiopia, the most amusing readings in the propaganda press were those about peasant associations in the remotest villages "condemning and warning" the revisionist and degenerate "Chinese Communist Party" for abandoning the true principles of Marxism-Leninism". At the time, condemning China was an "important component of national policy" for the Derg to prove, beyond doubt, its loyalty to the Soviet Union. Peasant associations were thus giving their "active consent" to this important national policy!

[34] J. Stiglitz: Participation and Development: Perspective from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm, in: *Review of Development Economics*, 6(2), 2002, pp. 162-182

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Furthermore, indifference to citizen consent is characteristic of "state capture" by particular elite interests, which erodes state legitimacy and renders state-citizen relationship dysfunctional. Seeking active and informed consent of citizens is thus an indicator that the state has freed itself from the grip of dominant classes.

The concept "site of compromise" briefly discussed above shows that society should not be considered an undifferentiated and homogenous entity. "There is never a general interest that embraces all possible particular interests". As a complex human collectivity, society cannot exist without conflict of interests among its constituents. And competition among interest groups for legitimate promotion of their respective interests should not be looked at as the major problems preventing democratic rule or inclusive development. If it were so these objectives could never be achieved. It is the capture of the state by particular interest groups that leads to exclusion and makes economic growth benefit the rich to the detriment of the majority, especially the poor. Tolerance of exclusion and marginalisation in all their manifestations, while at the same time promoting particular interests, gives rise to mistrust and disenchantment. Transparent facilitation of compromises between conflicting interests and inclusion of all segments of society in the facilitation process leads to social cohesion and promotes political stability.

To recap, a "non-captured state" is a state with the capability to manage particular interests, to facilitate their "peaceful coexistence", and to generate consensus on a range of principles. The mobilisation of citizens around a common set of interests is a powerful means to generate such a consensus. A non-captured state manages the "peaceful coexistence" of diverse and conflicting interests, not by suppressing one interest group in favour of another but by facilitating a binding compromise between conflicting interests through active popular participation in transparent consultation processes. Inclusion of the greatest number of different social groups to give an informed consent to state policies and actions promotes state legitimacy and ensures stability, even in a situation of political and economic crisis.

2.3 Accountability

Accountability is a relational concept. In a broader sense, it is about state-society relationship, about a relationship between duty bearers and right holders. For duty bearers, at the institutional level, it has a legal, political and ethical dimension. Legal: is dereliction of duty sanctioned? Political: is there a political price to pay for omissions and commissions that impinge on accountability? Ethical: do the prevailing norms and sense of duty within the institution fulfil acceptable moral standards?

Enforcement of checks and balances, incentive mechanisms and the professional ethos of individuals within institutions determine "upward accountability". Ensuring "downward accountability" is more complex. On the part of right holders, the basic (but not necessarily the simplest) requirement is awareness by citizens about their right to hold duty bearers to account. But awareness alone is not enough. Citizens require legal and organisational means to make effective use of this entitlement. The lack of downward accountability signifies impunity on the part of duty bearers, and disempowerment on the part of right holders.

Amartya Sen's famous aphorism: "famines cannot occur in democracies"[35] carries various inter-related messages with regard to accountability. The obvious message is that accountability is a core principle of democratic rule. The other message is that governments would perform effectively and responsibly if and when accountability becomes a "political incentive". It is worthwhile to quote him at some length. He writes:

When we move from the direct importance of political freedom to its instrumental role, we have to consider the political incentives that operate on governments and on the persons and groups that are in office. The rulers

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[35] "Indeed, no substantial famine has ever occurred in a democratic country – no matter how poor. This is because famines are extremely easy to prevent if the government tries to prevent t hem, and a government in a multiparty democracy with elections and free media has strong political incentives to undertake famine prevention" (A. Sen: Development as Freedom, pp. 51-52). He also discusses how famines bring about "the alienation of the rulers from the ruled (pp 170-75).

The discourse on "fragile states" appears to suggest that states can be built mainly through the military, financial and technical support of big powers and their intervention. However, reliance on external agents for such fundamental internal process undermines the very goal it intends to attain. States can only be built by their people in ways which benefit" them.

The role of development cooperation in promoting good governance has been ambiguous and ambivalent. A quick glance at a few cases makes one doubt if it tends to be "directly proportional" to "governance and democracy deficit" in the receiving country, which negates the publicly declared intention. The massive support given to the worst kleptocrats and dictators in Africa such as Mobutu is a case in point. In such cases, aid is "inversely proportional" to good governance and democracy, but also in terms of the geopolitical and economic relevance of a given country to donors".

As late as 1989, George Bush, Sr., had the following to say during a visit of Mobuto to the White House.

"One of Africa's most experienced statesmen, President Mobutu has worked with six Presidents. And together, they -- and we -- have sought to bring to Zaire, and to all of Africa, real economic and social progress and to pursue Africa's true independence, security, stability as the bases for that development".[43]

Whatever these "well intentioned" interferences may be, making development aid a key player for sustainable economic growth and political stability would be denying or usurping the legitimate role of a state and its citizens in the development process. Sustainable development can only be an internal effort of the state and citizens with good governance and accountability, and can by no means be "donor driven".

policies", *Siapha Kamara, Social Enterprise Development (SEND) Foundation of West Africa*

[43] ttp://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=17223#axzz1qaVe6qGN).

society relation is based on a rights-holder, duty- bearer relationship. Attempts towards achieving positive accountability without transforming the state-society relation is like beautifying a house on a shaky foundation, which can collapse any time.

As much as it requires the mobilisation of citizens to hold leaders to rule accountably, accountability needs the commitment of national elite, at least partially, not only as a moral principle of governance but also as part of its commitment to eradicate poverty and address inequality. In other words, the commitment to eradicate poverty signifies nothing if it does not entail the commitment to "reconstruct" state-society relationship. However, this should not be understood as a merely "voluntary" commitment of the national elite. It goes hand in hand with the struggle of empowered citizens to demand accountability. Thus, enforcing the commitment of the national leadership to accountability by empowered citizens is the other pre-condition for accountability and for a responsible and responsive state.

2.4 Can Development Cooperation Enhance Stability and State Legitimacy?

Development aid, as the term implies, is meant to help developing countries come out of poverty. But it would be naïve to consider aid as altruistic dissociated from the national interest of donor countries. A quick glance at the global distribution of aid shows that factors determining its distribution are the geopolitical and economic interests of donor countries rather than poverty. It will indeed be naïve to consider multilateral financial institutions to untie aid from the interests of global powers which dominate them.[37]

There is no doubt that foreign aid can both be supplementary and complementary to national efforts, and can contribute positively to alleviate poverty and human suffering, if it is conceived of and implemented efficiently. Therefore, it may not be fair to make donors wholly responsible

[37] Developing countries and those in transition account for almost 80% of the world's population, provide 75% of IMF's resources, are 100%beneficiaries of its programmes, but only have 36% of the votes on the IMF Board.

for the Dutch disease effect of aid and its fungibility. Recipient governments may also be held responsible for the misuse of foreign aid.

What is of interest here are the "strings attached" to foreign aid in the form of "conditionalities".[38] The "strings" are widely used instruments of interference in the political and economic affairs of developing countries. "Policy conditionalities" influence the economic and social policies of independent states, whereas "governance conditionalities" are being widely used to intervene in the political life of sovereign nations.

An analysis especially of "economic policy conditionalities" proves that aid is not altruistic. It is even doubtful if the conditionalities are based on "enlightened self-interest"[39]. The standard package offered by the North-dominated multilateral development agencies and bilateral donors consists of: "sound macroeconomic management", "clear and secure property

rights", "the rule of law", "democratic elections", "a conducive investment climate", etc. Looked at superficially, all these are "innocuous" and "interest neutral". However, in terms of their actual impacts (such as the consequences of dubious privatisation, opening up the market prematurely, capital market liberalisation, etc.), the "insider", Joseph Stiglitz, has this to say: "…the policies of the international economic institutions are all too often closely aligned with the commercial and financial interests of those in the advanced countries"[40].

Analyses of policy conditionalities and their consequences have led critics of development policy like Ha-Joon Chang to state that, with such conditionalities, donors are "kicking away the ladder" with which they climbed to their current stage of development so that it can't be used by developing countries and recommending to developing countries to 'do what we say, not what we did'"[41]. Besides, conditionalities disregard state sovereignty in policy making, and this cannot be imposed without undermining state legitimacy.

Further, aid may have a negative impact on the internal political and economic transformation of recipient countries in the sense that it may result in aid dependency syndrome, which undermines state legitimacy by encouraging and promoting the accountability of governments to donors instead of to their citizens. Aid dependency syndrome not only kills efforts towards self sufficiency; it also entails the risk that donors may end up being in the "driver's seat", as it were, in the process of development, thus taking the initiative from a country's government and citizens.[42]

[38] Those not professionally involved with development cooperation may not be conversant with conditionalities and how and why they are formulated and imposed. The following long quotation may provide an insight into this process: "As I moved to the international arena, I discovered that neither (good economics nor good politics) dominated the formulation of policy, especially at the International Monetary Fund. Decisions were made on the basis of what seemed a curious blend of ideology and bad economics, dogmas that sometimes seemed to be thinly veiling special interests. When crisis hit, the IMF prescribed outmoded, inappropriate, if "standard" solutions, without considering the effects they would have on the people in the countries told to follow these policies. … Rarely did I see thoughtful discussions and analysis of the consequences of alternative policies. There was a single prescription. … What astounded me … was that those policies weren't questioned by many of the people in power in the IMF, by those who were making critical decisions. They were often questioned by many of the people in the developing countries, but many were so afraid they might lose IMF funding, and with it funding from others, that they articulated their doubts most cautiously, if at all, and then only in private."(J. Stiglitz: *Globalisation and its Discontents*, 202, pp xiii – xiv)

[39] That is why Paul Collier, in his recent book and in various speeches while promoting it, pleads to donors to base their development aid on "enlightened self-interest" (P. Collier: The Bottom Billion, 2007)

[40] J. Stiglitz: Globalisation and its Discontents, 2002, p.19-20
[41] H-J. Chang: Bad Samaritans: The myth of free trade and the secret history of capitalism, 2008.
[42] I have attended several "PRSP consultation processes" in many countries in West and East Africa. The replay of government representatives at such consultations to proposals from participants has been invariably been "no, we cannot include this or that because donors won't accept it". As Kamara puts it: "The more African governments are dependent on international aid the less ordinary citizens such as farmers, workers, teachers or nurses have a meaningful say in politics and economic

consistently transform the oppressive machinery into an institution that serves society and transform subjects into citizens.

The short-lived post-independence euphoria was coupled with social development policies with the state taking an active role not only to overcome underdevelopment, but also to reduce poverty through the provision of social services. Significant, but as it proved to be, ephemeral achievements were attained in some cases. However, the machinery, as inherited, was more apt to serve the minority at the helm of power rather than society. Optimism of citizens changed into disenchantment. The euphoria of independence degenerated into rhetoric, and idealistic leaders were replaced by self-seeking rulers.

During much of the post-independence period, the state machinery erected by colonialists was extended while the state state-society relationship barely changed. To quote an authority on the subject again:

The state (in post-independence Africa) remains deeply marked by the hegemonial pretensions and authoritarian legacy of the colonial state. In innumerable ways, the peremptory, prefectoral command style of the colonial state remains embedded in its successor. The citizenry lacks empowerment, whether the state ideology is Leninist or capitalist. Civil society remains an aggregate of subjects confronted with the state. [46]
"Upward accountability", without which no hierarchical system can function, was also somewhat enhanced. However, this cannot be said of "downward accountability". What is more, it was deliberately weakened.[47]

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[46] C. Young: Africa's Colonial Legacy, in R.J Berg, J.S Whitkar, eds. Strategies for African Development, Berkley, 1986, p.49)
[47] Writing about Kenya F. Stewart concludes: Inequalities have often led to political resentment being expressed along tribal lines, particularly over perceived injustices over the distribution of land ownership. State-society relations deteriorated further since the start of the Moi era, when state predation intensified and the accountability structures of the state were deliberately weakened to allow unchecked use of state resources by the executive". (F. Stewart, In: *Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of development,* cited above)

It needs to be understood that nation-states, rather than citizens, are the key players in the global environment and international relations, even at an advanced stage of globalisation as at present. There is no universally recognised international governance with "global responsibility" for sustainable development and poverty eradication. This remains the primary responsibility of each nation-state. In the international context, the nation-state is both a "rights holder", i.e. upholding and defending the right of the nation to develop; and a "duty bearer", i.e. safeguarding the "national interest" on the international arena.

Because of the absence of legitimised global governance, there is no constituency of "world citizenry" to directly hold global institutions and powers to account. In international relations, each nation-state operates with the right to pursue its self- defined "national interest". However, the actions and inactions of global institutions and powers, which are dominant on the international scene, impact on development at the country level. Because of the imbalance of power on the international arena, it is more often an issue of "might is right" rather than of "equal rights". This means that the "national interest" of big powers is formulated and pursued to the detriment of the national interest of developing counties.

International development cooperation takes place within the framework of the prevailing global power and economic structures, which perpetuate obstacles to development resulting from the asymmetric integration[44] of

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[44] "Asymmetric integration" is a key concept for analysing and understanding development challenges. Nyerere's apt remark shortly after independence captures what the concept signifies: colonialism "made us consume what we don't produce and produce what we don't consume". By enforcing an "asymmetric integration" of Africa into the world market, Europe caused a fundamental change in Africa's situation in the world. It forced "non-contemporaneous" historical periods for different societies in terms of their stages of development to be "contemporaneous" in an "undistinguishing" real time. Our ancestors might have not been aware of Aristotle's Greece, leave alone seeing any necessity of imitating it. But ignorance of what was happening in Greece, or the lack of "imitative development" were not consequential then. However, after the "asymmetric integration" in the wake of colonialism, ignorance of what was happening in Europe and the incapacity to imitate it came with a penalty, the penalty of

developing countries into the world market. Further, development cooperation takes place in a global context which is characterised by "egoist" national interests. Since "competition" is on an uneven playing field without an "impartial referee", there will be no doubt about the outcome of the final whistle after each "game": "the winner is the fattest"!

Thus, the role of an African state in its relationship with global institutions and powers should not be perceived as negotiating with benevolent philanthropists. It is a daunting task of trying to safeguard and promote the interests of its citizens in a hostile global environment with rapacious old and emerging powers competing with one another for booty.

If poverty eradication and enhancing politically legitimate governance are to be at the centre of international development cooperation, the current approach and practice needs to be changed on both sides. African citizens and governments should abandon the pathetic and disempowering attitude that economic and political crises cannot be solved without support from "development partners", and from expecting salvation for long-term development challenges from "international development cooperation".

Donor countries and international financial institutions should believe that each developing country is a sovereign nation whose citizens are the legitimate agents of change. Interference in their policy making process should be considered as an attack on their sovereignty undermining state legitimacy. The goal of international development cooperation worthy of this appellation should be cooperation to overcome development challenges emanating from the unfavourable global context; cooperation to create an enabling international environment in which the economies of African countries thrive.

No external power can have a "mandate" to be a driver of political transformation in any developing nation. As stated above, there is no legitimacy without constituency. As long as citizens of developing countries have no rights and means to hold donors accountable for their policy and

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underdevelopment. Asymmetric integration also meant that how a society can live (and survive) was no more to be determined by endogenous factors alone".

governance conditionalities, such interventions cannot claim moral or political legitimacy.

III.   States in Africa and their Legitimacy

The structural and historical causes of "bad governance" and legitimacy deficit in Africa start with the historical process that led to the establishment of the state machinery and "nation-states" in the continent.[45] It thus includes the legacy of the colonial past from which Africa continues to suffer. The origin of almost all states in Africa is colonialism; the sate machinery was created to subjugate, and not to serve, society. It was this same oppressive machinery that was "inherited" by the emerging "nation-states" after the end of the colonial period.

Before colonialism, African societies were at varying stages of "pre-capitalist" development. There was hardly any surplus production so that there were no "ruling classes" to organise society with functionally differentiated institutions to facilitate surplus production, a precondition for the establishment of a durable central institution with a "monopoly of power" over a determined territory. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa thus had no experience in statehood and nationhood before colonialism. Social and political organisations hardly went beyond the communal level. Nation-states in which a regulated state-society relation prevailed were virtually non-existent.

Decolonisation and experience during the post-independence period have more or less failed to fundamentally change the state-society relation. The lack of indigenous roots of the state which was imposed by colonialism was by itself a formidable hindrance to "root" it in society during the post-independence period. The post- independence leadership was not able to

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[45] Even globally, the "nation-state" is a more recent and "modern" form of political organisation. I cannot go into an in-depth discussion of this here. It will suffice to mention that Germans existed for centuries but the *German nation-state* was created under Bismarck around 1871. The unification of Italy and the creation of the Italian nation-state under the leadership of Giuseppe Garibaldi, the "father of the fatherland", also took place around the same period.

ensure equitable entitlements of all citizens to ensure their capacities and functioning are adequate for a decent inclusion in societal affairs"[51].

As was pointed out, the state is neither disposable nor replaceable. It has also been said that the "nation-state" is the only form of political existence for peoples in the contemporary world. If Africa is to come out of its perennial misery and political malaise, it has to "fix" the prevailing dysfunctional state-society relationship. However, reforming the state should not be considered as fixing a malfunctioning gadget. Put differently, "fixing dysfunctional state-society relation" should be envisaged within the framework of a political transformation; as the process of "building a capable state as an inclusive institution" with the involvement of all stakeholders; as a process of building an institution, in which the interests of a whole nation are articulated, facilitated and managed.

The social context for the role of the state in Africa is the abject poverty of its population. The marginalisation of the continent constitutes the global context. The roles and functions of the state are thus internally determined in the process of equitable and sustainable socio-economic development for overcoming poverty and inequality. In the international context, its role should be safeguarding and promoting national interest in an increasingly difficult, hostile and uncertain global environment dominated by developed industrial countries. Its external roles and functions are thus determined by efforts to overcome development challenges resulting from "asymmetric integration" of Africa into the world market".

Builders of capable states should be: civil society organisations whose focus is empowering citizens; empowered citizens who can claim their rights and hold rulers to account; a patriotic national leadership whose purpose is not to please donors or not to loose power but to bring about transformative change; whose incentive is not derived from self-enrichment but the aspiration to end poverty; whose ambition is not to win the next election but to save the next generation from misery in a potentially rich continent.

This made the state "privatisable" such that the ruling elite could utilise it to pursue its "collective strategy of private enrichment" within an entrenched and pervasive pyramidal patronage structure.

Many studies indicate that the social distance between rulers and the ruled has not narrowed in post-colonial Africa (in terms of power, wealth, policy making processes, etc.). There is no clearer indication regarding the disempowerment of African citizens than the fact that they are not yet able to make rulers pay a political price for not making poverty eradication their priority task and legitimacy.

Even after the introduction of multiparty democracy in many African countries, there are no visible efforts made by African regimes to get political legitimacy by political means; i.e. by seeking informed active consent of citizens for state actions and policies; by enhancing transparency and accountability of governance; and by widening the political space for voice and participation of citizens. Almost invariably, economic growth was used as the "round about way" for political legitimacy and regime stability. Felix Houphouet Boigny's approach during Cote d'Ivoire's "miraculous growth", dubbed by critics as: *"Silence, on développe"* continues to be the normal practice.

The result of "economic growth first, political legitimacy can wait" attitude has resulted in the alienation of many African states from their society.
…With the state relying on force in order to perpetrate and perpetuate its oppression, the society is at liberty to relate to it as a conqueror entity – to be feared and obeyed where it becomes necessary and to undermine it where it is possible. (…) When most of us encounter the state as a predatory force on the rampage, when those who are supposed to defend us have turned their arms against us and never grant us any respite from exploitation…In these circumstances is it any wonder that we don't have a public morality, that we think nothing of subverting the state, stealing from it, cheating it in every way and refusing to pay taxes? [48]

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[51] Th. Mkandawire: Non-Organic Intellectuals and 'Learning' in Policy Making Africa, EGDI (Expert Group on Development Issues), 2000

[48] C. Ake: *Democracy and Development in Africa*, 1996, pp:8-9

Since the end of the cold war, Africa has also been ushered into the era of "multiparty democracy". Non-governmental and civil society organisations mushroomed. The structural adjustment programme was, by and large, discredited and replaced by the "participatory poverty reduction strategy". We are beginning to witness more elections than *coups d'etat*.

It would be absurd to deny that some democratic gains have been made in many African countries[49]. However, these new developments have not substantially improved the situation regarding accountability. There is still a large discrepancy between rhetoric and reality, especially in terms of "downward accountability" and delivering results regarding poverty and inequality. At the risk of gross generalisation, it can be said that state-society relationship is still characterised by the "impunity of rulers–disempowerment of citizens" rather than by an accountability of duty bearers to right holders.

The attitude of citizens towards the state is sill based on mistrust and disdain, and not as an institution which incorporates their interests. Far from observing rules and regulations, disobeying them is considered as a legitimate and defensive act. Obviously, this is not a conducive environment for accountability to prevail. Only through legitimising state policies and actions through active and informed consent by citizens can this be overcome.

"Electoral democracy" in most cases has largely been "voting without choosing". "Recycled" potentates of ruling parties have created their own

[49] It has been observed, in recent years, that some resistance to policy conditionalities in an increasing number of African countries and recognition of accountability deficit of governance in Africa. Declarations such as the following by the Commission for Africa are thus encouraging: "Africa's history over the last fifty years has been blighted by two areas of weakness. These have been capacity – the ability to design and deliver policies; and accountability – how well a state answers to its people." (*Commission for Africa, 2005*). Although recognition of a problem or a mistake is a good first step in the right direction, however, declarations remain hollow if not followed by consistent and verifiable implementation of policies to rectify recognised mistakes

political formulae based on patronage (usually ethnic) to compete for power. The "winner takes all" outcome of these "democratic elections" has aggravated inter-elite bickering; it has increased instability by encouraging shifting alliances and changing sign-posts. It has led to "election campaigning" and thus "politicisation of society", which very often lead to polarisation of society (usually along ethnic lines) and not to the "socialisation of politics" which would have implied issues-based debate, and political competition based on societal vision and programmes. Ownership of the development process is still largely rhetoric. Donor conditionalities or "anticipatory obedience" to satisfy perceived conditionalities still prevail.

Much has been written about the legitimacy deficits of governance in Africa[50]. However, most of these "analyses" do not go beyond stating that governance in Africa is not like the one in the North. Such "analyses" make the *result* of development in the North the *precondition* for development in Africa.

"State failure" in Africa is described differently by different analysts. There are those who lament that the African State has failed to penetrate society ("the uncaptured peasantry"). Others maintain that African societies have failed to hold the state accountable, and thus have themselves become prey to a predatory state. These lamentations reflect the fact that perennially dysfunctional state-society relationship characterises the political systems in Africa, and that it is the major political impediment for eliminating poverty and inequality. The solution lies in transforming this relationship into a functional one.

One of the greatest challenges faced by African countries is the establishment of state-society nexus that facilitates and promotes economic growth and structural transformation, that derives its legitimacy through popular participation and electoral process, and sustains social policies that

[50] Th. Mkandawire: Thinking About Developmental States in Africa, 2001

rms of conditionality; and (5) The European Union's (EU) new policies *reasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change* and *The ture Approach to EU Budget Support to Third Countries*, to be implemented in 14/5), with a paradigm shift from governance conditionality to vernance and development, sector reform and state-building contracts.

this paper, I argue that, prior to the so-called North African revolution rather revolt), traditional development aid policies and trajectories were lied differently in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. While strict od governance conditionality was advocated and proactively pursued in b-Saharan Africa, such conditionality was hardly actively pursued in rth Africa. Three main factors contributed to this differentiated atment: (1) North Africa's proximity to Europe; (2) its role in the Israeli-lestinian conflict; and (3) the strategic role North Africa plays in mbating terrorism, illicit migration and human trafficking from Sub-haran Africa to Europe. These considerations still hold sway in Western ategic thinkingvis-à-vis ethical considerations pertaining to democracy, man rights and the rule of law. However, unlike in the past, Western ategic engagement with Africa in general and North Africa in particular l be pursued under new democratic dispensations rather than by horitarian regimes alien to the tenets of good governance, respect for man rights and the rule of law. The paper also outlines post-2011 ropean policy towards North Africa with respect to democracy and man rights conditionality, as well as new instruments for implementing ese policies. This illustrates the dividingline between Sub-Saharan Africa d North African conditionality regimes which have been gradually ding with the Arab revolt, so that comparable conditionality policies are rently being pursued. The paperconcludes with a reflection on the plications of these policies for popular demands or agitation for mocratic governance.