

**Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked
Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn**

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problem with the gender equality during wartime is that it is reversed when prewar patterns are re-established. The masculine establishment is reestablished in the post war setting. The power envisaged in displaced society has more to do with temporary empowerment i.e. “borrowed power” syndrome.

A participant questioned how tradition evolves into modernity, and the double standard employed by female intellectuals who want to restructure the gender equation to include equality, yet promote the maintenance of tradition. There needs to be a differentiation between ideology and the realities on the ground. Another participant raised the issue of gender based violence, for example the use of rape as a weapon during the Rwandan genocide. The participant questioned whether the AU, IGAD and other regional organizations include women in their peacemaking activities. Another participant raised the issue of women’s roles in Islamist movements.

Ms Tadesse responded to these questions stating that the often the inclusion of ethnic groups and other minorities in peacemaking activities is out of fear of retaliation as opposed to a desire for a holistic process. The other neglected group is the youth, which needs to be targeted in gender equity discussions. Often different generations have drastically different conceptions of gender. Dr. Abusharaf responded stating that resolutions need to be translated into the local language in order to develop local ownership of these issues.

Professor Hassan gave the closing statement for the first day of the conference. He stated that womanhood is not a static concept, it embodies different figures and roles. An important question in these discussions is why the same issues are being revisited 40 years from when they were first introduced. The gender issue in Sudan has been especially pertinent with the sanction of polygamy by President Bashir. The issue of accountability is tied to the issue of the modern warfare being fought via a pre modern ideology. For example, the rape of women in south Sudan was seen as an acceptable form of warfare.

and a better future for their children.”

Afaf Ahmed Abdel-Rahman, Woman Center for Peace and Development:

“This war was created by poverty. Poverty perpetuates the cycle of violence and one strategy to eradicate poverty and violence is to build the capacity of women through training.”

Notes

This paper draws on the report of an event which brought 16 Sudanese women peacebuilders for meetings, presentations and events in Washington DC and New York. It was organised by Inclusive Security: Women Waging Peace (www.womenwagingpeace.net) whose founder Ambassador Swanee Hunt facilitated the entry of the women into US and UN decision-making circles. The author wishes to thank her compatriots for their tireless work in formulating the recommendations included in this article.

Second session on the Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa

Professor Medhane Tadesse assistant professor of history and expert on regional security and peace in the Horn of Africa, director of the Center on Policy research and Dialogue, and author of four books presented the first paper dealing with the crisis in Somalia. The presenter concentrated on a more recent analysis of the conflict, stating that the root causes are a much covered topic. He began by positing the different premises for the paper, narrowing it down to four areas. Firstly, the military defeat of the Islamic Courts Union does not mark the end of the conflict. Secondly, although the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) is legitimate, and representative, it lacks strength, capacity, leadership and competence. Thirdly, the Ethiopian support of the TFG and Western support in rebuilding Somalia have neither been successful nor legitimized the institution. Lastly, the disparity between the conditions now and two years ago have withered away with the deteriorating situation, except that the Islamists are not in full control of Somalia.

Dr. Tadesse next posited the indicators for the continued conflict. There is the continued insecurity in Somalia. Secondly, the progressive fragmentation of political forces in Somalia is still present, and continues unabated. The complex insurgency is coupled with a blend of terrorism and criminality. All of these coincide to create a persistent security threat for Ethiopia. These were relevant considerations in the decision for Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia, however there was an underestimation of risks. There was a workable military strategy, but there was a less effective political strategy.

The war that was instigated by the entrance of Ethiopia into Somalia in 2006 was initially successful. However this did not last due to the change in the military tactics of the ICU. They began to target civilians, which led to displacements and a humanitarian crisis and the group Al Shabab appeared carrying out the assassination of

- supporting gender training for political parties using national and international experts and national women's organisations.

Sudanese women are articulating the need for change:

Agnes Nyoka, Coordinator, Sudanese Women's Empowerment for Peace (SuWEP):

"Dialogue is very important to resolve and prevent conflict in Sudan. As women, decisions are being made for us. The GoS and SPLM are using arms, and we carry UNSC 1325 as our arms to promote inclusion."

Keziah Layinwa Nicodemus, Head, SPLM Women and Gender Commission:

"We are speaking in one voice today. We are women from all over Sudan and we are a voice for peace. We speak in one language regardless of our divisions ... we have been given 25% seats in southern Sudan's constitution. But we have to push to make this a reality. Sudan is a country of men and we have to work hard with the support of the international community to train our women to be leaders."

Muna Khugali, postgraduate student:

"At the local level, we need crimes against humanity to be documented and captured. With this information, we can start to create more accountability and prevent history from repeating itself."

Eiman Seifeld, founder of the Darfur Women's Relief and Rehabilitation Agency:

"It is women who are caring for the family, who remain at home, who know the situation on the ground. Women will be the ones who are left, who must implement the policies of the peace talks – if they are not included, they will surely fail. Women are ready for peace"

- convening periodic national women’s consultations at which female representatives of the grassroots, government and non-governmental organisations throughout Sudan, representing all ethnic and faith-based groups, can discuss shared priorities and concerns
- raising the marriage age to 18
- ratification and observance of CEDAW and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
- establishing a ministry and presidential advisor for Women’s Affairs to ensure gender main-streaming
- including foreign and Sudanese women in all missions, negotiating sessions and needs assessment teams sent by foreign governments and international organisations to assist Sudanese peace building
- including women in UN and African Union peace-keeping units
- ensuring that disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) efforts include ex-women soldiers
- training and involving women in the security sector (women police officers, military officers, security officers)
- designing a protocol on accountability and transitional justice mechanisms, especially with regard to gender-based violence
- establishing an internationally-sponsored commission of inquiry and commission for truth and reconciliation
- ensuring women’s access to re-productive healthcare

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Plans for the voluntary return, resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs cannot succeed without more being done to involve women. Income-generation activities must be created for women in refugee and IDP camps and at transit and entry points for returnees. The international community needs to facilitate links and communication among women leaders and the grass-roots, women returnees in urban and rural areas and women returnees across the country and across conflict lines. Women need to be given access to credit and information about local and national markets so that they can set up small businesses.

Other key demands being made by Sudanese women's organisations include:

- increasing to 50% the target for women's participation at all levels in all governing and deliberative bodies in Sudan, including land commissions, oil commissions, party lists and elected and appointed bodies in national, local and regional governments, both transitional and permanent
- removing legal impediments to the registration and operation of civil society organisations and repealing restrictive laws that inhibit the freedom of movement so that women's NGOs throughout Sudan can work together
- building capacity of women's organisations, particularly skills in proposal writing, project planning, management and evaluation, accounting and money management
- monitoring to ensure women are at least half of the beneficiaries of all assistance efforts in all sectors
- establishing mechanisms to clarify and strengthen the roles and relationships among NGOs, civil society and government entities dedicated to assisting women

re-establish themselves. Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has noted the absence of structures in Darfur to promote justice and healing and bring perpetrators to justice.

Addressing the root causes of conflict in Sudan must include promotion of women's economic empowerment. Women make up the majority of Sudan's population and in some conflict-affected areas three quarters of the surviving inhabitants are women. Women head households, yet they do not have legal access to land or resources due to discrimination in Sudanese statutory and customary law. Sudan – like most Arab states – is not among the 180 nations which have signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Challenging tradition

Sudanese women are challenging their traditional status. In Sudan and in the diaspora we have established organisations and networks to raise awareness about the human costs of the conflict and to call for an inclusive approach to the implementation of the peace agreement. As breadwinners and decision makers, women are starting income generation projects, some in fields as untraditional as carpentry. Women from the North and South have organised to respond to the needs of orphans, street children and others in dire economic straits.

Support for women's efforts must be seen as a vital component of peace and reconstruction. Sudan urgently requires a broad, nationwide, awareness-raising campaign about women's rights that speaks to men and women as well as young people. Women's land tenure, title and ownership rights must be clarified and an enforceable legal framework set in place that reconciles competing claims on land and enables women and women-headed households to hold and defend ownership. It is essential to educate the population about the diversity of customary and traditional laws with an eye towards codification and revisiting of customs that discriminate against or disadvantage women, such as female genital mutilation.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABC	Abyei Boundary Commission
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DOP	Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan's People's Liberation Movement
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
WFP	World Food Program

mandates women's participation in peace processes, Sudanese women have been consistently sidelined by North-South and Darfur peace processes. Although many women's organisations were registered observers with the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and presented technical papers to negotiators in the Machakos talks, they were not formally involved. When the Government of Sudan prevented women from boarding a plane to take them to the Naivasha talks in Kenya, women from the South joined northern women to formally protest their exclusion from the peace process. At Naivasha, women's organisations were forced to present their papers with recommendations to the parties by pushing them under the closed doors of the negotiation room. Sudanese women have played hardly any role in the African Union-sponsored Darfur peace talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja.

Women comprise the majority of Sudanese IDPs and refugees. Even when housed in refugee and IDP camps, women are not safe from gender-based violence. Reports abound of women being abducted and/or raped while collecting firewood near camps while little or nothing is done to bring perpetrators to justice. During resettlement, women face specific challenges including increased burdens as female heads of household, little access to healthcare and education, and few economic opportunities.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM does not speak to the full complexity of the ongoing conflict in Sudan as it fails to address the intermittent conflicts throughout the country with additional parties, related human rights abuses and the deep ethnic and religious rifts which make reconciliation and transition to peace difficult.

Nowhere is this more so than in Darfur where the Janjaweed militia have used sexual violence as a strategy to dehumanise women and girls and humiliate and control entire communities. Abductions, sexual slavery, rape, torture and forced displacement have been so pervasive as to call into question the ability of communities ever to

Proceedings of Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa

InterAfrica Group (IAG) organized the second in the series of conferences on peace and security in the Horn, entitled “Conference on the Prevailing Interlocked Peace and Security Conundrum in the Horn of Africa.” The conference covered many facets of the interlocked conflicts in the Horn, including the deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the divisive conflict in Sudan and the complex crisis in Somalia.

Mr. Tamrat Kebede, executive director of IAG, gave the opening remarks describing the challenges facing the region. He noted that the Horn of Africa is an area of significant conflict, internally displaced people, insecurity, and high human fatality rates due to these factors. The first peace and security conference in 2007 presented critical analysis on the impediments of peace, highlighting the intricate and entrenched nature of the conflicts. The second conference focused on the interlinked nature of the conflicts. Ambassador Peter Robleh, deputy chairman of the IAG board, took over as moderator and began the session by remarking that there is insecurity as opposed to security in the Horn of Africa, as evidenced in Somalia, and the instability of Chad spreading to Kenya. Ambassador Berhanu Dinka gave the keynote speech following these statements.

Amb. Dinka referred to a study by the University of Maryland which stated that violent conflict around the world has decreased by a general magnitude of 80%. Stephen Pinker has also stated that people are living in the most peaceful time in the world. These optimistic declarations are reassuring but they also raise questions as to why the Horn of Africa is still wallowing in conflict. This involves both an examination of intra state conflict and its ability to affect neighboring countries.

There are many similarities evident throughout the region. These include ethnic and linguistic similarities, economic, political and

Sudanese Women Waging peace by Rogaia Abusharaf

Although UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) specifically

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ 'Darfur JEM may have received help from Sudan army officers: US,' *Sudan Tribune*, Khartoum, 11 May 2008.

³⁸ Salva's support for the NCP dominated GNU and the refutation of the Dafurian rebels was not universally supported by southerners, many of whom admired JEM's attack, want to see the war taken to Khartoum, and are convinced that another war between the SPLA and SAF will be necessary to finally defeat the NCP.

³⁹ 'Salva Kiir says ICC endangers Sudan's peace process,' *Sudan Tribune*, 17 July 2008.

⁴⁰ Also promptly rejected was the proposal by SPLM Governor Malik Agar of Blue Nile State that Sudan be organized along confederal lines.

⁴¹ Two examples of this include the negligible role of the SPLM in the development of Sudan's foreign policy and its almost complete exclusion from participation in the Darfur peace talks, albeit during the negotiations leading up to the DPA the movement was not aggressive in its efforts to participate in the talks.

⁴² 'Sudan President orders probe against SPLM official over statements,' *Sudan Tribune*, Khartoum, 9 July 2008.

⁴³ 'Sudan SPLM slam Beshir decision to probe Amum; Kiir 'disappointed'', *Sudan Tribune*, Khartoum, 11 July 2008.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ 'SPLM threatens to pull from Sudan cabinet over Amoum probe,' *Sudan Tribune*, 12 July 2008.

⁴⁶ However, within the south the issue of 'Dinka domination' is also highly emotive and claims by Dinka that their right to lead southern governments is based on their tribe constituting a majority of the population could finally be resolved if tribal affiliation were accurately determined.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Douglas Johnson, 'Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's CPA,' *African Affairs*, 107/426, 1-19.

²² Choal Deng, Chairman of Land Commission, 22 February, 2007 quoted in John Young, 'Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War,' Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, July 2007.

²³ The integration has been complicated by the fact that SAF rapidly promoted SSDF officers as a means to win their loyalty and some now accept demotions. In addition, there is a general resentment among SPLA officers that people they viewed as 'traitors' because of their alliance with the government might overtake them in the hierarchy. A similar problem on a smaller scale ensued with the return of Riek to the SPLM/A in 2002 when senior officers resented being pushed down the hierarchy because of the new-comers. Ibid. p. 27.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 24.

²⁵ 'South Sudan president reshuffles cabinet ministers,' *Sudan Tribune*, 3 July 2007.

²⁶ Riek and others, however, were convinced these attacks were largely carried out by renegade members of the SPLA and not the LRA.

²⁷ Stvarker Finnstom and Ronald Atkinson, 'Building sustainable peace in Northern Uganda,' *Sudan Tribune*, 5 May 2008.

²⁸ There is some doubt as to whether these attacks were carried out by the LRA or by elements of the Ugandan army.

²⁹ John Young, 'Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War,' *Sudan Baseline Assessment Project*, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 2007, p. 37-39.

³⁰ John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Copyright John Young, Unpublished, Khartoum, June 2007.

³¹ John Ryle, 'Disaster in Darfur,' *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 51, No. 13, 12 August 2004.

³² John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Copyright John Young, Unpublished, Khartoum, June 2007.

³³ Interviews with Julia Raphael and Ernest Makuai, Security Adviser to the WBEG government, Wau, 25 February 2007. John Young, 'Emerging North-South Tensions and Prospects for a Return to War,' Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, July 2007.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Lecture by Dr. Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, JEM official, Sudan Conference 2008, Hermannsburg, Germany, Sudan Focal Point, 24 May 2008.

social similarities, chronic underdevelopment and shrinking political space, lack of good governance and an absence of a tolerant political culture. Ill-liberal democracies could be seen as the defining characteristic of the states in the region. The presence of weak states also introduces other negative qualities, including a restive unemployed youth population who are increasingly aware of their rights. And on the other hand are politically awakened ethnic groups who are demanding representation in the power structure.

The discrepancies in elections are a serious problem in the Horn. For years they had been elevated as fosterers of democracy; however recent events have shaken that faith. In societies where there is a breakdown in the national consensus, elections seem to exacerbate the situation. In some cases just and fair accommodation is seen as a sign of weakness. Timely and sustainable solutions are overridden by easy solutions.

The Ambassador referred to different examples showcasing the different intrastate and interstate nature of conflict in the Horn. Sudan-Ethiopia relations were tense in the 1960's due to the rebellion in Eritrea. The rebellion was exacerbated by bad governance and the Emperor Haile Selassie's attempt to shield the conflict from the international stage. Both countries became heavily involved with the rise of the Derg and the intensification of the conflict, which led to Sudan supporting Eritrea and Ethiopia supporting rebels in south Sudan. Fortunately, Sudan and Ethiopia now enjoy peaceful cooperation. Another example is the case of Ethiopia- Somalia relations, where tensions intensified following Somalia's claims over the Ogaden, French territories of Afar-Issa, and northern Kenya during the Derg period. Following the bombing of Borana the western Somalia Liberation Front infiltrated into Ethiopia in preparation for a full scale revolt. However, the overthrow of Siad Barre put a halt to these plans. The Islamic Courts Union seized power in Mogadishu two years ago and declared jihad on Ethiopia, which led to the consequent invasion by Ethiopia. Ethio-Eritrean relations have declined following the stoppage of the UN supported buffer zone, the uncertainty

see John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Unpublished, Copyright John Young, Khartoum, June 2007.

⁴ Another significant personal link between Garang and the US Government was his long term friendship with Roger Winters, Brian da Salva, and Andrew Natsios, all of them senior American civil servants.

⁵ Waithaka Waihenya, *The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process*, Nairobi, Kenway Publications, 2006.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Declaration of Principles (DoP), IGADD, 1994.

⁸ Those not deluded by the congratulatory rhetoric at the time nonetheless held out hopes that Garang's ambition to be President of Sudan would overcome the secessionist character to the agreement and ensure the unity of the country, but those hopes died with his death in July 2006.

⁹ John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Unpublished, Copyright John Young, Khartoum, June 2007.

¹⁰ Machakos Protocol, Section 1.6.

¹¹ John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Unpublished, Copyright John Young, Khartoum, June 2007.

¹² This includes Eritrea and Ethiopia which had completely dominated the first IGAD Initiative. This can be attributed to two things: first, the Ethio-Eritrea War of 1998-2000 which reduced their interest in the Sudan peace process, and second, their conclusion that the US was in control of the process, and they were not prepared to challenge its dominance.

¹³ The peripheral role of the Secretariat is illustrated by the request by IGAD to have the official English and Arabic versions of the CPA turned over to them as the official sponsors of the negotiations. Sumbeiywo refused and only permitted the IGAD representatives to have their pictures taken holding the documents, after which he resumed possession of them. See John Young, 'IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,' Unpublished, Copyright John Young, Khartoum, June 2007.

¹⁴ These senior officials include Deng Alor, Luka Biong, and Edward Lino.

¹⁵ It has been made clear to the Missiriya that while their movement into South Sudan will require petitioning the southern government and the local chiefs, this will not be withheld as long as the nomads leave their weapons in the north.

¹⁶ 'CPA Monitor,' April 2008.

¹⁷ 'UN report cites lessons from South Sudan attack,' *Reuters*, 24 July 2008.

¹⁸ 'Sudan's joint units arrive in Abyei,' *Sudan Tribune*, Khartoum, 19 June 2008.

¹⁹ 'Sudan's parties refer Abyei case formally to the arbitration court,' *Sudan Tribune*, The Hague, 12 July 2008.

election unless they endorse the constitution, and since the constitution is based on the CPA, that effectively stops critics of the agreement from having their voices heard in an election. Moreover, a consideration of the possible outcomes of the election, as was done above, does not suggest that an election will necessarily either advance the democratic process in Sudan or solidify the peace process.

As a result, the peace progress is making progress in only the narrowest sense that while it is not laying the basis for a united Sudan, is not providing a framework or impetus for the resolution of the conflict in Darfur, and is not ushering in a democratic transformation in the country, it has not irrevocably broken down. And if, as there is now an inclination in some circles to do, the central objective of the peace process is only held to be the provision of a somewhat orderly process for the separation of South Sudan, then the process cannot be considered a failure and has some successes to its credit. Moreover, to the extent that Western politicians wanted to respond as expeditiously as possible to demands from their constituencies to stop the fighting, they too can claim some success. But these successes were only achieved by setting aside consideration of the conflict in Darfur and ignoring their own rhetoric about the CPA providing the basis for a united Sudan and a democratic transformation.

¹ A comprehensive consideration of the key developments in the peace process can be found in the UN publication, *The CPA Monitor*.

² Abdelwahab, [Abdelwhab El-Affindi, "The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?"](#), *African Affairs*, 100, 581-599, 2001.

³ For a detailed exposition of the background to US engagement in Sudan

surrounding the Algiers agreement, and the Eritrean support of the Somali Liberation Front. The Djiboutian status in the region is worrisome following the invasion of Eritrea, which was condemned by the UN, AU and EU. This was purportedly carried out as punishment for Djibouti's support of the transitional government in Somalia. The Eritrea- Sudan relationship was marked by Sudanese support of the rebellion in the 1980's, however this was fractured support due to the split between southern and eastern Sudanese with the center. Finally, Sudan-Uganda relations have been strained due to the Sudanese support of the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) following the signing of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement.) The above examples showcase the spillover effect of internal conflict to other areas in the region.

Regional conflict has been especially detrimental due to the failure of regional peace initiatives, as well as the abuse of internal cleavages by foreign powers. Some internal rearrangements could include opening up political space for civil society including the media, and the expansion of early warning and preventive diplomacy. At the sub-regional level each country is confronted with environmental issues, which is especially pertinent due to the high number of pastoral communities. Porous borders are also an important consideration with regards to violent pastoral conflict.

The Ambassador concluded stating that Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya are showing exemplary bilateral relationships, and the Sudanese-Ethiopian regional cooperation is a positive development. IGAD and the AU should be further encouraged. This could be done via the establishment of a council of elders created from members from all countries, and not ascribing to any political ideology. Eritrea is problematic because it often stands against the sub regional flow of ideals and cooperation, for example its voluntary suspension from IGAD. The isolation of Asmara is evident. Ambassador Dinka ended by stating that intellectual courage requires not bending to consensus.

The first paper presented was entitled, "IGAD Peace Process: An Update," written by John Young, and presented by Dr. Siddiq Umbadda. Dr. Umbadda began his presentation of the paper by delving into the IGAD peace process which resulted in the CPA. Currently, there are numerous uncertainties surrounding the agreement. The three target areas of the CPA were the establishment of southern unity, democratic transformation, and reaching a Darfur settlement. The move from humanitarian assistance to development is evident. The presenter next showcased the contextualized scenario behind the peace process, beginning with the principles and circumstances that led to the creation of IGAD.

One of the reasons behind the construction of IGAD is the apparent gap left by the removal of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, and the concurrent need to have a body that would resolve conflicts in the Horn. IGAD, which was initially constructed as IGADD in 1986, was driven by international donors, and in 1993 it was dominated by a Kenyan led group. However, Eritrea and Ethiopia eventually dominated the group because Kenya was often seen as a reflection of British interests.

The Declaration of Principles on Sudan, which is the IGAD sponsored agreement in 1994 attempting to pave the way to peace in Sudan, had a more cohesive outlook on the conflict in Sudan, as opposed to north- south divisions. Secularism, and sharing the resources of the periphery with the center emerged as ideals accepted by the rebels but not the government. The U.S. involvement in the process was based on its strong relationship with Kenya, and the machinations of the war on terror. The bombing of the U.S. embassies in east Africa and the high Muslim population in Sudan was a major concern. However the U.S. involvement was influential because it allowed the SPLA to leverage their advantage while the government in Khartoum felt threatened by bombing of the pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, as well as the U.S. intervention in Somalia. This consequently led to the decision to share intelligence with U.S.

ing almost all state power between the NCP and the SPLM it threw up an almost insurmountable barrier to a peaceful resolution of the conflict without seriously changing the original agreement. And with the parties to the CPA united in agreeing not to change the CPA, peacemaking efforts in Darfur have floundered.

Three and half years into the peace process the CPA has thus far also failed to deliver on its commitment to achieving a democratic transformation. While a bare-bones government institutional structure is taking form in the south, a culture of respect for human rights and tolerance for differences is not in evidence. Moreover, a multi-party system in the south exists only in the sense that parties have gained representation in the legislative assembly as a result of the CPA. Most have little or no popular basis of support and the assembly is barely functioning. In the north the institutions of government are more developed, but remain under the complete control of the NCP. Parties have a popular base in the north, but apart from the NCP and SPLM they have a negligible presence in the National Assembly, or none at all in the case of the Umma Party which won the last free election in 1986. The media remains tightly controlled by the government and trade unions and popular associations face considerable restrictions.

It is against this background that national elections are anticipated in the first half of 2009. Although after much dissent an elections law has been agreed to in the National Assembly, there is considerable doubt as to whether a free and fair election as stipulated by the CPA is possible, and if it takes place whether it would help solidify the peace process. The international backers to the peace process pressed for the commitment to a free and fair election during the peace negotiations in the face of considerable opposition from the parties who preferred that it take place at the end of the process, if at all. The US and its allies maintained that since neither the NCP, nor the SPLM, held power on the basis of democratic vote that the peace process could only acquire legitimacy if it was affirmed in an election. However, the fact that the National Assembly subsequently passed legislation that precludes parties from participating in the

dent that the means would be found for bringing the conflict to an end. Much earlier the NDA had demanded the right to participate in the IGAD peace process and the NCP forcefully objected, although there was little doubt that the SPLM also did not want to share the negotiating table with its erstwhile allies. The NCP was still convinced in 2004 that SAF and its jangaweed allies could militarily defeat the Darfuri rebels so there was little point in making concessions to them in formal negotiations. In any case it opposed the presence of the Darfuri rebels at Naivasha for the same reason it opposed NDA involvement, namely it did not want to provide the opposition with a forum in which they might unite and oppose the government. Far better that if forced to conduct negotiations with the various rebel groups that they be confronted individually and thus for the NCP to be in a position to play to rebel weaknesses and divisions.

The US and its allies in the peace process were not immune to the pressures of their domestic constituencies who wanted to see progress in bringing the horrors of the Darfur conflict to an end, but they held alternately that the Naivasha peace process was the first of a two step peace process, or that it provided the framework for resolving the conflict, with Garang as First Vice President assuming a critical role. Most of the think tanks and analysts of the peace process also took this position. The problem was that it had no basis in fact. As Dr. Mutrif Sadig (currently Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the GNU, but then a senior member of the NCP's negotiating team) told me at the time, there is nothing in the CPA that lays down the basis for a two step peace process. And as the experience of the past three and a half years has made amply clear, the CPA did not provide any framework for successfully resolving the Darfur conflict.

There was a framework that captured the multiple dimensions of Sudan's conflicts, namely the DoP, but the parties with the backing of the international community, rejected that formulation in favour of a focus solely on the north-south conflict. Indeed, the CPA not only did not facilitate resolution of the Darfur conflict, but by divid-

The final phase of the CPA was seen in the so called breakthrough of the Machakos Protocol. The difference between the DOP and Machakos protocol include that the former allows the secession of the south if the state doesn't become secular. The latter agreement constrained the idea of self determination to two groups, namely the NCP and SPLA, ultimately maintaining the status quo. The conflict was contextualized as a south Sudan problem, thus holistic analysis was neglected. Both the NCP and SPLA signed the agreement in bad faith, and did not believe in the agreement's capabilities to initiate dialogue. This can be seen as the crucial, if not primary problem behind implementation. Ownership of the process was also lagging, and the paper suggests that the U.S. set the stage while IGAD only served as a conduit for finances.

Other challenges that emerged following the agreement include, the inability of the government to accept Abyei border demarcations as recommended by the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC). The Missiriya tribe in the area had also been unhappy due to the loss of grazing land, showing that the issue of border demarcations has many facets. The dispute has been referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. A second issue is the emergence of other armed groups, such as the SSDF, whose members joined the SPLA in January 2006. The LRA is another armed group that has emerged as a problem, while in the south the Sudanese armed forces are the most dangerous forces due to their ability to arm other groups. The Darfur crisis is another impediment, because even with the signing of the Darfur peace agreement, JEM attacked Khartoum on May 10th 2008, reflecting the fractures in the agreement. The indictment of President Omar Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) also places the SPLM in a difficult position because they now have to ally themselves either with the international community in condemning the president or working with the NCP. The option of power sharing has also been nullified, with cooptation by the government as the only option offered by the agreements.

The recent national census that was carried out also presents other challenges. The SPLA introduced many concerns, ranging from the lack of border demarcations in the production of the census as well as the non inclusion of the diaspora. Other concerns included the lack of religion and tribal delineation in the categories of the census. Some of the recommendations of the paper included the need to have elections for the democratic transformation of the country, however there is a need to create institutional infrastructure first. The limitations of the CPA are problematic for carrying out democratic elections since the national assembly passed a decision that parties not supporting the CPA cannot take part.

The discussant for the first session was Dr. Ahmed Sikainga, Director of African Studies at Ohio State University, and author of numerous publications including "The Western Bahr Al Ghazal under British Rule, 1898–1956." Dr. Ahmed began by reiterating some of the important point of the paper. The paper is critical of the CPA process, implementation and outcome. There is a consensus among the architects of the CPA and Sudanese scholars that the CPA was flawed from its origin because of the non-holistic way it was produced. The town of Abyei, nicknamed the Kashmir of Sudan, is a highly contentious issue that will be dealt with in the 2011 referendum.

The discussant went on to critique some of the paper's contents. Firstly, it posits unity against separation; however these distinctions were laid out by international pressures and the inability of each side to win. The other incorrect aspect of this distinction is that it discounts the social realities on the ground. The displacement of southern Sudanese has changed the composition of the north. Therefore secessionist desires to create monolithic entities is not realistic. The split between Hasan Abdullah al-Turami and Omar Bashir in 1999 has led to a loss of ideological solidification in both the central government (NCP) and the National Islamic Front (NIF.) Rather the different organizations have become power centers with a combination of both hardliners and pragmatists. SPLA has not been able to transform from a guerilla movement to a

While the US role in reaching a peace agreement cannot be over-estimated, its engagement has markedly declined in the implementation phase when the problems of the agreement have increasingly come to the fore. Thus the claim that the CPA would lay the basis for a renewed Sudanese federal union quickly floundered and the hope now is simply that the agreement will provide the framework for peacefully ushering in South Sudan's independence. The SPLM leadership never had much faith a united Sudan despite their CPA commitments and a program dedicated to New Sudan. But its leaders were confident they would never be put to the test because they believed the NCP would never live up to the CPA stipulation of making unity attractive. And if the NCP was committed to a united Sudan – a big 'if' - it was only because it anticipated southerners would turn against themselves as they have so often done in the past and the referendum would either be indefinitely postponed or the ruling party would be seen as the only means to stop the country's descent into chaos.

While the NCP, SPLM, and the international backers of the peace process were divided on many issues in the lead up to the signing of the CPA, they were united in opposing consideration of Sudan's conflict in a holistic manner and accepting that the contradictions that fostered conflict in Darfur and the east were the same as those that produced the twenty-two year long north-south war. During 2004 when Darfur was experiencing what the UN described as the greatest humanitarian disaster in the world the parties to the peace process each had their own reasons for ignoring the conflict. But by so doing they passed up on what in retrospect was the best opportunity to resolve the conflict before it spun out of control.

The SPLM did not want any expansion of the peace process because that could undermine its efforts to lay down a path for achieving self-determination for the south. But appreciating that approach would not go down well in international circles Garang inferred that with the SPLM in the GNU and himself serving as First Vice Presi-

ty who argue that scheduling under the CPA is too restrictive and there needs to be more time to meet its requirements. There is less prospect of this scenario being realised since the SSDF – the most effective means SAF had to cause disruption in the south – have largely gone over to the SPLA, but it cannot be completely discounted. However, depending on the position taken by the SPLM this approach could produce massive dissent in the south and the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence.

No doubt other scenarios could be considered, but this review should be sufficient to cast into doubt the beliefs of the formulators of the CPA that national elections will make a major contribution to Sudan's democratic transformation and the advancement of the peace process.

Conclusion

The objective of this analysis was to provide an overview and update as of the end of July of Sudan's North-South peace process. Although it was claimed that the CPA represented a high mark for regional cooperation and for IGAD, instead it demonstrated the importance of outside agents, notably the US and its allies, in shaping regional relations in the Horn and security outcomes. Unlike in other parts of the world, however, the US decided to operate through a regional body, IGAD, and a local ally, Kenya. There is little doubt, however, that US engagement was crucial in bringing the parties to the negotiating table, shaping the process, and giving legitimacy to the CPA. The US was also crucial in ensuring that the peace process was narrowly defined, that the Darfur conflict was not taken up in the peace process, and that only lip service was given to Sudan's democratic transition. While to some extent these failures can be attributed to over-sights, they also derive from the approach of the US to the peace process which was primarily driven by geo-political interests and in particular the so-called war on terror.

political party. Currently, there is a debate whether the government will carry out the referendum; however the recent acquirement of tanks by the SPLA is worrisome. There is a belief that war may be imminent.

The plenary began with statements and questions from participants. A participant agreed with the statement that the north is not purely Arab. This was showcased in the second convention in Juba in May, where unity talks with SPLM were problematized by southerners in the north feeling isolated, therefore they were more likely to advocate unity. The participant concluded that war is on the horizon, since the SPLA is also trying to attain an air force. A second participant stated that civil society groups from the north and south have been communicating and the consensus has been that the CPA was successful in stopping all out warfare; however it also legitimized a delegitimized system. The fundamental issue is not the north or south, rather it is the collapse of a whole state. A third participant associated challenges in the north with a lack of political will, while in the south the problem is lack of capacity. There is a fundamental need to transform the center. A participant followed this statement by questioning the assumption of unfettered freedom expected by southern secession, and how this was viewed by neighboring countries.

Dr. Umbadda responded to these assertions by emphasizing the paper's stance that the DOP of 1994 destroyed the foundations of the CPA. However, it did meet the interests of both parties. The analysis of the DOP needs to be more refined, and the interests of the international community should not precede local advancement. A participant added that southern identity emerged out of animosity towards the north, and that Dinka members of the SPLA dominated the movement. The elections in Kenya and the violence that followed had an influence on the region. Another participant stated that the majority of Sudanese accepted the CPA with excitement, since most found John Garang's vision of a new Sudan appealing. However, major stakeholders were not willing to include other stakeholders, for example civil society. The participant posited the

Sudanese desire for a new Sudan with other participant's depiction of secessionist sentiments in the south. A second participant had a two part question targeting the influence of oil companies in the region, and whether IGAD has the capability to make peace a reality. A third participant requested more clarification on the involvement of external actors. A fourth participant questioned some of the facts in the paper, namely the assertion that Kenya provided land for U.S. activities. However the participant did attest to U.S - Kenya military cooperation.

Dr. Umbadda responded by stating that he could not refine the U.S.-Kenya relations depiction in the paper. IGAD should be interested in the joint security of the regions. The multinational perspective of U.S. foreign policy to some extent represents corporations as well. Dr. Sikainga responded that IGAD countries have interest in Sudan becoming a secular state.

The second paper that was presented was by Gerard Prunier from Ecole de Paris, a researcher on the Horn and author of "Darfur: An Ambiguous Genocide." The paper entitled "The State of the Darfur Problem at mid 2008" addressed the intertwined nature of the unresolved conflict in Darfur and the crisis in the whole of Sudan. The presenter began by referring to books that provide background to the situation in Darfur, such as "Darfur's Sorrows; A History of Destruction and Genocide." The presenter stated that such books would provide the necessary background to the conflict, and that he would concentrate on the current issues at play.

The CPA never included Darfur, which is a considerable misstep stemming from American pressure. The assumption was that peace in the south will lead to peace in the West. The DPA has been non-functioning since June 2008 following the departure of its only signatory Minni Arkoy Minnawi. The Chadian dimension has also created hurdles for the process because the initial rapport between the two countries had deteriorated following the Khartoum supported quasi coup in Chad in May 2005. This led to a retaliatory rebel attack on Khartoum. In the case of Darfur a low intensity war

vote on southern self-determination carry far more weight with the SPLM than support for Sudan's marginalised.

The second possibility is that the SPLM and NCP would form an electoral alliance. This would have the advantage of carrying forward the peace process (to the extent that the peace process was really about providing a blueprint for the south's separation and protecting the interests of the NCP) and it would likely mean the election would largely be fair because the two main parties could expect to gain a large majority without cheating. But it would negate any notion of a democratic transformation and would be a prelude to the south's separation. Moreover, given its consistent practice of appeasing the international community the SPLM would be very sceptical about such an alliance should warrants be issued by the ICC judges for the arrest of President Beshir (and a decision is expected by October or November 2008).

Third, the NCP and its Islamist allies might win a free and fairly conducted election. This would ensure the present security regime would be maintained, but there would be no democratic transformation, and southerners would interpret it as a rejection of the south and would vote for independence.

Fourth, fearing the loss of the election the NCP could commit massive fraud to maintain power. Again there would be no democratic transformation, the south would be encouraged to vote for independence, and this would likely precipitate an *intefadab*.

Fifth, either as a result of the efforts of the Darfur liberation movements to disrupt the election, or an indecisive outcome in which no party or group of parties gained control, the army could carry out a coup.

And lastly, just as the promised referendum on southern self-determination in the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 was not kept because of insecurity, this argument might again be used to postpone the CPA stipulated elections. Indeed, postponing the election has support in some sections of the international communi-

to that was the CPA stipulated national elections. While the CPA requires the election to take place before the end of the third year (i.e. by December 2008), under the modalities of implementation the NCP and SPLM agreed to postpone the election for another year, which made clear their lack of enthusiasm for the exercise and how it was only agreed to in the face of considerable international pressure. In the event, even with the additional year there has been no North-South border demarcation, including that of Abyei, the census results are unlikely to be conclusive and in any case for the most part do not include Darfur.

Moreover, as a pre-requisite to the election both the GNU and the GoSS are required under the CPA to enact democratic constitutions and create regimes of respect for human rights, but three and a half years into the peace process censorship of the media remains common in the north while unofficial harassment of journalists is frequent in the south. Demonstrators are routinely beaten and arrested in the north, free trade unions are still in their infancy, civil society is manipulated and infiltrated by the police, and security agencies continue to dominate life in the north. And in Darfur more than two million people live in IDP camps, face major problems of personal insecurity, and exist under a regime of martial law. These conditions do not bode well for the conduct of free and fair elections, and it is unlikely they will significantly improve prior to the election.

Against this background it is useful to consider at least a few possible outcomes of the election should they take place. First, one might expect that the SPLM would endeavour to lead an alliance of parties representing the marginalised since this is consistent with the party's commitment to 'New Sudan'. Such an electoral alliance, if successful, might advance the prospects for a Darfur peace agreement, and could serve to convince southerners to vote for unity in the 2011 referendum. But progress in constructing such an alliance has at best been slow. Moreover, the strong support the SPLM has given to the NCP over the JEM attack on Omdurman and the ICC Prosecutor General's claims against President Beshir make clear that *real politic* and the desire to maintain the peace process through to a

is reverting to banditry. There is a lot of infighting among Arabs since the displacement of black settlers has freed up land, which has created a scramble among Arab groups for the acquisition of land. The primary basis for the Janjaweed attacks was the possibility of acquiring land. There is a potential reoccurrence of active genocide as witnessed in the late 2003 until late 2004 period where actual cleansing took place. The current situation is one of violent attacks as opposed to cleansing. Other problems include the cut of the WFP allowance by 50% on May 1st 2008 due to transportation problems in delivering supplies to the camps. The camps house 2.3 million people.

The impending indictment of President Omar Bashir has numerous consequences. Firstly it's a huge obstacle to the continuance of the peace process. For example, Khalil Ibrahim (leader of JEM) and other players now want regime change as opposed to reaching a possible settlement. Secondly, JEM (Justice and Equality Movement) has emerged as the main threat to the government. This was augmented by JEM's purportedly close relationship with Hasan al Turabi, one of the fore front leaders of the ideological wing of the NIF, and the army. JEM denies these allegations. The repercussion of this triple association was realized on May 10th 2008, where an attack orchestrated by Khalil Ibrahim on Khartoum was supposed to start an uprising against the government. Fourthly, the attack on the refugee camp of Kalma, which is the largest camp housing 80,000 people, signaled the enormity of the consequences if President Bashir would be indicted. Following the indictment President Bashir also went to Darfur and made promises for the region, which is a drastic change from the half a century of neglect experienced by the region. There is also a Chinese initiative to block the indictment, which reflects the country's concern with the stability of the country. The Chinese are aware of the internal weakness of the regime, and understand that this could lead to a war in the south. This in turn would hamper unity efforts, which would compromise Chinese interests in the country. The Chinese are attempting to apply article 16 of the Rome statute, which would allow for a one year suspension of the indictment. However, the application of

article 16 is problematic, because the wording is difficult. China will ultimately look to the AU. During the last Ankara meeting, President Bashir appealed to the AU directly, stating that "...if it happened to me, it can happen to you."

Dr Siddiq Umbadda was the first discussant following the presentation. He began by addressing the root causes of the conflict in Darfur, stating that the main problem is insecurity. In the 1980's, the south and east were stable regions. The conception of Darfur as a separate entity is overstated, rather the Darfur region was neglected for a long period of time leading to marginalization. The discussant next addressed the CPA issue. SPLA representatives were against the possibility of compensation for Darfur and possible ascription of the vice presidency to Darfurians. This was primarily because it would go against the status quo. The discussant went on to state that the government is not interested in resolving issues of governance. Fighting among Arab groups was instigated by the government because initially they were entities supported by the government but afterwards they became too strong. This was compounded by the progress of development which was concentrated in the north while minute efforts were evident in the south.

The plenary began with a series of question and critiques. One participant raised the issue of the tribalization of Darfur. Between 1925-2000 fighting was centered around resources, the tribal aspect of the conflict was minimal. Consequently, the paper fails to look at root causes, and gilds over the human right violations of the regime. The central issue is actually compensation. A second participant stated that there is a tendency to view the conflict as static. The dissemination of violence to lower levels, and the emergence of new players such as the Rzeugat Arabs need to be considered. Another new element is the politicization of IDP camps.

Dr. Prunier responded to these statements by extrapolating the historical backdrop of the Sudanese state. There used to be one united Sudan with six regions. Following federalism it was further

will likely determine who is eligible to vote in the 2011 referendum since voters must be southerners resident in the territory at the time of the census. Indeed, in the past year there has been a major effort by International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs), the GoSS, and even state governments to return people to the south, but many still remain. Second, the GoSS was anxious to have the census determine the tribal and religious identity of those counted, but this demand was rejected by the NCP. In the last British conducted census it was determined that 30% of Sudan's population claimed an Arab identity, which if affirmed or the number of Arabs had declined, would bring into stark relief Arab domination of the country and strengthen African claims to a greater share of state power.⁴⁶

Concern over these issues led the GoSS to announce on 12 April that the census had been postponed indefinitely, but on the following day the Presidency announced that it would only be delayed one week and would proceed on 22 April. The one week delay represents a climb down by the GoSS since those few additional days could not be expected to provide the necessary time to change the security conditions in Darfur, make progress on the border demarcation or bring more IDPs and refugees back to the south. At the time of writing (July) the results of the census are only beginning to trickle in and no conclusive results are available. In any case, with major gaps in its coverage, such as Darfur, and continuing distrust between the NCP and the SPLM, the SPLM has made clear that it will not necessarily be bound by the results, while the various Darfuran rebel movements have strongly condemned the exercise. What is clear is that the final determination will probably have less to do with a dispassionate consideration of the technical issues than with the political interests of the SPLM and NCP.

National Elections

Critical to the legitimacy and viability of the peace process was the commitment to a democratic transformation and intimately linked

subsequently appointed to investigate the affair. While a SPLM spokesperson said that the party had not ruled out leaving the GNU over the affair⁴⁵ the event was immediately overtaken by the SPLM's resounding endorsement of the Beshir led government in the National Assembly in the wake of the ICC announcement. Once again the SPLM is conveying the message that it is prepared to overlook or accept NCP transgressions of the CPA in the interest of keeping the peace process on track.

National Census

Critical to the holding of the 2009 national election was the conduct of the CPA stipulated census which was held in late April and early May 2008. As well as formidable logistical and organizational problems in carrying out a census in an environment as underdeveloped as that of South Sudan, there were also major political obstacles. Although this was the fifth attempted census, the last uncontested one was carried out by the British on the eve of independence, such is the controversy they raise in a country as divided and polarised as Sudan. From the outset there were problems in the organisation of the census, notably between the North and South components of the Census Commission and allegations in the south that Khartoum was not releasing funds in a timely fashion. More important were the delays in demarcating the North-South border, including that of Abyei, and the impossibility of conducting it in major parts of Darfur given the continuing conflict. In the event not only was there no count in the war affected areas, but the IDPs were also not counted.

But the GoSS was particularly concerned about two issues. First, was the continuing large numbers of southerners still in the North and others living in refugee camps outside Sudan. This is because the CPA power sharing formula was based on the assumption that the south had (or more accurately would have at the time of the census) 28% of the population. This formula is also supposed to serve as the basis of the distribution of central state resources and

divided into 25 regions, and the presenter asserted that tribalization was instigated by this structure, and conflict was ultimately filtered to the localities. The issue of the militarization of the IDP camps has been exhibited via the transformation of camps into bastions for rebels. The outside influences of the conflict include the Save Darfur movement in the U.S. which Mr Prunier described as defunct. However, it funnels money to the communities, and promotes a new conservative block. The influence of the Black Caucus, and the Human Rights lobby ultimately showcases the internationalization of the conflict in Darfur.

The next round of discussions began with a question from a participant. It's been over two years since emissaries from Abuja were sent to revive the agreement. The participant questioned whether the revival of the agreement was still a feasible alternative and whether a negotiated settlement was possible in Darfur. Mr Prunier responded by negating the possibility of a peace settlement at this current time, and that there are two factors to consider in future settlements, namely the Janjaweed and the progression of the indictment. In relation to the south, the likelihood of violence is high and the absence of John Garang leaves a big gap. The presenter also highlighted the importance of the period between elections and the referendum i.e. 2009-2011. Dr. Siddiq also mentioned the presence of civil society in the conflict in particular the emergence of debates over the nature of power sharing agreements and wealth. There should be a movement to unite these different agendas into one coherent dialogue. The discussant concluded by stating that the main players should be local, and international interests should be addressed after tackling local interests.

The discussions around the Sudanese conflict continued with a participant stating that no single party can win a majority in Sudanese politics, and that this was incorporated in the DOP and other agreement. Dr Siddiq responded by stating that there needs to be a more concrete analysis of the meaning of Darfur Darfur dialogue. The discussant assured the audience that the only divide between Darfurians is whether the area should be a region or a

state, and the majority of Darfurians are leaning towards a region status. The discussant continued stating that the basis of Abuja can't be thrown away all together, and that there is a need to tighten the resolve around it. Currently, the government has signed it, but has avoided implementation. Prof. Prunier continued the discussion on the central government stating that the NCP is the most progressive and capacitated group to come to power in Sudanese history, however the issue of Darfur was strategically left out. This is due to the possibility that the Darfur transitional authority could develop into the something like Juba, which would make it a quasi regional government. This would make it a power player when the north Sudan-south Sudan conflict erupts. The presenter concluded by stating that "Sudan doesn't exist anymore, now it's a mosaic of agreements held together by a thread." The discussion should be focused around what to do next.

The plenary continued with four participants posing questions and statements. The first participant stated that there should be a move out of the DPA. A second stated that the Darfur Darfur dialogue should be implemented after the peace agreements. A third participant targeted the issue of mistrust and the possibility that it may hamper progressions towards peace. The last participant questioned overall perceptions towards northern Sudanese, and their sense of security.

Dr. Siddiq responded by stating that defining northern Sudan is problematic because it traditionally contained both Darfur and eastern Sudan. This implies that there are divisions in northern Sudan itself. However, so far the conflict in the south has been shielded from the north, via government restriction. Therefore there is limited consciousness in the north concerning the conditions in the south, concurring with low levels of public pressure. Unequal development in the different regions relates to the gaps in the CPA. The CPA also created a ceiling for other agreements for example in the marginalization of Darfur. Subsequently, there is a fear that reopening the agreement will reignite old issues. The role of the international community is pertinent in this matter because there

ment did not initially forcefully demand participation), and other concerns.

The refusal of the NCP to respond to these concerns led to SPLM ministers withdrawing from the GNU in mid-2007. However, with neither party prepared to accept a complete breakdown of the peace process agreement was reached between them in December that led to the Cabinet changes Salva wanted. Telar was removed from the Presidency, Lam was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by Deng Alor, and Pagan Amoum, General Secretary of the SPLM, became Minister of Cabinet Affairs. In the subsequent acrimony Telar and two others were dismissed from the SPLM and Lam is being investigated for allegations that he was creating his own party in the Shilluk Kingdom.

To date major political issues dividing the SPLM and NCP have not been resolved and it is not clear that the newly appointed ministers will prove any more effective than the out-going ones. To provide just one example: while the SPLM maintains its own unofficial ambassador in Washington and repeatedly draws the attention of the Americans to what it perceives as the failures of the NCP to implement the CPA, Foreign Affairs Minister Deng Alor is working just as hard as Lam did in rehabilitating Sudan-US relations and is supported by an SPLM appointed ambassador in Washington.

But despite the SPLM display of strength by withdrawing from the GNU, problems over the composition of the Cabinet remain as was made clear by Beshir's dismissal of Pagan Amoum as Cabinet Affairs Minister on 9 July 2008 because of a speech in which he was quoted as saying that Sudan is a 'failed and corrupt state'.⁴² Salva responded that he was 'disappointed' that he had not been 'informed' of the decision,⁴³ not exactly a ringing endorsement of his minister, and perhaps this was due to his reported disenchantment with Pagan. Indeed, statements by NCP officials make clear Pagan's expulsion was meant to play to SPLM divisions.⁴⁴ The SPLM was, however, reported to be unhappy that there were no representatives from the party on the five person committee Beshir

that had been appointed by the NCP and were loyal to the NCP. Although the CPA called for growing southern participation in the civil service, progress to date has been limited. This situation produced tensions across the board, but particularly in the Ministry of Energy which the SPLM accused of lacking transparency in oil production and revenue figures as a means to deny the south its fair share of petroleum revenues. The NCP also delayed the formation of the CPA stipulated National Petroleum Commission and according to the SPLM worked to undermine its effectiveness.

Also of concern for the SPLM was the widely held view that some of its appointed ministers and officials in the GNU had been co-opted by the NCP. Dr. Lam Akol, who Salva had appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, stood out in this respect. A case in point was the conflict in Darfur in which he roundly criticized the rebels (some of whom had previously been supported by the SPLM/A), strongly defended the role of the government in the face of mounting international criticism, and worked hard for the election of Beshir to the presidency of the AU (although these efforts came to naught). Telar Deng as a Minister in the Presidency was also accused of supporting NCP policies. Salva appointed them for their intelligence, but also because they were not in the Garang camp and hence could be expected to support him, but they proved to be some of the politically weakest and least reliable SPLM members.

Responding to these criticisms, Salva informed President Beshir that he wanted a number of his ministers removed or re-assigned. Beshir refused to respond to these requests and SPLM concerns at where were held to be the NCP's failure to implement key provisions of the CPA. Failure to accept the ruling of the Abyei Boundary Commission led the list, but it also included SAF's continuing support of OAGs in the south, lack of progress on the census and border demarcation, failure to keep security arrangements provisions on the removal of troops from the south (although the SPLA was also in breach of these provisions), unwillingness to accept the SPLM as a partner in the Darfur peace process (although the move-

was a high level of involvement by the U.S. and Europe in the construction of the CPA. The discussant concluded stating that northern Sudan should not be discounted especially with the existence of anti Islamic, anti Arab sentiments. There are also sentiments in favor of a larger Sudan among the urban population, for example by the Sudanese communist party who have been an important arbiter of discourse for decades. A participant interjected at this point returning to the issue of the SPLA stating that the group should not be ignored or negated.

Prof. Prunier contextualized the Sudanese conflict by referring to history. Between 1955-1972 northern Sudan was a coherent whole, however it fragmented in subsequent years. A single party is not feasible in the current setup, but this should not lead to comparisons of SPLM with previous groups. Millions of people welcomed John Garang because he embodied the notion that Sudan was "Le Hammaras," and had the charisma to project. The current commander Mr. Salva Kiar does not exude similar characteristics. There is hope that the SPLM can revitalize the discourse began by John Garang.

The last presenter on the first day of conference was Dr. Rogaia Abusharaf professor of anthropology at Kuwait University. Dr Abusharaf began by dividing the presentation into two parts, firstly in the portrayal of displaced women's narratives. The second part would be a critique of policy reports in Sudan.

Women's narratives in the context of displacement portray the pain of removal and active efforts to make peace, promoting reconciliation on a daily basis. There is a process of intermingling, interacting among different cultures. In conditions of displacements, there is a stronger need to shed male-female differentiations because assertiveness is required in insecure situations. Dr. Abusharaf associated this with a process of feminist transformation and the reemergence of a female narrative. The presenter next tackled the topic of local ascriptions of meaning towards peace and security via the identification of the interlocutors of peace and the master

planners behind the dominant narratives. This relates to questions over submissiveness and the subsequent insecurity over security.

In the context of the Horn inequitable gender roles and violence against women are often accepted. Displacement however creates a sharpened sense of citizenship via participation. This combats victimization, which is one layer of state transgression of fundamental rights, which is embedded in a multilayer discrimination of women. However there are still difficulties for women in displacement, and one should not romanticize displacement as a space for political expression. There is still a lack of equality especially in the area of representation, and a lack of institutional support. There are attempts to amend this, for example 25% of seats in the south Sudan constitution is given to women. However, there still needs to be an analysis of the structures prior to the war, and there needs to be a sustainable narrative around peace. Other examples of attempts to create discourse include women strategizing to bring an end to the Nuer- Dinka conflict in Sudan. Efforts like these should be promoted as part of a practice of listening across differences.

The presenter next addressed the problems of traditional practices promoting discriminatory measures. Challenging traditional roles is not seen as a valid option in the context of distributive justice, which is problematic. Some solutions forwarded by the organization Inclusive Peace: Women Waging Peace addressed this problem and others including the necessity for inclusive peace meetings, the creation of administrative and other plans around refugees and IDP's, gender based security initiatives, and the promotion of peace and security in general. Accountability has emerged as a major feature of this process, especially since it features predominantly in the ICC indictment of President Bashir. Promoting accountability is especially problematic because of the system of kinship that overrides and permeates the legal system. The presenter concluded by stating that interethnicgroup talks is an important component of reconciliation.

an understanding with the international community and to cooperate with the ICC', but at the same time said the accusations by the Prosecutor General jeopardize the implementation of the CPA and the country's democratic transition.³⁹

Until mid-2007 the SPLM had tried to ignore the conflict in Darfur, but in the last year it has been increasingly drawn into the politics of the dispute. Some in the SPLM/A leadership had shown sympathy for the Darfurian rebels, particularly the SLM/A, which Garang had supported and which advocates a program similar to that of the SPLM/A, including a clear statement on the need for separation of state and religion. But it is clear that others (and this likely includes Salva), are fearful that the Darfur insurgency could derail the CPA initiated peace process and in particular its commitment to the 2011 vote on southern self-determination. Thus when SPLM General Secretary Pagan Amum publicly entertained the idea of reviewing the CPA's power sharing provisions as a means to bring the Darfuri liberation movements into the peace process his ideas were promptly rejected by Salva and others.⁴⁰ The message was clear: the CPA was the 'bible' to which the SPLM/A was devoted and any challengers to it, even if they were members of the 'marginalized', would be fought.

Government of National Unity and the Peace Process

As stipulated by the CPA a Government of National Unity was established with the NCP holding 52% of the seats and positions, the SPLM holding 28%, and the remaining 20% divided among Sudan's other political groups. Over the past year the GNU was a focus of battles between the SPLM and the NCP and factional struggles within the SPLM that negatively impacted the peace process. Three and half years after the signing of the CPA power at every level of the GNU remains overwhelmingly with the NCP, SPLM ministers have been weak and ineffectual, and that includes Salva whose influence on GoS policy-making has been insignificant.⁴¹ In part this was because SPLM officials operated through a civil service

Darfurian political parties and Sudan's National Assembly have given their complete support for the president and they were joined by the AU, the Arab League, and the government's foremost international supporter, China.

This support, however, does not necessarily reflect the views of non-Arab Sudanese, particularly those outside the riverain core. Moreover, while the ICC Prosecutor's indictment proceeds from his conviction of the guilt of Beshir, the opposition to it in Sudan's political circles is based on fear of opposing the government, and the contention that it will reduce the prospects of a peace agreement in Darfur and disrupt the work of the UN-African hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur (UNAMID), or threaten the viability of the GNU and bring about the down fall of the North-South peace process. To those claims it need to be noted that first, the DPA collapsed almost as soon as it was signed, and there has been no viable peace process since then, and second, the problems facing the North-South peace process pre-date the action taken by the ICC Prosecutor General. Although the NCP could – as some critics claim – express their anger at the ICC by intensifying the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, it is likely to be constrained by fear of alienating important international backers, such as China and Egypt, both of which have peacekeeping contingents in Darfur.

Similar constraints exist with respect to the North-South peace process. The NCP is unlikely to walk away from the CPA because by so doing it would lose the SPLM as an ally and bring about the return to a North-South war, something it is woefully ill-prepared for given its military and political difficulties in Darfur. But the Prosecutor General's actions have placed the SPLM in a particularly difficult position of wanting to retain the support of the international community which it has long depended upon, and at the same time wanting to continue working with the NCP to ensure that the peace process is not disrupted. When the first arrest warrants were issued a year ago the SPLM called upon Beshir to turn those wanted over to the ICC, but this time the party's position has become more nuanced. Thus Salva called on the GNU (in effect the NCP) to 'forge

The discussant for this paper was Ms. Solome Taddese, former spokesperson for the Ethiopian government. She began by targeting the placement of gender as a separate topic in the conference. The discussant stated that because gender was placed as a separate topic other papers did not cover it, which could be doing a disservice to the topic in general. She next addressed the nature of victimization, which ascribes the notion of dehumanization via the desecration of women. This is because manliness or national pride is often ascribed to the purity of the woman, and her desecration becomes a symbol of national humiliation. However, the notion of women as unadulterated peace promoters is also an exaggeration, because women can also be promoters of conflict. This can be seen in the increased masculinity of women during guerilla wars. The discussant stated that war time is one of the most evident times of gender equality because both men and women participate in warfare. The discussant next addressed the value of representation and the notion that female representation is necessary in all fields. This assumes that this will introduce a gendered perspective in different disciplines; however this may not be the case. There needs to be a move from a gender debate to a gender conversation, because some of the core assumptions underlying the gender debate need to be reanalyzed.

The discussion began with a participant relating the gender discussion to Somali society. In Somalia men are mostly demoralized and unemployed, while many women are widowed or orphaned. The term displacement connotes removal from a place, however when these groups are displaced from a situation of inequity asking them to return becomes a difficult task. A second participant opened the discussion to the different divisions of labor evident in south Sudan, and that purely adopting equality with men there would actually cause deficiencies in the labor force because women bear the brunt of production activities. Dr. Abusharaf responded to the discussant and these assertions by first addressing the issue of representation. Increasing female representation doesn't necessarily address inequality, rather the established system of hierarchy needs to be reframed before gender inequities can be addressed. Quota's may serve more of a symbolic importance rather than a functional purpose. The

Africa. Although the crisis went on for almost two decades, the conflict in Somalia remained more or less manageable for Ethiopia. This has changed in late 2006 with the emergence of the Islamic Courts as a united military force. Led by figures with an Islamist and irredentist rhetoric and powerful elements with an unmistakable *jihadist* agenda, the UIC invited Ethiopian intervention³⁰. The decision to enter Somalia was driven by more immediate considerations though: the Courts' links to transnational terrorism, support for Ethiopia rebel groups, and reliance on Eritrea. Clearly, the recent war in Somalia is the result of a reckless policy of confrontation by the Somali Islamic extremists who have taken both policies and rhetoric (such as holding their next *salat* prayers in Addis) too far to provoke a powerful neighbor³¹. Their reckless and out of control behavior triggered the presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu today. Another consideration was the conflict with Eritrea.

Not unique, but certainly the main conflict between states in the region; the political and armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea lies at the heart of the region in geopolitical terms; and it has a poisoning effect on other conflicts, including those which are essentially unrelated to it³². Eritrea and Ethiopia are currently locked in a proxy war in Somalia. Eritrea is fully supporting, most, if not all of the rebel groups that are causing havoc in Ethiopia and Somalia. After failing to convince the rest of the world to stand by Eritrea on the "border issue", the Eritrean leader has taken it upon him to destabilize Ethiopia. To that end, he continued to sponsor a myriad of rebel groups³³. Already, the region is suffocating with liberation fronts, some with legitimate grievances and some others, with dubious origin and agendas. From the Sudan, to Eritrea, to Ethiopia and Somalia, the region is bursting with many armed rebel groups. It is now clear that the region should confront the startling fact that Eritrea has fully given itself completely to the cause of being a military base to all insurgencies throughout the region.

In addition, there are reports that elements in SAF provided assistance and that some of its members joined the rebels.³⁷ The regime was clearly unsettled by the attack and immediately set about arresting large numbers of Darfuris in the capital and conducting various investigations. The Ministers of Defense and Interior were roundly criticized in the National Assembly and the former offered his resignation. The one bright spot for the NCP was the response of First Vice President Salva Kiir (who was serving as president of the republic at the time because Beshir was on the hajj) and the SPLM/A leadership which made clear their complete support for the government and condemnation of JEM.³⁸ Since the Darfuri rebels were largely inspired by the SPLM/A, took on board its notions of New Sudan, and the SPLM had endeavoured to bring them into the peace process and considered an electoral alliance with them, this forthright rejection was all the more significant. Moreover, it made clear to JEM that in targeting the government they would also have to confront the SPLA.

The announcement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC Prosecutor General, of his intention to seek indictments against President Beshir for the policies of his government in Darfur has served to further underline the fact that Sudan's conflicts cannot realistically be considered in the piecemeal fashion of the peacemakers in Naivasha, Asmara, and Abuja. This latest effort by the Prosecutor General comes a year after arrest warrants were issued for Ahmed Haroun (subsequently appointed Deputy Minister of the Humanitarian Affairs Commission in the GNU) and Ali Kushayb (a janjawid leader believed to be operating at the behest of SAF) for crimes against humanity in Darfur and whom Beshir made clear will not be turned over to the ICC. Without considering the growing debate on whether the indictments will increase or decrease the likelihood of reaching a sustainable peace agreement in Darfur (and the Prosecutor's action was not in any case premised on that objective), there is no doubt that it will complicate the north-south peace process, undermine the legitimacy of the GNU, and weaken Beshir internationally and nationally. Although at the time of writing none of these developments is apparent. Indeed, all the major non-

More serious are the political threats to the peace process caused by the continuing war in Darfur. They begin with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) that was signed in May 2007 between the NCP and the Mini Manawi faction of the SLM/A, but one year later it can be said to have had no discernable effect in decreasing the violence and instead has served to largely marginalize Manawi and his faction. (Indeed, at the time this is being written there is speculation that Manawi is in the process of defecting from the government.) The Darfur liberation movements have repeatedly stated their intention to carry the war to neighbouring Kordofan, and indeed in the last year a number of centres in the state have been attacked. They have also threatened to take the war to Khartoum, although the assumption was this would involve an attempted uprising in the city. With a large number of Darfuris in the three towns, and the supposed link between JEM and the Popular National Congress (PNC) of Turabi, the government took the threat seriously. But in the event, a contingent of a few hundred JEM soldiers led by Khalil Ibrahim travelled in jeeps six hundred kilometres from western Darfur to launch an attack on Omdurman on 10 May 2008.

JEM hoped that its forces could bring about the collapse of the regime, and should that objective not be achieved that SAF's military capacity be reduced, the government appear incapable of protecting Khartoum, and JEM be held as the prime arbitrator of the survival of Sudan.³⁵ In the event, the JEM force was defeated, but not before it destroyed a number of military planes and equipment and reportedly captured considerable weaponry.³⁶ Moreover, the weakness of SAF was exposed and the defence of the capital largely fell to the security agencies. Turabi and his close followers were arrested (and quickly released), and Sudan broke diplomatic relations with Chad which was accused of supporting the rebels. The Chadian Government may well have assisted JEM in response for Khartoum's aid to the rebels who attacked N'djamena in a similar manner from bases in Darfur in February.

Equally significant JEM's ability to travel long distances over largely open desert suggests that it received support from people en route.

Eritrea now is host, to a number of rebel groups, ranging from the Oromo Liberation Front/OLF/, the Ogaden National Liberation Front/ONLF/, the former Somali Union of Islamic Courts and many others, in between. Earlier this year, the Eritrean regime had increased its focus on what it considers as Ethiopia's weakest point—Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia³⁴. The conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Somalia cannot be delinked. This is not only because of the geographic proximity and ethnic affinity, the similar economic deprivation and humanitarian crisis, but also due to the religious and political nature of the conflict. Like the opposition in Somalia, the ONLF struggles to resolve the tension between the Islamist and nationalist/secular strands within the organization. The two strands have coexisted for long shaping relations with Somali insurgents in one way or the other. This coupled with the Eritrean factor have remained to be the major glue that binds the insurgency in both areas. Currently the ONLF is still caught in the military pressure from Ethiopia on the one hand and the tension between its own Islamist and secular-nationalist tendencies on the other which threatened its existence as a cohesive rebel group³⁵.

Eritrean obsession with Ethiopian politics is such that Somalia has become a major diplomatic priority for Asmara so much so that it pulled out from the regional grouping IGAD, which exposed the festering tension between the two countries and IGAD over the management of the conflict in Somalia³⁶. But Asmara has been at odds with IGAD since the bloc approved the deployment of peacekeepers in Somalia to help the Ethiopia-backed Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. It is now the main backer of the extremist wing of the ARS. This is having a profound impact on the war in Somalia and the quest for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. The *Shabab* and hardline elements of the Somali opposition will not accept anything that would favor a win-win solution because their backer (Eritrea) will not satisfy anything less than humiliating its arch enemy, Ethiopia. Although Eritrea is small, weak and very poor, it is, largely due to the situation in Somalia, a major threat to its neighbors, notably Ethiopia. Through the support for the UIC

political targets and humanitarian workers. The looming drought exacerbated these circumstances particularly the humanitarian crisis. The TFG was created as a response to these developments, however they were not endowed with the necessary strength or support to withstand these pressures. One of the major conclusions of the paper is that Ethiopian forces spent too much time being compromised by the TFG. Dr Tadesse described the weaknesses of the TFG as the following; it is heavily dependent on international support, there is a lack of trust among officials at the top level, the institutional structure is hollow, weak, and cannot deliver, it is unable to control and tame the warlords, and it is incapable of handling the humanitarian crisis. The need for a broader political consensus is obvious at this point, since the weakness of the TFG necessitates an alternative.

On the other hand, the opposition has major weaknesses as well. The previous ICU became part of the Alliance for the revolution of Somalia, but this is an amalgamation of different networks, including nationalists, clan forces, and business networks. It is not a monolithic group. All three groups were allied in opposing the Ethiopian support of the TFG. The Al Shabab is not part of the mainstream opposition as seen in its accusation that the ICU is a secular organization, rather it is based on strong links with international networks. However this international network has increased between the periods of 2006-2008. The hard-line elements such as Hasan Turki also exhibit rigidified views, often opposing any negotiated settlements of the Somali crisis. This goes beyond an opposition of the TFG. They were behind the entrance of Islamic Sharia into the military court system of Somalia, and they are the major link to Eritrean destabilization in Ethiopia. Terrorism has ideological bend, but criminal elements don't. The labeling of the Al Shabab as terrorists by the U.S also reduces the groups capability to negotiate. Dr Tadesse stated that the only solution is to overpower them considering these circumstances.

Dr. Tadesse next presented the regional aspect of the conflict. Ethiopia's intervention into Somalia was obviously based on securi-

ber at the bargaining table would increase the likelihood of leaks that could galvanize dissent, and third, the prevalence of the view among the mediators that 'small is good'.³⁰

In the jargon of the day the mediators concluded that Darfur was a 'peace spoiler' and that it was best not to consider the conflict within the context of the IGAD peace process. This was typically justified by contending – and almost all interested members of the international community at the time took this line – that the CPA would open the doors to a peaceful settlement in Darfur. That has not proved to be the case. Again this failure has its origins in the IGAD mediators' proposed agreement between the SPLM and NCP which gutted the holistic approach of the DoP. And the failure of this reductionism was made all the more clear by both the enormous scale of the conflict in Darfur, and the failure of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2007 to bring it to an end. Indeed, as Ryle and others pointed out, 'The price of the agreement in the south has been the exclusion from the peace process of all but two parties, the government and the SPLM'.³¹ Although the US has denied allegations by some in the GoS that it encouraged them to quickly militarily overcome the Darfuri rebels because of the threat they posed to the Naivasha peace process, it is true that the Americans concluded that it was expedient to press for a North-South agreement, even if that meant ignoring the unfolding horror in Darfur.³²

There is a limited danger of the Darfur conflict spreading to southern Sudan based on the armed groups that operate in the border area. SSDF leader Atom Al-Nur is believed to still have a small force in western BEG which has links with the Misseriya, Baggara, and Fursan, a SAF-aligned armed group believed to be assisting the *jangawid*.³³ There has also been some movement of displaced Darfuris into western BEG to escape the *jangawid*. Another potential point of conflict is over border demarcation because it is widely believed that that the Kafggen and Hoffra areas of Raja in western BEG contain valuable deposits of copper and uranium.³⁴ Lastly, Ali Tamin, a NCP Minister in the GNU from the area, is trying to unite western BEG with Darfur and that is proving destabilizing.

ern Equatoria were instigated or supported by SAF through its JIU forces in the south. SAF is also known to have armed large numbers of nomadic tribes in the border areas under the auspices of the Popular Defense Force (PDF), and many still retain their weapons.²⁹

In addition, SAF has taken many former SSDF soldiers into the JIU, despite provisions in the security arrangements agreement that the JIU is to be an elite force that will form the basis of the united Sudan army should the south vote for unity and that its members are to be drawn from SAF and the SPLA. And with their limited training and the fact that few of them are even literate, it is difficult to conceive of them as an elite. But it is not the technical breach of the agreement that engenders fear, but the view that SAF's southern JIU members can be used to disrupt the peace process.

The performance of the JIUs have been mixed at best: many of the forces have yet to be integrated, there have been problems over salaries which have on occasion led to rioting, and armed police under the NCP remain deployed in the oil fields. The issue of SAF's continuing presence in the south and the oil fields was one of the main reasons the SPLM withdrew from the GNU and it only returned upon receiving assurances that SAF would leave these areas by 9 January 2007. There was a re-deployment by that date, but the elements of SAF or its agents remain in the oil fields.

Darfur War

At present there is little danger of the war in Darfur spreading to southern Sudan in a significant way, but it does threaten to undermine the peace process and destabilize the GNU. The conflict in Darfur first came to the fore during the final phase of the IGAD sponsored peace negotiations, and while the Darfuri rebels pleaded to have their problem dealt with at that forum, their request was rejected. The refusal to consider the Darfur conflict was based on the same reasoning that other groups were excluded: first, the negotiations were held to be too complex; second, increasing the num-

ty concerns, which were exacerbated by Eritrean attempts of a proxy war via their involvement in Somalia. This was part of Eritrea's politics of destabilization following the Ethio-Eritrean war. Eritrea has a monopoly over all non state actors in the Horn, from Darfur to Somalia. This emanates from an obsession with Ethiopian politics. The Ethiopian intervention did not occur in a workable political formula ultimately relying on only one political actor in Somalia (the TFG) and was not anchored by an international support plan, for example AMISOM and UN peacekeeping teams are not stepping in. AMISOM became weak to the point that it was finally left with trying to survive as opposed to promoting stabilization. The strategy to reconstruct the state was top down as opposed to bottom up, which the presenter stated was a mistake considering the examples in Puntland and where peace was achieved via the establishment of local networks. This comes with the understanding that peace building may relegate state building in some circumstances. Control in Mogadishu should not be the main concern. The top down approach is also unrealistic due to the weakness of the TFG.

Dr Tadesse next laid down the foundations that would lead to robust peace in Somalia. Firstly, the presence of a government body is advantageous for hammering out deals, as opposed to dealing with a military government or a jihadist movement. Collaboration with governments also lends to capacity building projects. Secondly, this process would promote the rise of the moderates, and would bring the notion of national unity government to the table. Thirdly, this could guarantee an orderly withdrawal for Ethiopia. Fourthly, there is a need to moderate Islam in Somalia as opposed to marginalizing it. Fifthly, the categorization of the Al Shabab as terrorists by the U.S. administration throws a serious wrench into negotiation capabilities. Sixthly, external help could blunt radicalization, this should be seen in large scale economic aid involving reintegration of ex combatants (DDR.) Finally a bottom up approach and protection of the peace zones should be implemented..

Amb. Robleh, who was the moderator for this session stated that the issue of human security versus regime security should be a further topic of discussion, and introduced the discussant for the paper, Dr Mohammed Omar from the Center for International Education and Democracy in the University of London. He began by stating that it is an informative, comprehensive and well conceptualized paper. The Somalia conflict is often depicted as the clash of clan and tribal systems, marginalizing other modes of analysis. Rather the Somalia conflict is due to the long term marginalization of the peoples and regions as opposed to the clans. Competition over resources is an element of this. For example, the Somali land independence from Somalia was based on this sense of marginalization. The discussant stated that the paper tends to give tacit support to the Ethiopian intervention, basing the support on the threat posed by the Union of Islamic courts. The discussant countered this by stating the threat from the Union of Islamic Courts was rash and could not be the primary basis for the intervention, since the group had made similar threats before. Rather the main reason for the intervention is the danger of proxy war with Eritrea. The representation of the Islamists as the main threat is also misguided in because the Islamists appeared in 2006, while Somalia has been without a governmental structure for nearly 18 years. Islamists should be viewed as a framework for organizing the opposition, and this framework would have been existent with or without the Islamists. Rather the failure of Somalia should be seen as the lack of a capable, legitimate government.

Dr. Mohammed next laid out the process of Somali state formation. Between 1991-2004 there have been fourteen major conferences dealing with the conflict. There were two major conferences from among these, the first organized in Djibouti was considered to be part of the "Arab agenda." The president who emerged from these meetings was an Arabist. The second conference which was held in Kenya, and was funded by international NGO's, members of the EU and regional powers was considered to be part of the "African agenda" and saw the high influence of Ethiopia. The president of the TFG who emerged from these talks was close to Ethiopia. The

water and this led to attacks on local people and the SPLA. However, the failure of the Ugandan army to defeat the LRA and the SPLA's inability to defend the civilian population of Equatoria led the GoSS's Vice President, Dr. Riek Macher, to assume responsibility for mediating the dispute. And in August 2006 the LRA signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement with Uganda, which was subsequently renewed. The slow progress of the negotiations led to most of the LRA forces moving to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by the end of 2007, but isolated attacks on civilians in Equatoria continued.²⁶

In January 2008 the negotiators reached agreement and it was expected that Kony would sign on behalf of the LRA at an official ceremony on 10 April. It is known that Kony has met with Acholi traditional authorities and it is believed that he wants assurances that the process of reconciliation proposed will deter the International Criminal Court in The Hague from arresting him. In the subsequent weeks there were disquieting reports of LRA child abductions, which could be interpreted as laying the basis for further conflict,²⁷ as well as two attacks on civilians in South Sudan attributed to Kony's forces.²⁸ However, at the time of writing, and in the face of conciliatory statements by Kony, Riek has apparently convinced his own party and the NRM to make a further and final effort to get the LRA leader to sign the agreement.

SAF and the JIUs

The SPLA and GoSS continue to view SAF as the principal security threat facing southern Sudan in the first half of 2008. The biggest concern is held to be SAF's support for OAGs despite provisions in the CPA which restricted the armed groups to SAF, SPLA, and the JIUs. SAF continues to support a rump SSDF with Gordon Kong as its head, and although its numbers have been considerably depleted in the wake of the Juba Declaration and are now largely in the north. The concern, however, is that they could be activated in the event of a break down of the peace process. There are also suspicions that some of the banditry and supposed LRA attacks in west-

and clothed, may consider renewing their alliance with SAF. Indeed, a number of violent incidents have occurred in Bentiu and Malakal. The problem has also produced tensions between Nuer and Dinka fighters as was made clear in mid-2007 when former SSDF fighters and SPLA soldiers almost fought on the streets of Juba over possession of a Nile barge containing food and supplies.²⁴ At the last moment Salva diffused the crisis and ruled that the food belonged to the former SSDF.

Key to resolving the problem is the need for the SPLA and former SSDF leaders to develop cooperative relations. Until mid 2007 Salva served as the Minister of SPLA Affairs (effectively defense minister), but then he appointed Major-General Dominic Dim Deng, a long time ally, to the post.²⁵ Salva had long been frustrated with Oyai Deng who Garang appointed to the position of chief of defense staff to replace him. However, while Paulino had a good working relationship with Dominic, Oyai reportedly resented the new appointment and initially did not cooperate. Some progress was made in the wake of the SPLM's decision to leave the GNU when the threat of a return to war increased and this made clear the need to integrate the SSDF soldiers, many of whom are Nuer and would be on the front line in the event of conflict with SAF. But the wounds of the past have not been healed. Added to the difficulties on 2 May 2008 Dominic was killed in a plane crash in Wau and finding a suitable replacement will not be easy.

Lord's Resistance Army

The coming to power in the Ugandan government of Yoweri Museveni caused disaffection in much of the northern part of the country, but among the Acholi it produced the bizarre revolt of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) under Joseph Kony in the early 1990s. In response to Ugandan support for the SPLM/A, SAF began supplying the LRA with weapons on the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Finding itself unable to operate from their home area because of the Ugandan army, the LRA moved into western Equatoria to gain access to the region's food supplies and

sequence of conferences showed that Somalia is a battleground for regional powers, the inclusion of Somalia in the Arab project, the fragmentation and weakness of the Somali political groups, and the inability and weakness of Somalia in carrying out state building on its own. The discussant contrasted this with the development of Somaliland, where the local reconciliation process was strong. The Somaliland process also lacked international involvement, rather the Somaliland diaspora was instrumental in the funding of the peace process. In Somalia, warlords were given political platforms particularly by the U.S., who the discussant described as giving more support to warlords rather than the peace process. The discussant concluded that the international community should support the recent Djibouti agreement with a concurrent support by Ethiopia for the TFG. Somalia would also benefit by giving recognition to Somaliland.

The second discussant was Dr. Hussein Bulhan, who is a mental health specialist in Somaliland, and was previously a professor at Boston University. The discussant began by talking about the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia, stating that the intervention was based on national prestige, and establishing the country as a superpower in the Horn. The cycle of conferences that attempted to deal with the Somalia conflict also represents the bottom down approach forwarded by the international community. However, there are two problems with this approach, it promotes financial incentives over resolution (for example, in the desire for per diems) and it neglects local interaction. The discussant concluded by stating that the history of camaraderie between Somalia and Ethiopia is in danger of being eroded due to the intervention.

The discussion began with a participant stating that the TFG is not an elected government, rather it is selected. A problem with the analysis of the conflict is the fact that most organizations that are supposed to be based in Mogadishu are actually working from Nairobi. This distances the observers from the facts on the ground. The participant ended by asking for more discussion on the nature of AMISOM, and the condition of Somaliland before 1960.

A second participant again raised the issue of the TFG, asking whether the body is really legitimate. The participant also questioned the validity of the intervention, stating that parliamentary discussions prior to the invasion showcased the divisions in opinion towards the intervention. A third participant questioned the statement concerning moderating Islam. This represents the rhetoric of good/bad Muslim in the post 9/11 period, and showcases the global context of the war on terror in dealing with Somalia.

Dr Tadesse responded to these assertions by first stating that the conflict in Somalia is an issue of human security. However the regional context should not be ignored since the danger of Eritrea utilizing the conflict for a proxy war, and the existence of anti-EPRDF forces in Somalia is a major concern for Ethiopia. The global context of the post 9/11 world is important to consider in any approach to resolve the conflict.

The next session began with a presentation by Sarah Healy, who is a fellow at the Chattenhouse. Her presentation on "Ethiopia Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict" focused on the legitimization of security threats. She contextualized this concept to the situation in the Horn of Africa, where war zones are regionalized because local problems exist alongside regional competition. The presenter stated that the regional security system reinforces insecurities within the states. One example of this is the security situation following the Ethio-Eritrean dispute of in the beginning of 1998, where both countries courted Sudan and employed a policy of encirclement with Uganda. Ethiopia was also involved in creating a power sharing scheme in Somalia (per the Sodere meeting,) which was problematized by the entrance of the Arab agenda, especially via Egypt. During this time Osama Bin Laden had also recently left the Sudan.

The two crucial events that triggered these different developments was the Ethio Eritrean war, which reconfigured the political landscape. For example, Sudan was put in a favorable position because Ethiopia abandoned the policy of encirclement. The second event

Other Armed Groups

Under the CPA all Other Armed Groups (OAGs) with the exception of SAF, the SPLA, and the JIUs were to be dissolved within one year of the signing of the agreement, but they continue to threaten stability and pose a threat to the peace process. The SPLA attempted to eliminate all OAGs during the armed struggle, but its sometimes contentious relations with the inhabitants of the territories it occupied and the efforts of SAF to use these groups to pursue its own ends ensured the problem continued. However, the Juba Declaration of 8 January 2006 provided for the integration of the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), the main OAG in the south, into the SPLA, the elevation of its leader, Paulino Matieb, to the position of Deputy Commander in Chief of the SPLA, the formation of a number of committees to make recommendations on the ranking of the SSDF officers in the SPLA, and the granting of various political positions to SSDF officials in the GoSS and state governments. Two problems, however, ensued. First, not all of the components of the SSDF went over to the SPLA, and second, and more seriously, most of those that did have not to date been integrated and this poses a threat to the unity of the SPLA and to the security of the civilians in the areas in which these fighters are based.

Pockets thus remain in many areas of southern Sudan, and the former officials of the SSDF (including Gordon Kong who is now the formal leader of the SSDF rump under SAF) remain in Khartoum and could, it is feared, be activated should security conditions in the south deteriorate or the peace process break down. But the biggest security threat is posed by the failure of the SPLA to integrate the majority of SSDF soldiers into its ranks. While the assignment of ranks to the SSDF officers is a major part of the problem,²³ there is also resentment among the Garang appointed army elite at sharing power with their erstwhile enemies. While there is little danger of Paulino returning to SAF, and significantly his own forces from Western Upper Nile have been integrated, many other former SSDF fighters who are not being paid, are sometimes not even being fed

there are no assurances that both parties will accept the outcome of the mediation, and at the time of writing (end of July) many of the displaced civilians of Abyei had still not been able to return to their homes.

The Abyei border problem is a sub-set, albeit the most crucial one, of a wider problem of border demarcation. As Douglas Johnson has noted, 'If there can be no agreement on this boundary what is the prospect of agreement on the delimitation of the whole North-South boundary?'²¹ Indeed, the CPA stipulated Boundary Commission was not established until February 2007, and while much preparatory work has been done, there has been no substantive progress on border demarcation. Further delaying the problem, the national land commission and the subsidiary land commissions that are supposed to sort out the vexing problems of land ownership have not been established by the presidency as required under the CPA.

Moreover, it is anticipated that problems will come to the fore virtually everywhere resources are close to the border. Officials of the Southern Land Commission, who are responsible for the demarcation of the border anticipate problems in the oil producing areas of Unity State in Heglig, Karsana, and Kaliek, in Hoffra near Raaja in Western Bahr El Ghazal where it is believed there are deposits of copper and uranium, in Wodakuna north of Renk, near the Adar oil fields, Kaka north of Melut which has gum arabic, and in the dura producing areas of South Blue Nile.²² Complicating the situation is the continuing presence of elements of the SAF supported Popular Defence Force (PDF) and cross border nomadic tribes that have been armed by SAF and not yet disarmed. The uneasiness by both parties about borders and security means that SAF and the SPLA have not met deadlines regarding the re-deployment of their forces from north and south Sudan, as well as the border territories of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. While Abyei has been the focus of conflict, SAF and the SPLA are reportedly reinforcing their positions all along the border.

was the embassy attacks in Nairobi, and the use of Mogadishu as the terrorist launch points for these attacks. The series of events exhibit the reverberations of security related events throughout the region.

Ms Healy contrasted the conditions in 1998 with the conditions in 2005. In 2005 the Ethio-Eritrean war was over, but the implementation of the Algiers agreement was still a problem. Eritrea on the one hand saw the incapability of the UN and U.S. to enforce the boundary delineations on the side of Ethiopia. Ethiopia on the other hand produced a five point peace plan, which was accepted by the international community. Eritrea pressured UNMEE to deploy forces, while a clear constituency emerged in Somalia due to the production of the TFG, which was subsequently allied with Eritrea. Ms Healy stated that there was a causal relationship between the breakdown of the peace process between Ethiopia-Eritrea, the creation of the TFG, and the eruption of conflict in Somalia. The Algiers agreement was fundamentally problematic because it was in a state of arrested implementation. This was due to the non functioning of the boundary commission and UNMEE.

Since 2000 the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been a diplomatic war. It has had a profound impact on how they relate to the other areas in the region. Eritrea in particular employed strategies to weaken Ethiopia, utilizing non-state actors in the process. Ethiopia is a major power in the region buttressed by U.S. support, which promotes the identification of Eritrea as the weaker party standing up against a powerful adversary. The Eritrean stance has led to its isolation in the region, and the state has also opportunistically supported armed insurgencies in Ethiopia. In Somalia the situation has worsened following the installation of the TFG by Ethiopia. This has produced levels of violence that surpasses previous levels. The conflict in Somalia showcases all three types of conflict as identified in the recent human security report, i.e. the three categories of violence being, state based armed conflict, non state actors, and organized violence against civilians. Accordingly, there are different definition of the war by the different actors. Ethi-

opia perceives it as a war against extremist Islamism, and Eritrean subversion. Eritrea perceives it as a war against Ethiopian allies and a fight against U.S. imperialism.

Ms Healy returned to the topic of risk assessment, and stated that the collision between the two conflicts goes beyond proxy wars. The main problem is that both sides don't attempt to see the other side. The prospects for peace and security include issues such as, the resistance to dialogue, and the internationalization of the Somali conflict (which includes the labeling of terrorist of some groups.) The best prospect for peace in the area is the IGAD structure, however it is entangled in the Somali conflict and weakened by the suspended membership of Eritrea. Possible ways forward include the realization that the Ethio-Eritrean deadlock cannot be resolved by local players, because of the lack of trust. IGAD should be instrumental in Somalia by bringing Eritrea into the fold and engaging critically in the TFG. This should coincide with a set guideline for the exit of Ethiopian troops and a promise from Eritrea not to get involved. The presenter concluded by stating that "...going backwards to go forwards..." may be the remedy to these issues, so that IGAD can revert to the older conventions i.e. upholding sovereignty and disabling the use of force.

The discussant for this paper was Mr. Hirui Tedla, former vice president of the Eritrea liberation front, presently chairman of the Eritrean congress party. He began by tackling the Ethio-Eritrean conflict. Unionists in Eritrea were not homogeneously from the region of Tigray, although TPLF and EPLF were allies during the liberation period this was not an ethnic alliance. The instigation of the conflict was the issuance of a separate currency by the Eritrean government. The port of Asab also became an important issue. The border conflict did not arise out of a conflict over colonial demarcations, for example the alleged map of Tigray is not taken seriously by Eritrea. Following the ceasefire there should have been face to face dialogue, however this was replaced by international arbitration. Eritrea's intrusion into Somalia was influenced by financial and diplomatic bonuses, particularly access to the Middle East. Eritrean

grounds that the Protocol provided for a joint administration of the territory. Tensions rose as the SPLA and SAF increased their forces in the area.

Skirmishes between sections of the Missiriya and the SPLA led to full-scale fighting between the SPLA and SAF in mid-May 2008 in Abyei town and the adjacent area. Using heavy artillery SAF forced the SPLA to retreat from the town, killing as many as 100 civilians and dislocating 50,000 more. It also led to accusations by many, including US Special Envoy Richard Williamson, that during the fighting the UN military forces hid in their barracks and failed to protect the civilian population.¹⁷ Although the UN endeavored to get the parties to agree on a ceasefire more fighting broke out which threatened a return to war and the collapse of the fragile CPA. However, on 8 June SAF and the SPLA agreed to withdraw their troops from Abyei, for the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) of the SPLA and SAF and UNMIS peacekeepers to deploy to the disputed areas, and for the NCP and SPLM to form an interim joint administration,⁸ although it was not until early July that the combatant forces had fully withdrawn. The joint administration remains in doubt, including the role of Edward Lino.

Despite repeated statements by the GoSS leadership that it would not budge from its commitment to the rulings of the ABC, in the wake of the fighting it agreed on 12 July to refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.¹⁹ The tribunal is tasked with determining whether or not the ABC exceeded its mandate 'to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred from Bahr El Ghazal to Kordofan in 1905, as per the Abyei Protocol'.²⁰ Under the agreement the NCP and SPLM will appoint two representatives and they in turn must agree on a fifth member. The tribunal can either confirm the findings of the ABC and order their full implementation or proceed to demarcate the boundary itself. It is by no means clear this recourse to arbitration will definitely resolve the conflict, but it should have the effect of ending the crisis atmosphere and reducing the prospect of a breakdown of the peace process and a return to war. However,

As well as supporting its Missiriya ally the NCP may have also concluded that in spite the SPLM/A's aggressive stance on Abyei southerners do not want to go to war and risk the collapse of the CPA to defend the ABC decision when the chiefs of the area decided many years ago to be linked with the north. But the SPLM also has a local constituency among the Ngok Dinka, some of its leading officials come from the area,¹⁴ feels bound to support the ABC and the CPA, and does not want to lose the oil producing fields. Meanwhile the NCP is undoubtedly trying to play from a position of strength on the ground – SAF, Missiriya, and the presence of a SAF supported police force in the oil fields to advance its bargaining position.

The Missiriya are unhappy about losing grazing lands and control over the Bahr Al-Arab River (known in the south as the Kiir River), and indeed about the increasing likelihood of the south's separation which will necessitate these nomadic herders petitioning the GoSS to cross what will likely become an international border.¹⁵ A considerable number of Missiriya have joined the SPLA, either out of anger that development promises by the NCP have not been kept, or as insurance that they will be able to access water and grazing lands in northern Bahr El Ghazel. The SPLM/A claims that the Missiriya are armed and directed by SAF and clearly the attacks were organized in areas under SAF control and it seems highly unlikely they could have taken place without SAF's authorization, and probably its support.

The Abyei problem was of sufficient concern that the SPLM highlighted it in its decision of 10 October 2007 to suspend participation in the Government of National Unity (GNU). In the event the SPLM returned to the GNU by the end of the year with agreement on other issues, but not Abyei, which was to be left to the Presidency. In the absence of a civil administration at the end of December 2007 the SPLM appointed Edward Leno, a son of the area and senior party official, to assume the role of Chairman of the SPLM in Abyei, in effect the governor. The NCP rejected the appointment 'in the strongest possible terms' at the end of March¹⁶ on the

support the Greater Somalia project, which promotes the inclusion of the Ogaden into Somalia. The Algiers agreement should remain as the basis for the resolution, and since both internal and external forces are not favorable for President Isayas he may be forced to negotiate. The discussant argued against the assumption that Ethiopia is involved in Somalia purely due to Eritrean involvement.

The discussant next broached the topic of Eritrea-Sudan relations. Eritrea terminated its relationship with Sudan primarily due to U.S. persuasion. Ms Healy's paper enumerated shared characteristics between the two, however Sudan did not support the Eritrean revolution. The assumption of a polarity between Sudan and Ethiopia is incorrect, and so is the uni-polarity of Ethiopian power that the paper suggests. The paper presents the Horn of Africa as a subsystem of the Middle East, and consequently the proposals may be too broad. Mr Tedla ended by stating that a de facto Eritrean government should be considered, and the difficulty of withdrawal from Somalia should be understood.

Discussions began with one participant stating that the considerations of going forwards or backwards should deal with the contending alternatives of regional integration or mini state creation. These should be forwarded by continental initiatives. Another participant made three comments, that the problem with region 5 (Ogaden region) is not the alternative of greater Somalia, IGASOM was laid down due to Western pressures, and the threat from the ICU is evidently pushed by Eritrea, but the ICU still presents a security threat to Ethiopia. A third participant stated that relying on IGAD disregards its weaknesses, and questioned the source of funding for the Ethiopian intervention. A fourth participant questioned the presentation of Eritrea's motives as primarily to destabilize, and instead forwarded the idea that Eritrea is attempting to emerge as a hegemon in the region. The premise in Eritrea could be that negotiations with the current government is improbable, therefore Eritrea is waiting for the next government to come into place. Somalia is establishing its own aspirations in the region. A fifth participant stated that public perception can thwart actual facts, for

example the assumption that the U.S. supported the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has not been supported by any statements attesting to it. Congressional oversight in the U.S. would not allow a secret deals. Sarah Healy's analysis looks at habits of war, but the participant disagreed with the use of the term "regional war zone." The participant also argued that the pillars of the Algiers agreement were more expansive than presented. A sixth participant questioned the use of the term non state actors, which traditionally refers to civil society, and whether the definition has expanded to include guerillas. The participant also stated that since 1992 it has been affirmed that the resolution of the Somalia conflict rests with the Somali people.

Ms Healy responded by first attesting to the weakness of IGAD, but argued that the model could be successfully reinvigorated. Examples from other regions have shown that this model can work. It needs to be re-conceptualized as a problem solving forum. Ms Healy next highlighted the fact that internal factors were ignored in the paper because the analysis focused on the regional aspects of conflict dynamics. This is due to the neglects of regional aspects in most analysis, and the problematic nature of internal dynamics. The presenter stated that the culpability of Eritrea doesn't override the need to include them because they are still regional players. Lastly, Ms Healy addressed the usage of the terms invasion or intervention, she ascribed to the term intervention however there are some Somali's see it as an invasion.

Mr Tedla followed this response by stating that the isolation of Massawa was primarily due to the diplomatic efforts on the part of Eritrea to get involved in Somalia. Dr Bulan further added that the nature of proxy wars is difficult to outline, because it is highly dependent on the aspirations of individual nations. But the necessity of engagement is clear. Another participant added that hearing the Eritrean perspective is an important part of this process. A second participant added that this is a discursive debate, and the demonization of Islam shouldn't be forgotten.

the appointment of Special Envoy Sumbeiywo, and the CPA did not provide any role for it in the post-agreement period. And while the mandate stipulated that General Sumbeiywo had to report back to the IGAD Secretariat that was only a nominal charge and he clearly understood that power rested with the Government of Kenya and as a result he treated the Secretariat with disdain.¹³

Had the negotiations taken place on the basis of the DoP – as IGAD's Council of Ministers stipulated – then it is just possible that the subsequent eleven years of war might have been avoided, the conflicts in Darfur and the east might not have broken out, and we would not be facing the imminent break-up of Sudan. That is because while the initial IGAD initiative sought to find a genuine solution to Sudan's endemic conflicts, the process that gave rise to the CPA set aside larger objectives and concentrated on getting an agreement based on the lowest common concerns of the parties. While the initial regional effort at peace making laid the basis for a genuine comprehensive peace and failed, the subsequent effort was successful, but at the cost of reaching an agreement that had little prospect of achieving its stated goals of Sudan's unity and democratic transformation. Moreover, it threw up obstacles to reaching sustainable peace agreements elsewhere in the country.

Abyei and border demarcation

Many security related issues threaten the peace process, but near the top of any list must be Abyei. Unable to reach agreement in the negotiations over the Abyei Protocol, the SPLM and NCP agreed to establish an Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) to rule on the north-south borders. But the NCP and their allies in the region, the Missiriya, an Arabized Islamic cattle herding people, refused to accept the ABC's findings of July 2005 and as a result the controversy has been steadily brewing. While claiming that its rejection of the ruling was because the commission did not follow its terms of reference, the NCP is clearly also unhappy about losing the agricultural schemes of Nyarna, the railway town of Mairam and the Bamboo and Heglig oil fields.

midst of what was called the greatest humanitarian disaster in the world, and eastern Sudan was suffering a low-level insurgency, made clear that Sudan's ills could not be reduced to a north-south conflict, much less a war between Moslems and Christians or Arabs and Africans.

Another key provision of the Machakos Protocol was the commitment 'to make unity attractive', a provision that was understood to mean that the national government had to convince southern Sudanese that their rights and culture would be protected in Sudan and they would be treated as valued citizens. However, during the course of research carried out by the author at the behest of the IGAD Secretariat no one interviewed on the SPLM negotiating team said they believed the government would live up to this commitment.⁹ Instead, this provision is held by the SPLM leadership as a 'get out of Sudan' card since it is convinced that the cost to the NCP of overseeing a democratic transformation would involve its loss of power, something it would never expect to do voluntarily. In addition, respondents from both the NCP and SPLM were equally sceptical about the Protocol's call for 'a democratic system of governance'.¹⁰ A GoS negotiator said 'there was no real democratic conviction on either side,' while a southern SPLM negotiator contended that 'all the protocols were signed in bad faith.'¹¹

What was held by the international community (but crucially not the parties to the peace process who had a markedly more sophisticated – if cynical – understanding of what was at stake) as a key agreement in bringing peace to Sudan, instead laid the basis for the break-up of the country. And for those who sing the praises of IGAD it is important to stress that first, the US largely set the stage for the negotiations and provided the critical pressures; second, the Kenyan Government which nominally led the peace process largely served as an agent for the US; third, apart from the role of the ambassador-envoys from the region, the countries themselves largely withdrew from the process,¹² and lastly, the IGAD Secretariat's role was mostly symbolic and reduced to providing legitimacy and serving as a conduit for financing the process. The Secretariat had no part in

The last session was a paper entitled "Interrelated Security Challenges of Kenya and Uganda in Eastern and Horn of Africa" which was written by Dr. Martin Rupiya and presented by Patrick Kamau. The presenter began by outlining some of the causes of pastoral conflict, citing their cross border nature, and the inability of state's to disarm their communities. For example, Kenya and Uganda had different approaches towards pastoralism. For example, the use of highly militarized methods to settle pastoralists communities has been negative. The peace and security dynamics in the area therefore are in a state of no war no peace. For the most part state's ignore clan conflicts, and there is a lack of governmental structures around pastoralist communities.

The regional security dynamics in the region include a lack of maritime security, the fragility of the AU, and a history of genocide in Burundi/Rwanda. Regional security arrangements have not protected different countries, and limited resources are allocated to conflict early warning. The functionality of IGAD has also been limited due to the hostility between the members. Inflow of refugees also causes a problem because it coincides with resource competition and arms flow. The Ethiopia-Kenya mutual defense pact creates a possibility for lasting security through a period of confidence building. In Uganda proliferation of small arms has led to the strengthening of the LRA in northern Uganda. Uganda has also been supporting movements in south Sudan, the DRC and Burundi/Uganda. Uganda does not exercise effective control over the Lake Victoria.

Ultimately there is a need to harmonize approaches towards super powers, and security in general.

The discussions that followed began with a participant critiquing the facts presented in the paper, namely the description of a benevolent dictator in Uganda. Another participant added that there are other issues that should have been considered by the author, namely the commercialization of cattle raids. The failure of disarmament can be related to the problem with porous borders, which compromises

the ability to control the acquirement of arms. Small arms proliferation is being looked at via bilateral agreements and there are efforts to streamline the efforts of the 8 regional RECS. A third participant stated that the paper had simplified pastoral conflict, and does not fully analyze the nature of the area. The paper also suggests that RECs are a negative to Africa, however this ignores a more profound analysis of the problem. Another participant questioned a statement in the paper, which attested that “Kenya was put on the benches” during the war on terror, while Uganda wasn’t. The presenter responded to these points by stating that since he was not the writer of the paper his responses would be limited. However, he stated that the comment on Kenya and Uganda seems to be based on Kenya’s non involvement in Somalia (Uganda was involved in Somalia.)

The last round of questions and comments, began with a participant commenting that the paper concentrated on low intensity conflicts. Grass root problems are usually cross cutting, and the paper could have included the structural problems as well. Another participant pointed to a linkage between drought and tribal conflict, stating that conflicts increase with the presence of drought because of increased competition over resources. Another participant stated that the micro level analysis of the paper ignores tribalization/ethnicization at the state level, consequently lessening the responsibility of the state.

Amb Robleh ended the conference by stating that the Horn is an area that is managed by conflict as opposed to managing conflict, therefore there should be a concerted effort by governments to ward of its ill effects.

mation in the war on terror.

While the final and successful phase of the peace process was intended to be underpinned by the DoP, and both the Communiqué of the IGAD Ministerial Sub-Committee on Sudan of 19-23 July 1999 and the Joint Communiqué of the First Session of the Political Committee Task Force of 20 July 2002 emphasised this commitment, that was not the case. In the supposed breakthrough of the Machakos Protocol Special Envoy Sumbeiywo described the DoP as a ‘complete analysis’,⁵ and further said that he ‘translated the DoP into a single text and then zeroed in on the two main issues of self-determination and separation of state and religion’.⁶ But in practice this understanding ignored key principles of the DoP which stressed the need to overcome broader inequities in the Sudanese state and did not reduce the problem to a merely north-south dimension. Specifically the DoP called for:

3.4 A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and customs.

3.5 Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various people of the Sudan must be realised.⁷

The Machakos Protocol thus moved from embracing a broad vision that recognised at the national level Sudan’s violent contradictions to meeting the needs of the NCP to maintain power (albeit probably in a truncated state with the departure of the south) and of the SPLM for self-determination.⁸ Crucially while the DoP made the right of the south to self-determination contingent upon the failure of the GoS to introduce democracy, secularism, and a fair distribution of resources, under the provisions of the Machakos Protocol the south was granted self-determination after a transitional period, irrespective of any changes within the central state. The fact that this ‘breakthrough’ took place at a time when Darfur was in the

enced by *jihadis*. The bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi in August 2000 served to further cement Kenya's ties with the US and with its policies in the region. This involved the provision of land in north-eastern Kenya for the US military for purposes related to the war on terror and the war in Iraq. For decades, Britain, the former colonial power and another crucial party to the peace process, had military bases in the country. In addition, in the context of the war on terror Mombassa became a major centre for Western warships patrolling the Gulf, and intelligence cooperation expanded. Against this background, the US would be reassured that Kenya would protect its interests in the region. The fact that the mediation was led by General Sumbeiywo who had received university education in the US and had worked closely with the American military during his stints as the head of the Kenyan intelligence service and the army would also serve to build confidence in Kenya and the peace process.

From the inception of the peace process there was a direct link between the US pursuit of the war on terror in the region and its critical role in the Sudan peace process.³ In the first instance the critical US role derived from its influence over the parties. With the loss of the Derg as its major foreign supporter, the Garang led SPLM/A shifted to the right and began courting the US Government and American churches and this gave Washington considerable leverage.⁴ Washington in turn influenced the NCP because of the military threat it posed to the regime (particularly in the wake of its military engagement in Somalia) and the fear that it could significantly increase support for the SPLM/A. And in the wake of the bombing of Khartoum's El Shiffa pharmaceutical plant the NCP sought to improve its relations with the US to limit these threats. The US was also able in the post-9/11 period to sufficiently intimidate Khartoum to agree to cooperate in intelligence gathering, even though this undermined its Islamist anti-Western ideology. The apparent success of this relationship, however, meant that while raising the rhetoric of democratic transformation in the peace process Washington did little to push this agenda when it might lead to the demise of the regime which provided it with valuable infor-

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Revitalizing IGAD and bringing back Eritrea as an active partner of the member states
- Vehemently advocating for expanded political space, establishing bench marks for democratization in the respective member states (with targeted timeframe)
- Revisiting the CPA of Sudan (with a more inclusive approach that avoids the current dichotomized effort)
- Expediting an orderly withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia
- Adopting a bottom-up approach that capitalizes on existing positive people to people relations (trade, hospitality to refugees etc.)
- Establishing a Council of Elders constituted from representatives of the member states IGAD who assist in the peace building endeavor
- Supporting grass-root gender peace building initiatives
- Confidence building through the instrumentality of non-interference and non-aggression protocols
- Creating consultation forums to regulate population movements across common borders (to prevent terrorist activities, drug trafficking etc.)

Peace in Somalia and Neighboring Regions:

A Distant Prospect

By: Medhane Tadesse, CPRD

Overview

Somalia is unstable and without a functional government and in spite of recent positive signs on peace talks, a violent Islamist force threatens to continue wage a destructive war. The military defeat of the Union of Islamic Courts/UIC/ in December 2006 was not the end of the war in Somalia. The Islamic Courts and the *al-Shabab* have recovered within a year of a massive Ethiopian military assault. The Transitional Federal Government/TFG/ lacks competence, leadership, morale and support to lead the battle hardened Somalia out of its current mayhem. There is little likelihood that Somalia's failed transitional institutions can be made to function, much less mesh with one another, in the foreseeable future. That the insurgents are returning in force 14 months after their military defeat is testimony enough that Ethiopian strategy of supporting the TFG and the West's support (or lack of it) for rebuilding Somalia have so far been less successful. Indeed, the battle lines, for the fate of the TFG, are being drawn. The myriad of actors with in the opposition alliance i.e. the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia/ARS/, notably the Courts Union have been gaining recruits, overrunning towns and becoming bolder. The military assault, the policy of marginalization and propaganda war against their members seems only to have enhanced their standing both internally and externally. They also overcome orchestrated international diplomatic isolation.

Meanwhile, as the battle over who would hold political power in Somalia is reaching a climax, the struggle over what that battle meant has yet to begin. A major problem of particularly but not exclusively of Somalia is that all political groupings are weak and divided. None of the Somali parties and political/armed groups has

IGAD was created at the urging of leading members of the international community, funded by Western countries, and its primary objectives always included safeguarding the international order.

Although the Moi led Kenyan government ostensibly led this initial process, it was dominated by the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia, both of whom came to power in 1991 under dynamic leaderships committed to regional cooperation. And both of these governments – unlike Kenyan governments which typically followed the lead of the US and Britain – were not beholden to the international community. In keeping with their activist approach in 1994 the foreign ministers of Eritrea and Ethiopia rejected conventional mediation and put before the parties a Declaration of Principles (DoP) that acknowledged the right of the south to self-determination, but made this contingent upon the GoS's failure to introduce democracy and secularism. It also stipulated that Sudan respond to the needs of its diverse population for social and political equality, thus implicitly recognising that Sudan suffered from more than just a north-south divide. The different factions of the southern rebels accepted the DoP, but it was rejected by the government and a stalemate ensued for the next four years.

In the wake of this failure more efforts at peace making were made, both by IGAD (notably under Ambassador Daniel Mboya) and others, but they too were unsuccessful. The final and successful phase of the peace process corresponded to growing US interest in Sudan's conflict, the increasing pressure it brought to bear on the two parties to engage in negotiations, as well as assurances by the Americans that they would not start their own process and would support the efforts of IGAD.

Critically the peace process was built on the close relationship between Kenya and the US after Washington launched its so-called 'war on terror' in the wake of the 9/11 attack. Washington called on President Moi to come to its assistance because of Kenya's strategic location adjacent to the Middle East and because of its large Moslem population which inhabited the coast and could be influ-

haps not surprising since the region had not previously shown an interest in collective security and had played no role in resolving Sudan's first civil war. That task was taken up by Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie and Sudan's churches and eventually the result was the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972. Nor did the region play any significant role in bringing an end to Eritrea's long rebellion against Ethiopia. Tensions between neighbours, such as those that periodically arose between Sudan and Ethiopia because of their support for one another's rebel groups were also not addressed in any concerted fashion by the region or any agency of the region, but instead on an ad hoc and usually bilateral basis. And this is all the more surprising because the Horn of Africa in the post-colonial era has been a region almost continuously beset by conflict. Moreover, while the focus of most of these conflicts was internal, given porous borders, over-lapping tribes, and predatory states, these conflicts invariably had an echo in neighbouring countries.

The first major effort at encouraging regional cooperation was the formation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), the fore-runner of IGAD. But two things are worth emphasising about this development: first, the terms of operation of IGADD did not initially involve security related concerns, and second, its creation was largely the product of efforts by aid agencies and international donors, and not due to any initiative by countries in the region. It was only later, and again as a result of international prodding, that IGADD assumed responsibilities in the fields of peace and security and this reflected concerns to develop regionalism and regional co-operation and to safeguard the international order.²

International pressure led IGADD to launch a peace initiative for Sudan at its Addis Ababa summit of 7 September 1993 and a Peace Committee made up of the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, and Kenya was established with President Daniel Arap Moi serving as chairman. Supporting these efforts from its inception were the Friends of IGADD formed by leading Western countries (later called the IGAD Partners Forum or IPF). Thus IGADD/

presented a political program and the capacity to stabilize Somalia and create a functional government. The disparity between what it was before Ethiopian intervention and what it has become now is increasingly and breathtakingly blurred. Events unfolding the past seem to be the future for Somalia. When the Ethiopian forces walked into Somalia, they were hardly met with resistance and took not even a week to get to Mogadishu, the fierce military resistance of the opposition was not expected. However, Ethiopian military intervention had its own downside. Ethiopia may not have exaggerated the threats but it might have underestimated the risks. Probably Ethiopia had a winning military strategy, but lacked a workable political strategy. Neither part of this strategy would have won such a war; in combination they may have proved triumphant. Clearly, the war in Somalia has become a costly trap from which Ethiopia should extricate itself soon.

With that in mind this paper will endeavor to place the recent war in Somalia in the national context, explain its critical regional dimensions, provide an overview of its mutation over the recent years, consider the principal actors, provide some background to the negotiations between the TFG and ARS, and end with a consideration of the peace agreement and some projections on the future.

Violence and Political fragmentation in Somalia

The conflict in Somalia is multi-layered. The conflict among clan militias, warlordism, the absence of a state, the mushrooming of criminal networks, the recent military and political conflict between the Islamic UIC and the TFG, and currently the TFG allied with Ethiopian forces against the ARS¹, a patchwork of *Islamist*, nationalist, clan forces. The conflict is much more than a contest over ideological and political differences. It is not only about "power": how to acquire it, how to use it. As in much of the sub-region, conflict in Somalia is often driven and perpetuated by marginalization of peoples and regions, by lack of the rule of law, and by competition for access to land, water and resources. These problems are often

exacerbated by the presence of weak, fragile, and unstable political regimes and institutions, and by growing inequality between people and communities. This being the case, by any reasonable standard of state building, Somalia appears as the biggest failure². In many ways the conflict in Somalia is related to the death of the state. Beyond Somalia, a main factor in the Somali crisis is the military and political conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The absence of a legitimate government in Somalia facilitates this proxy war.

The UICs unexpected collapse in December 2006 has been partially misunderstood by the TFG, Ethiopia, to some degree the US, and by the media and among observers. This has negatively impacted on the roles and motives of the main players thereafter. The entry of TFG/Ethiopian forces to Mogadishu was followed by an illusory lull in an inevitable confrontation. Shortly after the end of Ethiopian military offensive a collation of resistance movement known as *al Muqawamah* or resistance began launching a series of attacks against the TFG/Ethiopian forces and civilians³. The Mogadishu insurgency draws most support from Islamic Courts loyalists, clan fighters, and 'nationalists' largely from the Diaspora and anarchy businessmen. At the beginning of the war the Ethiopian military pursues what could be termed as a "policy of conciliation" toward the enemy forces and their supporters: defeat the armed insurrection but seek to win the sympathies of civilians back to the TFG. However, the insurgents deliberately changed the course of the war with huge humanitarian and political implications, by continuously launching attacks in densely populated areas⁴. Insurgent attacks on government forces targeting residential quarters became the major instrument of the war causing mass displacement, exodus and large-scale suffering.

The insurgents have sworn to wage an ugly war until they force Ethiopian troops out of Somalia; so far, they have only ensured that the whole enterprise is a bloody and costly affair⁵. Ethiopia's intent on taming Mogadishu has faced a formidable challenge. The hard war strategy is not pretty; nor effective. Inevitably, the consequences of a bitter entrenched warfare in a hostile environment is adversely

IGAD PEACE PROCESS: AN UPDATE

*By John Young**

Introduction

At the end of July 2008 when this update is being finalised, three and half years after the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, the outcome of the peace process remains in doubt. The CPA promised the unity of Sudan, but the south appears to be on a steady, if uneven, march to independence. The CPA promised a democratic transformation, but that has not been achieved, and as will be argued below the election planned for 2009 may not be the formative step toward that objective that was anticipated. It was widely proclaimed, although admittedly not in the agreement itself, that the CPA would open the door to peace in Darfur, and that clearly has not happened. However, the peace process has led to improvements in the security situation in the south, there is the beginning of a shift from humanitarian assistance to the pursuit of development objectives, and the skeletal structures of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is taking form. Against these results the aim of this paper is to place the peace process in context, review some of the critical events of the past year, and draw some conclusions. In other words, to try to bring understanding to where the process is now in light of where it started and its objectives.

The analysis begins with a brief overview of the peace process which highlights the background to the origins of the peace process and gives particular attention to the formulation of the Declaration of Principles (DoP). This set of principles focused on the north-south conflict, but called for recognition of injustices elsewhere in the country and for the government to create a democratic regime and separate religion and the state, and should it fail to do that the south would have the right to a vote on self-determination. Although this formula was rejected it is argued here that it was and

Acronyms

ABC	Abyei Boundaries Commission
BEG	Bahr El Ghazel
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DoP	Declaration of Principles
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and Drought
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NCP	National Congress Party
NIF	National Islamic Front
OAGs	Other Armed Groups
PDF	Popular Defence Force
PNC	Popular National Congress
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Force

affecting the political standing of Ethiopia in Somalia. Meanwhile, despite massive firepower, the TFG/Ethiopian troops have yet to make any significant improvement on the ground. Roughly estimated, over 65 per cent of southern strategic cities and some parts of central Somalia have been recently recaptured by the opposition forces⁶. Insurgents have already got control of several regions in Somalia particularly the Middle Shebelle, parts of Lower Juba and Hiraan.

Kismayo, the second largest town in Somalia is in the control of allied militias independent of the TFG, increasingly tilting towards some kind of understanding with the anti-TFG groups. There are no TFG/Ethiopian forces present in Kismayo and the Juba regions as a whole, although clan militias there officially claim they are part of the government, many of them are uncertain about their loyalty⁷. There is now a clear danger that Somalia could become, in fact, the nightmarish center of criminality and terrorism that many observers have previously asserted were the justification for launching the war. The Transitional Federal Authority still remains ineffective, dysfunctional by any standard. The military option is not working. A political option needs to be launched in which the loose network of opposition groups; the ARS is urged to be the main player. However, the group which calls itself the *al-shabab* is now intensively trying to transform the civil war through assassinations of what they call “collaborators” and aid workers. This is the first time in 17 years of continuous conflict that Somali rebels have deliberately targeted civilians and aid workers, women and children. This has aggravated the already precarious humanitarian situation. This coupled with the on-going chronic draught-attributed destitution of millions of agro-pastoralists in Somalia, Ethiopia's eastern Somalia Regional State and southern Borana Zone, and Eastern and North-eastern Kenya, is a major blow to human security in Somalia and adjacent regions⁸.

There is now a new political and security vacuum across much of southern Somalia, which the ineffectual TFG is unable to fill. In fact it is the weakness of the TFG that allowed the *shabab* and Islamic

Court's militia to snatch survival from the jaws of defeat. Fighting and violence has spread to once-peaceful pockets of territory, and the number of attacks and assassinations in major towns, including Mogadishu is increasing each passing day. The TFG is not designed to deal with this problem. The TFG lacks the necessary capacity and a coherent strategy for meeting its goals, if at all it has one, in Somalia. It has been able to survive in Mogadishu, but notwithstanding all rounded support from Ethiopia, the number of Somali units capable of carrying out operations without direct Ethiopian military assistance continued to hover around 10 to 20 percent⁹. The TFG army is not yet fully trained nor sufficiently recruited and the trained police force is not strong enough for the duties ahead. Training is not all; training and a good salary may be better, but ultimately motivation is essential, and the fear of being killed or wounded by insurgents and only tepidly supported by the population may well cause newly trained police and troops fade away, as many have already done¹⁰. The hope that Somali government security forces can be recruited and trained effectively so far has turned out to be illusory. Ethiopia have spent too much and too long being compromised by the TFG.

The Somali Impasse

As an actual political force, the T.F.G. had no resources except for international recognition, which placed it in a posture of resentful dependency. Corruption is rampant, there is little trust and confidence among the TFG officials, and the institutions are hollow and couldn't deliver. The political mood in Mogadishu has darkened, and the approval of the top leadership of the TFG is plummeting. Many Somalis complain about the TFG's reluctance or inability to confront the warlords¹¹. Others express disgruntlement over the resultant humanitarian crisis. Aid officials say Somalia may be headed toward another famine, with nearly three million people dependent on emergency food aid, 1.5 million displaced, and aid workers being killed¹². This is manifested in the ever-brewing insurgency and the TFG's dismal performance over the last year and half.

IGAD PEACE PROCESS: AN UPDATE

By John Young

TFGs attempt to impose a victor's peace is not and could not be successful under any circumstances. It is imperative that the TFG talks to the other side of the Somali conflict. There is a growing awareness of the potential of the insurgency to recover and the damage done to Somalia by both sides of the conflict. Infact, the opposition Alliance remains one of Somalia's major political players. Probably, the specter of defeat could shape the thinking of protagonists in both camps in telling ways. Hopefully, that is what seems happening in Somalia. With the help of the United Nations envoy in Somalia Ahmadou Ould Abdullah, the moderate factions in both the TFG and the ARS had signed the first phase of arduous and ambitious peace agreement in Djibouti on the 9th of June 2008. After follow up discussions it was agreed that the Joint Security Committee (Article 8) and the High Level Committee (Article 9) from both sides also met in Djibouti from 16 – 18 August and reiterated their commitment to stay in the peace process¹³.

Ethiopia helped to rejuvenate the TFG- whose five-year term is about to end without any tangible accomplishments-from a near oblivion situation. The mandate of the current administration runs out in two years and according to the constitution, a new election is planned to be held at the end of the term¹⁴. Without rapid move toward broader political settlement, the Transitional Federal Government risks failure and subsequent fragmenting along clan lines. The TFG does not have the luxury of wasting more precious time. Things can go wrong very fast. It should end bickering and get on with the task such as the peace process. Derailing the Djibouti peace process---arguably the only available hope for peace in Somalia is not an option. Paradoxically, the division within the TFG is to some extent related to the Djibouti peace processes and the issue of reaching out to the restive population of Mogadishu¹⁵. The tragedy of Somalia is that the opposition camp is also divided and weak.

While the Islamist insurgents may share the same short-term goal of defeating Ethiopia and bringing down the interim government, discussions with more Somalis reveal the insurgency is actually

being waged by two, sometimes three, distinct groups - fervent nationalists loyal to the Islamic Courts Union on one side, clan forces and religious zealots belonging to the home-grown, ultra-radical *shabab* group on the other¹⁶. Meanwhile, UIC fighters, as opposed to the *shabab*, are largely perceived as fighting for the Somali people while the clan militias are perceived to be defending the interest of their respective clans. Many Somalis think that the UIC insurgents have far more popular support¹⁷, and receive generous funding from the local business community, members of the Somali Diaspora, and ordinary people fed up with a government they overwhelmingly view as being corrupt and uncaring about their plight. The different groups are allied only in one agenda; fight against Ethiopian support of the TFG. The opposition is politically and militarily fragmented so much so that I strongly doubt that the mainstream opposition has any influence on the brutal operations of the self-declared *Shabab* warriors.

Reports show that the *shabab* has been re-organized with the backing of Islamic *jihadist* groups and supporters in the Middle East and elsewhere¹⁸. Probably the major difference between 2006 and 2008 in Somalia is that the *al-shabab*, rather than just seizing territory, has now solidified their links with international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, which remain elusive but well connected, and have adopted the rhetoric of global jihad against the US¹⁹. In recent months, *shabab* leaders have said the group's ultimate goal is to help Muslims worldwide create a unified Islamic state. More recently, the *shabab* has become sharply critical of the courts for being too secular and have boldly declared that it has distanced itself from the movement²⁰. No wonder the *al-shabab* leadership has rejected the ARS and its leaders as “traitors” for talking to the TFG and vowed to continue the insurgency until the Ethiopians and their TFG “puppets” are expelled from Somalia by military force. The growth of the *al-shabab* at the expense of the UIC proper (previously the core of the ARS) and the influence of individuals with links to al-Qaeda will continue to be a major stumbling block to political resolution of the Somali crisis. Equally threatening is the split within the TFG and the possible ascendancy of the group that

Defense Forces , the regime’s political militia) and a Security battalion .

¹⁶The non-AU troops who have been deployed (a few hundreds) are strictly engineers , office workers and logisticians . There practically no new “combat” troops . In New York , there is neither the money nor the stomach for a serious Darfur intervention and the new head of DPKO , Alain Leroy , feels the need to be “extremely prudent” on the question .

¹⁷This was the party line that resulted from the 2nd SPLM Congress in Juba last May .

opposes the peace deal initiated in Djibouti. However, the list of potential spoilers in Somalia is very long.

Though an amalgam of ideological terrorism and mainstream criminal activity in one organization is a rarity, the violence in Somalia seems to have sharpened the focus on links between the two. Criminal elements often aligned with clan militias have involved in arms and money transfers to radical and terrorist elements. The *shabab* use criminal and clan networks to aid their activities. Criminal organizations on the other hand aim to create their own space to ensure immunity from interference by a strong government and law agencies hence support the insurgency. While some Islamist leaders and influential clan leaders have joined the Djibouti discussions²¹, other Islamist opposition leaders claim the mediation was biased and continued to demand an Ethiopian withdrawal before talks can start²².

Those who strongly objected to the still preliminary peace agreement between the TFG and the ARS are however the *shabab* and hard-line Islamist leaders, Dahir Aweys and Hassan Turki. According to these hawkish elements within the ARS, an agreement with the TFG is not practical and objectionable to the Somali and Islamic cause. It is not a coincidence that both these men strongly opposed the deal and vowed to continue fighting. Both represent the extreme and grim side of the ruthless Jihadist block in Somalia and the Horn. And both have remained central to the link between Somalia and international terrorism. In the 1990's they belonged to the most extreme wing of the Al-Ittihad, the *al-Takfir wa'l Hijira*²³ and later oversaw the rise and development of the *al-shabab* as moral leaders and patrons to its late leader, Adan Hashi Ayro, whose death seem to have further hardened the position of radical elements²⁴.

Aweys and Turki played a leading role in the most defining moment of the Somali Islamist movement: the entry of Sharia Courts into military politics²⁵. It is interesting that both leaders come out strongly against the eventual withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and their re-

placement by a UN peacekeeping force. Thus, the split is not about personalities, it is about principles and reflective of a larger divide emerging between the hard-line and moderate wings of Somalia's Islamist movement. No wonder, the most important result of the efforts to open dialogue with the ARS is it helps to stir a sharp demarcation between the clan leadership, nationalists and extremists with links to international terrorism. The division within the Courts movement goes back to the days of their ascendancy, long before Ethiopian military intervention. However, differences were tolerated in the shadow of Ethiopian military onslaught. Long before the recent Djibouti agreement of June 9, 2008 brokered by the UN, the alliance upper echelon was malfunctioning; the Djibouti accord has only served as the last straw. The internal division within the Courts' movement-as it became evident in the Asmara conference in September 2007 and the recent Djibouti meeting- is indicative for the current situation in Somalia²⁶. The divisions between the two groups have become clear as early as September 2008²⁷. Before the public fully grasped the extent of the dispute, the two camps had already started assembling members in Asmara and Djibouti respectively for a possible fragmentation of the original alliance.

The near-collapse of the ARS and the TFG in the aftermath of the preliminary peace deal in Djibouti has become a source of concern for both Ethiopia and the US²⁸. It only dampened the prospects of peace in Somalia, a crucial issue for both countries. The *al-shabab* has become more or less independent of the political separation and constraints of the splinter groups of the ARS in Asmara and Djibouti. Any residual influence the ARS, or what is left of it, may exercise will have negligible effect on those in the ground, fighting inside Somalia against the Ethiopian/TFG forces²⁹. One lesson that Somalia's long political conflict teaches us is that any peace accord will be inconclusive if one opposing group is not the official member of the signatories of that agreement. Short of this, the fighting would go on, blood would be shed, suffering of the innocent Somali people would continue. The ARS should have made the necessary consultations (negotiations if required) with the

of the country's population which still relies on deductions and elaborations based on the 1983 census .

⁸This had already been the case with the *as-salam min ad-dakbil* ("peace from within") the 1997 predecessor of the CPA . The then signatories (Lam Akol , Riak Machar and a bevy of lesser personalities) soon found themselves ensnared in a fine net of obligations/manipulations/deceptions/limitations whose pattern strongly resembled that of the present CPA and which led the signatories to complete impotence .

⁹This is not the place to discuss the EPA . But suffice to say that almost two years later the "Agreement" has not been fulfilled and that it is now in deep trouble .

¹⁰It is rather amusing to see how the Sudanese regime , which usually vehemently denies any legitimacy to international criticism of its violent actions , is on the contrary quite happy to embrace the legitimacy that same international community bestows on the "Agreements" it sponsors . Non-compliance (of the other parties) is criticized and "spoilers" are loudly denounced .

¹¹In a perfect display of old-style short-sighted power politics , the then US Special Representative Robert Zoellick told me that the main reason to prefer Minni's signature to others was the fact that "*he was the strongest on the ground*". That particular strength (which was largely due to the support at the time of Shafie Ahmed al-Sheikh) did not last and the international community soon found itself with a lame duck single signatory .

¹²This was the case of the Jebel Mara area where Minni's men killed dozens of Fur civilians , particularly women , in June and July 2006 . Minni is a Zaghawa and he used Zaghawa fighters to kill the Fur .

¹³France had helped the Sudanese regime in many different ways , running from intelligence and training of its secret service to support at the IMF when Khartoum was threatened with expulsion in the 1990s .

¹⁴The French were also helping General Bozize in the CAR who was also facing increasing – if smaller – attacks from Sudanese-sponsored rebels .

¹⁵It is worth noting that the JEM fighters in Omdurman were crushed not by the regular army but by the *Difaa esh-Shabiyyi* (Popular

heterogeneous vis-à-vis the rest of the country . Although it is far from being the only “marginalized” area of the Sudan , it is the only part which is still today fiercely driven by a dream of national independence .

²In the short term the Libyans wanted to use Darfur as a rear base to overthrow the Hissen Habre regime in Chad . For the longer run , they were dreaming of annexing Darfur , a not completely unreasonable proposition if one remembers the control the Libya-based Senussiyya *tariqa* once had over these southern reaches of the Sahara desert . We should remember that the king of Libya , before Gaddafi , was the supreme Sheikh of the Senussiyya .

³The violence took a loose and decentralized form : peasants would be attacked on their way to the local market , transport trucks would be highjacked , “Arab” nomads would roam into the cultivated fields of “African” settled peasants with their flocks and Libyan-sponsored *Failaka al-Islamiya* “Arab” militiamen would loot , rape and kill people in “African” villages . The word “*janjaweed*” began to be used to describe the “Arab” brigands . Meanwhile pro-and anti-Hissen Habre Chadians would use the province as a battlefield , in a situation very reminiscent of today’s configuration .

⁴This was somewhat similar to the situation of the various Nuba tribes in Southern Kordofan at the time . But the religious and cultural divisions of the Nuba and the absence of a shared past of national independence made them into a material which was much more easily manipulated by the Khartoum propaganda . Thus the Nuba revolt never gained its own autonomy , later becoming subsumed into a broader SPLM agenda after 1985-1986 .

⁵As was the case for Idris Deby himself when he overthrew Hissen Habre and took Ndjamena by storm in December 1990 , with French and Sudanese support .

⁶This notion of geographical clairvoyance is in itself ridiculous . Does the old “founding fathers” EEC hardcore in Brussels *really* understand Albania or Lithuania , simply because they are geographically “European” ? History , cultural relativity , distance , ignorance , all play major roles in massive reciprocal misunderstandings .

⁷Hence the importance of the recently botched-up census . If it had not been carried out so badly , it might have given us a better view

militarily stronger *al-shabab* wing. That leaves, among the leading domestic players, the head of the ARS's military wing, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, as the only figure who has increased his power, although he is by no means in control of the multi-faceted armed resistance.

In one way those who favor political negotiations as opposed to military solutions to resolve the Somali crisis couldn't blame the TFG that it is unable to achieve it. Because it has become evident that an extremist core of the insurgency is not interested in the language of political dialogue. The tragedy of peace in Somalia today is that the group, which is crucial to a ceasefire and an end to violence, the *al-Shabab*, is not at all ready to talk. The combative mood of the *shabab* is partly influenced by the measures recently taken by the US. The *al-shabab* fighters together with some leaders of the UIC(now ARS), are in the US list of terrorists, and one will not expect these people to give up and surrender. Both a peaceful Somalia and their military defeat risks their capture and subsequent handover to the US government. For them therefore, continuing the war is a matter of life and death. There is less incentive for them to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement of the Somali crisis. It is not surprising that Dahir Aweys and his close associates are increasingly nihilist and paranoid by the fact that their names are on an international terror list. Alternatively, they are determined to form a system of government they can control so that their safety is guaranteed. In such a scenario it is near delusion to assume that any peace process, including the recent Djibouti peace accord, will be implemented without the Asmara wing of the ARS. The Asmara wing of the ARS should be an important component of the peace deal. The alternative is to decisively overpower them, a scenario that increasingly seems unlikely to happen in the near future.

The Regional Impasse

Regional interests-economic, political and ideological-are played out in Somalia, relatively unhindered by a functional state. The civil war in Somalia thus increases the extent of polarization in the Horn of

had been made and adjustments would be required during the demarcation phase. They argued that a boundary line that divided up villages on the border in the way proposed would be a recipe for conflict rather than peace and stability. The Commission responded that the Delimitation Decision was final and binding and they had no authority to vary the boundary line. Ethiopia next appealed to the UN Security Council, declaring that the work of the Commission was in terminal crisis as a result of the decision on Badme, which it characterized, as “totally illegal, unjust and irresponsible”. Ethiopia’s appeal to the Security Council to set up an “alternative mechanism to demarcate the contested parts of the boundary in a just and legal manner” was rejected¹³.

Eritrea agreed with the Boundary Commission that the Delimitation Decision could not be altered and demarcation must proceed on the basis of the Decision. Eritrea looked to the international community to put meaningful pressure on Ethiopia to accept the ruling and allow demarcation to take place. Despite having the law on its side, Eritrea had considerable difficulty gaining international sympathy. Their increasingly blunt demands for the international community to compel Ethiopia to comply with the Decision fell on deaf ears.

A stalemate set in from late 2003. The UN upheld the need to implement the boundary ruling while urging the two sides themselves to reach agreement on how to do so. This was well nigh impossible since they were not on speaking terms. Diplomatic efforts to seek some common ground between them foundered on Eritrea’s suspicion of third party initiatives and her conviction that this was an attempt to introduce the “alternative mechanism” that Ethiopia wanted. For her part, Ethiopia used skilful diplomacy to present its case for non-compliance in the best possible light, banking on its greater weight as a regional partner, particularly in the post 9/11 climate. Eritrea found it hard to accept the reality of its weak international standing *vis a vis* Ethiopia and at times made matters worse by playing its diplomatic hand badly and alienating previously friendly powers.

The standoff may have represented the least bad option for the two

troops for UNAMID has a clear signification : he is fairly sure that the AU will not support the indictment and that therefore the African troops which still make up the bulk of UNAMID are unlikely to be used by the international community to arrest him . This is the main reason for his refusing non-African troops in UNAMID . But he and his colleagues also know that the decision will turn him into an international pariah . He will become a virtual prisoner of his Chinese and Russian allies , just like in the old Cold War days , but with one big difference : the Sudan is not Angola in 1975 and we are unlikely to see Cuban – or even Chinese – troops land in Port Sudan to defend the Sudanese regime . Diplomacy yes – up to some measure of brinkmanship – yes again , military support , no . China does not want another Tibet in Africa and Russia does not need another Georgia there either .

The Sudanese regime’s fears are more related to the growth of its internal armed opposition which will be encouraged by the indictment . There again the situation of the south will remain the arbiter of the future .

August 27th 2008

Endnotes

¹³The case of the South should be considered separately . The South is deeply “African” in character , Islam has no significant presence there , it was administered separately by the British during colonial times and the importance of Christianity makes it fundamentally

very likely end up with a fairly bitter conclusion . What will be the impact on Darfur ?

The possible indictment of President Omar Hassan el-Beshir and its consequences

The ICC process which has led to the possible indictment of President Omar Hassan el-Beshir has already had several consequences on the Sudanese political scene .

- The government is running scared . The death sentences passed on the captured JEM combatants is already a sign . The GoS wants to frighten the population and particularly the Darfurians . It fears another attack on the capital and it is not sure of the loyalty of its armed forces .
- The confused efforts at revivifying the DPA corpse have been very confused . Nobody took them seriously , all the more so since they were coupled with a renewed military offensive in the Jebel Moon area of North Darfur at mid-August.
- In Ankara , President Beshir tried – fairly successfully – to scare the attending members of the AU into supporting him in the face of the indictment , telling them point blank that they too had skeletons in their cupboards and that they had no guarantee that the ICC procedure would not be used against them in the future.
- Meanwhile the recent government attack on the Kalma IDP camp shows that the regime is trying to blackmail the international community by implicitly telling it : “*If you indict President Beshir , we could take a dreadful revenge on the IDPs*”. The warning is clear . How will the ICC respond to it is not yet clear .

Nobody believes that the indictment would be followed by any kind of military intervention in the Sudan in order to enforce the ICC decision . But President Beshir’s refusal to accept any non-African

sides. It enabled Ethiopia to remain in Badme (and entrench its position there) while hurting Eritrea economically by the simple expedient of not normalising relations (restoring trade links etc). It enabled Eritrea to justify remaining on a war footing, stifling economic development and all political expression in the country. The passion with which Eritrea demanded its rights under international law was certainly not matched by the provision of constitutional rights for its citizens. There were growing doubts that the two leaders had any real desire to make peace. The zero sum game over boundary delimitation suited their propensity to take up hostile and intractable positions in every conceivable forum tasked with promoting agreement, whether the Boundary Commission, the UN Security Council or within the councils of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD).

If stalemate was the least bad option for the two protagonists, their failure to proceed to boundary demarcation posed a significant problem for the UN. Demarcation was the completion point of the UNMEE mission, without which it had no exit strategy. The UN Secretary General’s various efforts to unblock the stalled peace process by diplomatic means were rejected by Eritrea. In the same vein, Eritrea rejected a Five Point Peace Plan announced by Ethiopia in November 2004. This declared Ethiopia’s acceptance “in principle” of the Delimitation Decision and proposed to “start dialogue immediately with the view to implementing the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission’s decision in a manner consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace and brotherly ties between the two peoples”¹⁴. The United States was still trying to maintain a neutral stance between Ethiopia and Eritrea at this time and made no public comment on Ethiopia’s initiative. But the positive response from other parts of the international community, including the European Union, made the Five Point Plan something of a diplomatic coup for Ethiopia.

Eritrea’s response to the Stalemate

militias and now the ARS, including the *Shabab* Eritrea is enabled to engage in a proxy frontline war with Ethiopian troops.

While Ethiopia and Eritrea support different factions in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, new questions have emerged about the future of the quasi states and autonomous administrations that emerged in Somalia after the collapse of the Siad Barre government. Although Somaliland has made remarkably successful efforts towards statehood, primarily by holding elections and providing public goods, the silence by the international community over its recognition continues to cast a pall over its future. Similarly, Puntland has struggled to project the image of a functional state, even though it is less endowed than Somaliland in terms of human capacity and economic resources. In recent months, it has become beset by socio-economic and political crisis and witnessed a deterioration of security, an unwelcome situation related to some degree to what is happening in southern Somalia and within the TFG. In addition to the uncertain relationships with Mogadishu and southern Somalia, there are new border conflicts between Somaliland and Puntland, that blended with resource and the ever changing clan alliances, have occasionally resulted into violence, underscoring the endurance of border disputes in the region.

Meanwhile, Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia in pursuit of what Ethiopia perceives as its legitimate national security interest—namely to ensure that the Transitional Federal Government defeats its adversary, the Union of Islamic Courts—has made it a major player in events shaping Somalia. Nonetheless, recent Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, as mentioned previously, suffered from three major weaknesses. Probably, these shortcomings are based on the misreading of the TFG and Somali realities. To begin with Ethiopian military intervention was not anchored in a workable and realistic political formula. In the process it tried to impose the weak TFG by force and as a consequence came to be only associated with one political force in a highly politically fragmented country. Though the TFG is widely recognized as a legitimate government internationally, as discussed earlier, its claim

But two could play that game and the Chadians helped the Justice and Equality Movement of Khalil Ibrahim to attack Khartoum in May 2008 . That attack too was also poorly planned and it also resulted in a military failure. But there, just like in the opposite camp, it shattered the security oriented Sudanese establishment and revealed some profound political and even military weaknesses.¹⁵ The very fact that the JEM troops had been able to reach the capital across all of Kordofan , coming from Darfur , was in itself telling .

The JEM fighters retreated and went back, licking their wounds . But they did not return all the way to Darfur . They now have bases in Kordofan from where they hope to attack the capital again in late 2008 or early 2009 . Meanwhile UNAMID has pre-aborted . On December 31st 2007 its members took off their green berets and replaced them with blue ones . This was about the extent of UN influence on the process.¹⁶

This leaves us with the question of the peace process . As far as the DPA is concerned , it is completely dead and buried . Minni Minnawi , its only signatory , has now left Khartoum after being recalled in late June by his commanders who left him no choice : either he would rejoin the rebellion or they would leave him in Khartoum as the powerless head of a non-existent guerrilla group . As for them they would re-join their comrades of either SLM-Unity or the JEM . Minni went to Njamena to confer with Idris Deby and the Chadian President's advice was that he should drop his unpopular support for the DPA . He listened and did not go back to Khartoum .

The next step is to see what will happen with the planned September 2009 elections . Given the farce of the census , they are not looking too well . The SPLM attitude of trying to win them¹⁷ is of course completely unrealistic . The SPLM does not have any chance of winning at the polls – even if we discount the probable rigging – and one can reasonably wonder at the impact of its future defeat next year . The secessionist wing of the party has been silenced for the time being . But it is obvious that the defeat of the “Unionists” at the polls will result in a massive bout of soul-searching which will

any way affect the course of the actual fighting or influence the mass of the IPDs in the camps . Meanwhile the AMIS mission was sinking into complete irrelevance , its presence serving only to monitor the mayhem which it was incapable of preventing . Its men , isolated , underfunded , demoralized by the corruption which pervaded the whole operation , even became targets for anybody who felt like killing them , whether *janjaweed* or rebels . Many in the international community began to clamor for a devolution of the AMIS responsibilities to a UN force , thinking , perhaps a bit quickly , that New York could come up with a kind of panacea which would begin to bring perhaps not peace but at least a modicum of security for the camps and for their international suppliers .

At the beginning of 2007 the UN managed to come up with Resolution 1769 which provided for a so-called “hybrid force”(mixed UN and African Union or UNAMID) of 26,000 troops to be deployed in Darfur to replace the undermanned and under-equipped AU contingent there . But New York and Addis Ababa felt that the deployment of such a force might be useless if the non-signatory guerrilla groups (i.e. practically all) did not agree first on some kind of a common position in order to negotiate a ceasefire with Khartoum . UN-AMID was conceived of as a peacekeeping force , not as an invading army , and so far there was no peace to be kept in Darfur.

The Sudanese Army kept needling the guerrillas , in the vague hope that their military capacity (which was limited) would start to shrink . It also put ever increasing amounts of arms and money into boosting the Chadian rebels in the hope that these “friends” could overthrow Idris Deby and then help them cut off the JEM/SLM supply lines .

This whole process culminated in two frontal attacks on Ndjamená in April 2007 and February 2008 . Both attacks were poorly planned and resulted in complete failure , from the military point of view . But the *political* result was to further weaken the already wobbly Chadian regime , in spite of French help.¹⁴

is highly contested internally. The TFG from its inception lacked representative legitimacy and credibility, which hampered the 'efforts' it made to extend its appeal.

Secondly, Ethiopian intervention was not anchored in a clearly articulated international support plan. Since, Ethiopia had to run against time to save the TFG from collapse and had to stop the UIC from expanding one can say there was no enough time for Ethiopia to be able to garner concrete international support for its pro-TFG military operations in Somalia. For many in the region Ethiopian intervention opened a new window of opportunity for building a sustainable peace in Somalia, but it also triggered uneasiness in the UN system³⁷, and turned to be a divisive issue in the process of consolidating an inclusive political process in Somalia. If Sudan presented the most complex, combined peacekeeping challenges to the international community in 2007 Somalia presented and still presents the most difficult choice. The UN has always claimed that intervention in Somalia is marred by a lot of risks. With the debacle in early 1990's such an excuse was generally accepted. But the UN failed to act even when there were no risks at all, such as when the TFG was first established in 2004 and later in early 2007 when it reached Mogadishu immediately after the military defeat of the Islamists. After 20 solid months the UN is still skeptical about Somalia. Neither the expected assistance to AMISOM nor a UN peacekeeping force is in sight.

The expectation that the UN will provide high levels of assistance to AMISOM as well as the assumption that African missions, notably in Somalia, will eventually transition to UN operations is almost disappearing³⁸. Efforts to muster a strong African Union protection force to replace the Ethiopian forces will continue to run in to difficulties; at best it will be very slow. The stiff resistance activities in Mogadishu have also deterred the deployment of 8000 strong AMISOM troops in Somalia. The strategy of keeping AMISOM troops at bay so that the Ethiopian troops would finish off the remnant of the hard core Islamist fighters before the deployment of AMISOM soldiers take place have faced difficulties. Only a handful of Ugandan and Burundian troops have been deployed, some of them unenthusiastical-

ly³⁹. The African Union mission is understaffed, and as the head of UPDF once said, the mission target is survival in Somalia rather than the stabilization of Somalia⁴⁰. Faced with a weak government wanting to consolidate power and an opposition desperately trying to prove the situation is volatile, the United Nations Security Council is yet to come up with a definite and plausible plan of action. Looking at the failures of the very recent, in 2004 and early 2007, the likely consequences of inaction seemed obvious and far outweighed the risks of intervention.

Unable to guarantee international support, and probably hoping to get it sometime in the future Ethiopia had to act alone. Its military operation in Somalia, while necessary, was also a costly drain on its scarce resources. Another problem was evident too: the attempt to reconstruct the Somali state and stabilize the country from above, a repeatedly failed and discredited strategy. Long held view of the author of this paper is that peace building and state building in Somalia is not necessarily one and the same, and at times happen to be contradictory to each other⁴¹. The state haven't actually been around long enough to draw conclusions, however, recent experiences should inform policy makers that there is a need to push for an alternative form of government that might be better suited to Somalia's fluid, fragmented and decentralized society. The bulk of outside efforts have concentrated on standing up a strong central government, which may be anathema in a country where authority tends to be diffuse and clan-based. This has become glaringly evident due to the TFGs shortcomings. Equally mistaken was the undue emphasis given to taming Mogadishu, an obsession shared by majority Somali political players. All these factors, coupled with the division and squabbles within the TFG seem to have compromised total victory and orderly withdrawal of Ethiopia forces from Somalia.

began to support Chadian rebel groups opposed to President Idris Deby . But the internationalization did not stop there . Since the Central African regime of President Félix Ange Patasse had long been supported by Deby , the Chadian President's tactical switch had consequences all the way down to the CAR . Khartoum picked up the support of Patasse which led Deby to help rebel general François Bozize who in turn overthrew Patasse . A new power alignment then developed to the west and southwest of Darfur , with Ndjamena and Bangui being run by regimes which were both considered by Khartoum to be inimical . By 2006 rebel and *janjaweed* raids from Darfur began to bite deeper and deeper into both Chad and the Central African Republic . Both countries were former French colonies and France had long taken a very protective , not to say proprietary attitude towards its former African empire . Paris , which had long been the only friend Sudan had among western regimes,¹³ began to turn against its erstwhile ally .

This regional switch took place in a very loaded context , both vis-à-vis international institutions and in terms of the US attitude towards the Sudan . The UN had negotiated the presence of a Sudan mission – UNMIS – after the signature of the CPA in January 2005 . But UNMIS was specifically limited to the old areas of GoS/SPLA fighting and made no mention whatsoever of Darfur . In fact , since 2004 , attempts at restoring peace and security in Darfur had been left to the African Union which had deployed a force culminating at 7,000 men (AMIS) .

Meanwhile the US , still quite pleased with its Naivasha/Nairobi “success” dreamt of progressively extending the “virtuous circle” of the CPA to Darfur . When I saw Robert Zoellick at the time , his major worry seemed to be the Chadian dimension of the problem which was then growing by leaps and bounds .

During the course of 2006 it rapidly became obvious that the DPA was not going to be another CPA . In fact it was almost the opposite . The Darfur guerillas, far from being attracted by an evanescent DPA , steered clear from it and the only groups Khartoum managed to coax into signing were insignificant groups which could not in

extremely violent course of trying to force the non-signatories to sign, largely by killing their civilian supporters.¹² This did not work very well and his following not only did not grow but he even lost a good number of his supporters . Part of the reason was that , in spite of being made a Special Advisor on Darfur in the President's Office , he did not have many jobs to share among his followers. Moreover the various provisions of the DPA were not carried out and the various attempts at getting non-signatory groups to sign all wound up in dead ends . After the aborted Sirte meeting in 2007 , it became obvious that the various guerilla groups had observed the fate of the Minni fraction and that they were not very eager to follow the same path . Rather than blaming the Khartoum regime which had not kept its DPA promises the international community chose to blame the various guerilla groups , declaring that the reason why they remained unmanageable was that there were too many of them . The implied notion was that if only there had been one strong organization , like the SPLM , it could have “delivered the goods” and signed a workable Peace Agreement with the regime , like the CPA . Nobody seemed to ask themselves whether the CPA was really working (it was not , but seen from a distance , it could still look acceptable) and whether the Darfur rebels actually wanted a cut-rate version of the CPA as a “solution” to the problem of their relationship with Khartoum . Formal adherence to the DPA had become a kind of Graal which was pursued for a while . Then it died with the worsening of the Chad-Sudan relationship .

Sudan , Chad and the progressive internationalization of the conflict

As we noted earlier the Chadian regime of Idris Deby had started by helping Khartoum in the repression of the Darfurian insurrection . But in May 2005 a quasi coup carried out by high ranking Zaghawa officers of the Chadian Army obliged him to change his policy . Given the violence carried out by the Sudanese Army and its *janjaweed* auxiliaries against – among others – the Sudanese Zaghawa , their Chadian relatives insisted that President Deby had to support the Darfurian rebellion . As a *quid pro quo* , Khartoum

Conclusion: Debunking the Myth

Ethiopian intervention didn't have the decisive impact on the crisis in Somalia that many had expected. The continuing clan divisions and the strength of Islamists today are as much of a reflection of the civil war and the stateless situation as they are the result of Ethiopian intervention and the world's failure to help rebuild the country. Energized by Ethiopia's military machine as well as political and some external financial support, the TFG is still unable to turn some of its military successes in to organizational strength and political achievements. As the crisis in the T.F.G. deepened, the insurgency in Mogadishu led by the *jihadist* movements continue to spike, with many areas in south Somalia descending to chaos and anarchy. With a clan-based structure dominated by clan warlords, the T.F.G. as an institution has been proved that it is not designed to resolve Somalia's intractable problems. This is something real. Its inherent problems are also real, which is exactly a major reason why Ethiopia should support negotiations with the opposition so that a more credible and functional government is established in Somalia. This will guarantee complete Ethiopian withdrawal and eventual disengagement. Indeed, a major part of the problem for Ethiopia will not be solved by new military tactics or increased military operations: it is the weakness of the Somali government.

Unless the situation is altered, Somalia risks sliding back into the anarchy and warlordism that prevailed in the 1990's. Such a reversion would have a disastrous consequence for Somalia, the stability of Ethiopia and the region and would be a profound setback for the US war on terror. One of the justifications for Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia was that it needed to prevent militant Islamists from stocking the fire of Ogaden irredentism as they did in the 1970s. Although the Ethiopian government seems to have conducted relatively successful counterinsurgency operations against what it considers as a terrorist organization, the ONLF, failure to meet the grievances in the Ogaden may recreate the instabilities that have dodged the region in the past. The gene of radicalization, chaos and mayhem may have been unleashed onto Somalia

and neighboring regions as a result of the mistakes accompanying the intervention, rather than the intervention per se and can't be put back into a bottle⁴². Meanwhile, unlike Ethiopia the fight of the *shabab* and other militias against the Ethiopian army has become an ideal instrument for Eritrea to wage war against its biggest neighbor. A war that does not risk losing neither its own territory nor causing a large number of Eritrean casualties.

The TFG is doing Ethiopia a disservice by squandering the opportunity and failing to turn the support it enjoys into real capacity. Its performance to date has undermined the confidence many of its allies who have had confidence about its leaders and their ability and integrity in combating terrorism more generally. It is falling because it is inefficient, or dysfunctional, or unpopular, or all three. Its leaders are consumed by yet another round of infighting. The first step toward undoing the mistakes entails debunking the myth that The TFG could stabilize Somalia and fight against terrorists effectively. The second step would be, as is also related to Ethiopia, debunking the myth that supporting the TFG enhances regional stability and more specifically Ethiopia's national security. The third step should be debunking the myth that all major players in the Courts movement are linked to terrorism. The last point is timely because an interesting dynamics is repeating itself, like the one which took place a year and half ago in the Courts Union, within the ARS. Moderates with a Somali agenda are distancing themselves from the hardliners with a foreign and global agenda.

Almost all political and military forces in Somalia, including clan leadership, business and civil society groups are either weak or internally divided. To a large part the division within the opposition emanates from clan loyalty to ideological (Islamic) extremism. The problem starts from its composition involving disparate, contradictory and sometimes antagonistic political agendas and actors. Currently it is weak and divided and its fate hinges solely on the Ethiopian factor bereft of any common agenda for itself and devoid of an alternative exit strategy for the war torn country. It mixes

could be re-negotiated was considered as a heresy in Washington , Paris , London and New York) .

- Accepting the NCP/SPLM claims that this was the only true and genuine article of faith for “peace in the Sudan” .
- Relegating any “marginalized area” claim to a secondary rank , to be dealt with through lower echelon “agreements” which would fit both *outside* and *under* the glorified CPA dispensation . Any further signed piece of paper would thus hold a canonically lower ranking than the CPA .

This suited the Khartoum regime fine . It had always been its view that agreements , while making wonderful paper traps for the *other* signatories, left it with free hands in *interpreting* the contents of the document.⁸ The NCP then resolutely engaged in negotiating a whole series of “agreements” such as the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 and later the Eastern Peace Agreement (EPA) in October 2006.⁹ The various provisions of these “Agreements” were structurally inadequate for a basic reason : what the NCP was prepared to negotiate – even if not really prepared to carry out – was only some form of partial tactical “arrangement” of the former global political dispensation which would leave the core elements of Nile Valley elite Arab domination intact . The political , economic and administrative structures of Khartoum’s control were to remain firmly set while cosmetic financial and local changes would be proffered . This window-dressing was usually liberally sprinkled with moneyed “inducements” which were supposed to buy the goodwill of the traditional elites while co-opting “new elements” from the guerilla into it .

While Khartoum handed out its limited local goodies , the “international community” played its role in legitimizing from abroad what had no legitimacy nationally.¹⁰ The DPA is a good case in point . Its provisions being both inadequate and poorly guaranteed , the only guerilla segment which accepted to sign it was the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) fraction led by Minni Arkoy Minnawi.¹¹ Soon after signing the DPA , Minni embarked on an

and by the African Union . This non-treatment of the problem has played into the hands of the Sudanese regime which has literally run circles around its foreign critics .

The starting point of the problem goes back the period of the Naivasha negotiations between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) . Here we had two entities , the NCP representing “the North” and the SPLM representing “the South” , talking to each other . The first point to be remembered is that the NCP , under its previous guise as National Islamic Front (NIF) had received 7% of the popular vote in the April 1986 elections and had later taken power through a military coup in June 1989 . As for the SPLM it was an armed movement which had never competed in an election . Given the fact that all the Southerners together represent perhaps about 25 to 30% of the population at best⁷ and given the fact that the SPLM is often quite unpopular both among the Equatorian tribes and among the Nuer , the real nation-wide electoral weight of the SPLM in a free and fair election would perhaps be around 15 to 20% . Let us give incumbency a role in boosting those scores and let us assume that the SPLM would have had an honorable score in the “marginalized areas” of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile ; in any case , at the most , the two signatories of the Naivasha/Nairobi January 9th 2005 agreement known as the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) could have represented together 40% of the Sudanese population . Which means that 60% of the Sudanese citizens of this supposedly “comprehensive” peace agreement were excluded from the peace , making it a very “incomprehensive” agreement indeed . And among the excluded non-signatories were *all* of the Darfurians , the whole East and large segments of Kordofan which supported neither the NCP nor the SPLM .

So the international community started with backing a very limited “peace agreement”, not only taking it to represent the whole country but also :

- Turning it into a Sacred Cow (any suggestion that the CPA

political/democratic transition with *Jihad*. Rhetoric aside, this group is unable to forge a common political platform and come up with a sensible or reasonable political strategy. The imperfections of the TFG are troublingly obvious, but this is what we have in Somalia. Unlike the TFG, the opposition, particularly its radical wing, lacks even the intent to contribute for peace and state building in Somalia. The progressive fragmentation of political forces has continued unabated. Recurring conflict within the TFG and the current political fragmentation among the opposition alliance is symptomatic of this development. This makes the prospect of peace in Somalia a distant prospect.

Recommendation

There are a number of steps that should be taken and general directions that should be followed by different stakeholders, which will help resolve the Somali crisis in general. This includes crosscutting issues and specific measures that need to be taken by particular players in the Somali conflict.

As a start, the only available, if not the best, alternative is to support the peace accord just signed in Djibouti between Somali opposing sides. This accord should be expanded to its logical conclusion of unity-government between the TFG and its opposition. Engage with the traditional leadership, particularly the Hawiya clan leadership in Mogadishu. Violence will intensify unless the government reconciles with clan elders, who control as much as anyone controls, what happens in Somalia.

Both the UN and Ethiopia should have placed great emphasis on the obligation of the Somali government to achieve some benchmarks for peace and state building in Somalia. Above all Ethiopia should link its strategy on Somalia and all its support of the TFG to progress on clear benchmarks and political steps than its zeal to fight its adversaries. It is also imperative that the TFG as an institution should be made to deliver. That doing away with a dysfunctional government is more important than directly fighting with *jihadists*

Peace in Somalia requires the TFG to be reconstituted as a genuine government of national unity irrespective of the TFG's signs of willingness or its tendency to use the war on terror as an excuse not to reach out other forces or secure unlimited support from Ethiopia. Whatever amount of representation and legitimacy it may command, the TFG is a transitional entity. It should not be allowed to monopolize transitional institutions by excluding all other actors in Somalia. This will not help a peaceful political transition in Somalia. That was not the intention of creating the TFG in the first place. The Transitional Federal Institutions/TFIs/, mainly key transitional institutions such as the electoral Commission and Reconciliation Commission, including the security sector should be open to the participation of different players in Somalia.

The international community and the United Nations should walk extra mile to strengthen the moderates by working hard to facilitate timely withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia—the ARS's key demand. Failure to do so will undoubtedly embolden the militants and potentially derail the entire peace process.

Since the mid 1990's there has never been a more auspicious time for Ethiopia to establish close relations with those Somali forces who have long used the *Islamist* and nationalist card. Ethiopia should learn to engage and cooperate with those forces in Somalia that are critical to its role or those that work to constrain its influence. Such forces are not necessarily enemies of the national interest. In some instances, for Ethiopia, peace and national security entails learning to work with some of its enemies and coexist with political leaders with strong Islamist credentials. In a mess such as that of Somalia, it is imperative to deal with different actors and avoid the tendency of supporting one group, however good that group is, to impose complete control in an uncontrolled space such as Somalia, which will never happen anytime soon.

Meanwhile, for the sake of stable transition Somali actors need to develop somehow grudging acceptance that they could gain a lot

was a Chadian Zaghawa . He represented the disaffected Zaghawa establishment of Chad who had decided that their relative Idris Deby was not generous enough and that overthrowing him and taking his place would bring excellent benefits to the tribe . For that purpose he wanted to use Darfur , the traditional launching pad of all regime change processes in Chad,⁵ intending to use anti-Khartoum Darfuri resentment to set up his own rear base in Jebel Mara . It worked , but not in the way he had envisioned : encountering favorable ground the rebellion took off like wildfire while Idris Deby who had at first allied himself with Khartoum to combat it , was later forced by a mutiny of his own Zaghawa officers to change sides and support the rebels instead of fighting them . As for Commander Abbakar himself , he had been killed fighting in April 2004 . By then Chad had turned into an unavoidable element of the Darfur conflict , with rebels on both sides using the other country's regime as a prop to their home rebellion .

The frustration , the depth of resentment , the seriousness of the Darfur populations is often not correctly perceived by outside observers trying to understand the situation and who are often only looking at the ridiculously fractious guerrilla commanders as a clue to evaluate what is going on . Rhetoric notwithstanding , Darfur expresses a deep political fracture of the Islamic polity and it won't go away , to be simply solved by humanitarianism and traditional diplomacy . Darfur's needs and demands , just like those of many other Sudanese peripheries , require to be addressed seriously , politically and structurally . DPA style band aids simply won't do .

The international treatment of the crisis so far

As is often the case with many African crises , most of the outsiders do not understand the true nature of the problem . And by "outsiders" , we do not only mean distant foreigners like the Europeans or the Americans . Most Africans do not understand it either, something which solidly contradicts the facile cliché of "*African solutions to African problems*."⁶ As a result largely inadequate solutions have been proffered , both by the so-called "international community"

look outside the borders of Darfur , what was the general “Sudanese” situation of the time ? Those same authorities which treated Darfur with such neglect and contempt were massively conscripting Darfurian youths to go and fight the Southern *kuffar* (unbelievers) in the name of Sudanese unity and Islam . Thus the very victims of peripheral marginalization were asked to die in the name of nationalist centralism.⁴ This had already been the case during the first civil war of 1955-1972 . But at the time Darfur was still very traditional , the “national” army was Muslim , the rebels were Christians , they were secessionists and there were no mass-communication media . In addition , the southern rebels did not even for one moment think of the possibility of working on any kind of psychologically-targeted propaganda because they themselves , just like their Darfur killers , saw the world in black-and-white, with Islam working as a convenient cultural false-consciousness glue for their enemies , just as Christianity was working for them . As a result at the time foreign observers described the war in purely religious terms while the “marginalization-within-the-Islamic-camp” dimension went completely unobserved . But given Colonel Garang’s strategic view of the Sudan as a mosaic of marginalized societies , the situation was now quite different . During the late 1980s and early 1990s , the SPLM political line began to bite into the complacent “Islamic” northern consciousness . The SPLM supported the armed movements then developing among the Nuba tribes of Southern Kordofan and the various tribal groups of Southern Blue Nile . In addition , the equally marginalized Beja tribes of the East , who had also long been faithful servants of the Nile Valley “Arab” elite , began to develop a rebel movement of their own . Darfur , which was still remaining a bastion of loyalty to the Khartoum political establishment , slowly began to develop doubts , particularly as the security situation within Darfur itself went progressively from bad to worse .

In a way it was the Chadian situation which served as a fuse for the whole setup . The legendary “Commander Abbakar” , the first rebel commander who took El Fasher in February 2003 and blew up a good part of the local Sudanese Air Force planes on the ground ,

from, and only from orderly and phased withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.

Reducing the threat from Somali Islamists need to be linked with creating conditions conducive to constructive political dialogue in that country. One without the other is difficult to achieve, and even it is less desirable.

There is every reason to reach out to those who think Islam must play a role in the political transition in Somalia, as long as they agree on the transitional process and abide by its rules. Nonetheless, as long as the *al-shabab* fighters together with some leaders of the UIC(now ARS) are in the US list of terrorists, one will not expect these people to give up and surrender, and something needs to be done about it.

What is needed is a political strategy to combat, contest and weaken the appeal of these groups or to marginalize their violent factions. It is impossible to totally marginalize Islam from the political life of the Somalis. Islam cannot be totally excluded, it can only be moderated. The best way to do that is by opening an inclusive political process that ultimately marginalizes the extremists and accommodates the moderates. External help is always needed to blunt Islamic extremism.

The most urgent task now is, however, how to deal with the fundamental problems of Somalia, mainly the task of providing former combatants and the youth with access to livelihoods. Economic pressures are rising within the IDPs. What is required is large-scale emergency and economic aid geared towards Demilitarization, Demobilization, Reconciliation and Reintegration/DDRR/, with the last R being the biggest one. This will not totally resolve Somalia's political problems, but it will definitely enhance chances for peace all over the country and the establishment of a functional government in Somalia. That is like a great leap forward towards resolving the crisis in Somalia and the region. This will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, security risk for the region and the world at large. It is wise for the international community, mainly Western

countries to become more serious about Somalia before the momentum for peace is totally lost.

Major political players in Somalia are so disorganized; disoriented and divided the focus needs to be on the peace building initiatives at the local level. State building from above is either hopeless or distant; at present the only feasible project is peace building at the local level and in the regions. After the recent experience of the TFG following this model is surely unthinkable.

There is an urgent need to spark decentralized political processes, not because that is what is possible today in Somalia but also because it is an effective mechanism to immediately undertake the urgently needed projects of reconciliation, law and order, and rehabilitation of the national infrastructure. The only option is to rebuild Somalia from the bottom up.

The fixation on Mogadishu must stop. For all practical reasons, guarding Somaliland's achievements and protecting Somalia's peace zones is equally important. The conflict has reached a point where it is almost impossible to resolve the crisis in south Somalia without according recognition to and rewarding the achievements of the Somaliland people. To avoid yet another complication, external allies of the TFG must realise that making progress on the south depends on a clear and sensible position towards Somaliland. It seems unlikely that any real progress will be achieved in south Somalia unless the signatories of the Djibouti Accord abandon their pretension that they also represent Somaliland. Unless both sides view their role as limited to the south, then Somalia's problems will not only linger but also might worsen.

Some reflections on the causes of the Darfur problem

After over four years of writing on Darfur , we need to address the causes of the crisis not only in the simple terms of “marginalization” , “poverty” , “discrimination” and so on but rather in more systemic fashion , trying to answer two basic questions :

1. What was so fundamentally wrong with Darfur that some of its inhabitants could not bear any more the situation they were living in and resorted to armed revolt?
2. Why is it that they chose to revolt when other marginalized areas remained relatively quiet?

The first question has some set answers : Darfur had almost no paved roads , very few schools , a pitifully insufficient health system , a dreadfully inadequate water supply infrastructure and , since the mid 1980s , an almost complete lack of security . Starting in 1985 , when Sadiq al-Mahdi cooperated with Gaddafi to open Darfur to Libyan armed penetration,² the “African” denizens of Darfur became fair game for their Mahdist and Libyan-supported “Arab” brethren . In the classical definition of the state , the state is the body which has a monopoly of organized violence over an internationally recognized area and , concomitantly , has the duty of protecting its citizens from aggressions carried out by competing forms of organized violence. From that vantage point , Khartoum could simply not be considered to be the legitimate government of Darfur . Actually it was not even a *de facto* government , since it had no capacity to impose its authority over the province . And this in a part of the country which had not been “Sudanese” before 1916 i.e. in a part of the country where memories of the region’s traditional specificity were still vividly alive . By the late 1980s Darfur was adrift , prey to a low intensity conflict which was claiming hundreds of lives every month³. Darfurians felt completely forgotten and despised by “their” government in Khartoum .

But to this was added another extremely painful sore . Because if we

³¹ Sally Healy Conflict in the Ogaden and its Regional Dimension, Chatham House Conference Report September 2007

³² The Eritrean President had warned several times in December 2006 that the contemplated invasion of Somalia would be a “journey into a quagmire” according to Shabait.com (Asmara) editorial of 20 December 2007

³³ Prime Minister Meles Zenawi Report to the House of People’s Representatives on Operations in Somalia 2 January 2007

³⁴ Sally Healy, Conflict in the Ogaden and its Regional Dimension, Chatham House seminar report, September 2007

³⁵ Personal communication

³⁶ AFP 24 April 2007

³⁷ Reuters, Asmara, 18 August 2007

³⁸ Q & A with President Issaias Afwerki, Los Angeles Times, 2 October 2007

³⁹ Observation by Harun Hassan, Somali writer and broadcaster.

⁴⁰ Nur Adde replaced Gedi as Prime Minister in October 2007

⁴¹ Interview with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Simon Tisdall. The Guardian 25 January 2008.

⁴² Interview with President Issayas Afewerki. Anand Naidoo. Al-Jazeera English TV 23 May 2008.

⁴³ Defined by Laurie Nathan as “dependable expectations of peaceful change”. Nathan argues that large-scale domestic violence prevents the attainment of security communities among states by rendering people and states insecure, generating uncertainty, tension and mistrust among states, and creating the risk of cross border violence. LSE Crisis States working paper No 55 November 2004.

⁴⁴ Forward to “Towards the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy”, proceedings of the Khartoum launching conference 1-3 October 2005. (IGAD Publication 2007)

⁴⁵ Newton’s Third Law of Motion: for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction

⁴⁶ Defined as “the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat.”

The State of the Darfur Problem at mid-2008

By Professor Gerard Prunier

Endnotes

¹ The ARS was formed in September 2007 in Asmara and delegates chose Sheikh Sherif Ahmed as its new leader.

² Annette Weber. State Building in Somalia-Challenges in a Zone of Crisis. In Hot Spot Horn of Africa revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of conflict. Lit Verlag Dr. W.Hopf Berlin 2008.

³ The Spokesman for the African Union peacekeeping mission Barigye Ba-Hoku says Islamist insurgents have been using guerrilla tactics borrowed from the insurgency in Iraq.

⁴ Discussions with Somalis and Ethiopians involving in the military conflict in Somalia reveal that gradually it has become clear that the TFG/ Ethiopian forces couldn't change the hearts of the people of Mogadishu or south Somalia, tilting towards pursuing a hard war policy that their opponents will give up and sue for peace

⁵ Almost all Somalis I had discussions with say that despite the insecurity and misery of the last 16 years the people Mogadishu were not feeling the brunt of war in such a scale.

⁶ Discussions with Somalis from Middle Shebele and Lower Juba, Addis Ababa. July 2008. Press reports and Somali Web sites have also reported along similar lines, reports never contradicted the other side of the Somali conflict.

⁷ Given their recent expansion of infrastructure and military consolidation in the area, it is a matter of time before the ale *shabab*, either co-opt or defeat the clan militias in Lower Juba, including Kismayo.

⁸ Horn of Africa-Complex Emergency. USAID. Fact Sheet, July21, 2008.

⁹ Somali informants Addis Ababa. May 2008.

¹⁰ Discussions with Ethiopians and Somalis, Addis Ababa, April 2008.

¹¹ May be it is too late too little, but the removal of Mohamed Dheere from the office of the Mogadishu mayor is characterized to be part of a strategy by the Prime Minister to create in Mogadishu and its environs a relatively peaceful environment where national reconciliation could be advanced.

¹² The Financial Times. August 20,2008.

¹³ Communique by the Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, August 18,2008.Djibouti.

¹⁴ Somalia is far from achieving any of the TFG mandates: completion of the peace process; implementation of Federalism in the country; demarcation of boundaries; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR); developing a viable security sector; the drafting-and passing through a national referendum- of a constitution and elections in 2009.

- ¹⁵The straw that broke the T.F.G.'s back came when Nur Adde dismissed the unpopular Dheere in an attempt to gain credibility with disaffected sub-clans of the Hawiye clan family, which dominates Mogadishu.
- ¹⁶Discussion with former members of UIC.
- ¹⁷Somali informants: They say while the UIC fighters are very much liked, the *shabab* are very much feared, mainly due to their ruthless character.
- ¹⁸The Daily Nation Newspaper, Nairobi, Kenya August 1, 2008. Besides in a recent interview with the BBC, Sheikh Mukhtar Roobow, the leader of the *al-shaba* (a position previously filled by Ayro) acknowledged the presence of foreign fighters and that foreign funds boost his forces, not to mention modern firearms and equipment.
- ¹⁹The presence of international *jihadists* and a network of training camps in middle and lower Juba have reportedly increased since late last year. The recent (August 25, 2008) by the Los Angeles Times which extensively cited the commander of al-shabab Mukhtar Robow seem to confirm this assertion.
- ²⁰This was repeatedly stated by the spokesman for the Islamic Courts Union insurgents in Somalia, Abdurahim Isse Adow, May 12 and June 23, 2008.
- ²¹Ahmed Dirie, spokesman for the Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council, told reporters that the Djibouti peace initiative should not be dismissed.
- ²²"Links Between Organised Crime and Terrorism". The Conflict, Security & Development Group Bulletin. Issue Number 14. Kings College, London.
- ²³Medhane Tadesse. Al-ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia. Religion, Money, Clan and the Struggle for Supremacy Over Somalia. Mega Printers, February 2002. Addis Ababa.
- ²⁴The death of Ayro in the end of April by American strikes and putting his group in the list of terrorist organization by the US made the group more paranoid and less interested in any peace.
- ²⁵Medhane Tadesse. Sharia Courts and Military Politics in Stateless Somalia. In *Hot Spots Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict*. Transaction Publishers, LIT VERLAG, Berlin 2008.
- ²⁶Somalia's opposition alliance elects Islamist as chief. 14 September 2007. Garoweonline. <http://www.garoweonline.com>. (Access October 5 2007).
- ²⁷According to Gerard Prunier, "Armed Movements in Sudan, Chad, CAR, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia." ANALYSE 02/08. Paper Presented by Center for International Peace Operations, Berlin/Germany in February 2008, the division between the two groups are so poor that the

[meles-letter-to-UNSC.htm](#) accessed 7 November 2007

- ¹⁴Five Point Peace Plan, UN Secretary General's Progress Report S/2004/973 of 16 December 2004, para 14
- ¹⁵Healy S and Plaut M "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion" Chatham House Briefing Paper, January 2007 P 6
- ¹⁶Shabait.com 27 December 2007
- ¹⁷BBC Monitoring Report 28 June 2007
- ¹⁸A Week in the Horn, Ethiopian Embassy publication 5 August 2008
- ¹⁹"Ethiopia plays down fears of war with Eritrea" AP 31 July 2008; Eritrea's response to UNMEE Ending, BBC interview with Yemane Gebremeskel, Director of the Office of the President
- ²⁰Cliffe L, Regional Implications of the Eritrea-Ethiopia War in Jacquin-Berdal D & Plaut M (eds) *Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War*, New Jersey, 2004
- ²¹During meetings with Somalia-watchers in Nairobi in February 2008 the author heard claims that Ethiopia had bribed the Somali parliamentarians to elect Abdulahi Yusuf.
- ²²UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1630 (2005), S/2006/229, 4 May 2006, pp11-12
- ²³Sally Healy, Conflict in the Ogaden and its Regional Dimension, Conference Report, Chatham House Africa Programme paper, September 2007
- ²⁴Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts" Chatham House Briefing Paper, April 2007 provides a full account of how this came about.
- ²⁵Matt Bryden: "Somalia: Seizing the Opportunity" Conference on the current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa: CPRD/IAG Addis Ababa March 2007
- ²⁶In the House of Representatives debate of 24 November 2008 and PM Meles' press conference on 26 November the Islamic Courts were represented as a "jihadist leadership" posing a "clear and present danger to Ethiopia.
- ²⁷US Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer said that terrorists dominated the Courts leadership while Ethiopian official sources refer to the Islamic courts as the Somali Taliban.
- ²⁸UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1630 (2005), S/2006/913, 22 November 2007
- ²⁹UN Security Council, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, *ibid*
- ³⁰Quoted on Aljazeera English Africa News 30 November 2006.

¹ Healy, S. Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements Unravel, Chatham House Africa Programme Report, June 2008. This paper draws extensively on the Chatham House report.

² This is not typically the case for civil wars elsewhere in Africa even though it is not uncommon for neighbours to intervene in Africa's domestic conflicts.

³ Cliffe L, Regional Dimensions of conflict in the Horn of Africa, Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 1 1999

⁴ Buzan and O Waever, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, 2003

⁵ Buzan and Waever's definition of a Regional Security Complex is "a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another"

⁶ Buzan p 47

⁷ Buzan p 232 their caution is misplaced in my view. It appears to be based on a set of generalities about the nature of the African state that are not especially relevant to the states or interstate relations in the specific context of the Horn of Africa.

⁸ In the Horn of Africa specifically, the authors identify what they call a "pre-complex, having many elements of strong bilateral security interdependence, but failing to link these together into an integrated system" The case against the Horn being considered as an RSC is the lack of significant linkages between the Ethiopia-Somalia dynamics on the one side and the Ethiopia-Sudan ones on the other. There is also the difficulty – which exists throughout the African continent – of finding reasonably stable boundaries between different regional groupings, be they international organizations, interest groups or security complexes.

⁹ Negash T and Tronvoll K, *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War*, Oxford, James Currey, 2000

¹⁰ Hansson G, Building New States: Lessons from Eritrea, *World Institute for Development Economic Research*, discussion Paper no 2001/66, August 2001 pp 11-12

¹¹ Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes" in "Unfinished Business: Eritrea and Ethiopia at War" D Jacquin-Berdal and M Plaut (Eds) Red Sea Press 2004

¹² Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Algiers, 12 December 2000

¹³ Demarcation Watch <http://www.dehai.org/demarcation-watch/articles/>

shabab killed Salah Ali Saleh "Nabhan"(one of the three guys on the CIA most wanted list) in September this year because he had joined the ARS.

²⁸ Abdullahi Yusuf, as much as he is trusted and determined to fight against the insurgency, he is however increasingly considered as a liability by Ethiopia as his ways of doing things are politically costly.

²⁹ Following five days of consultations meeting they held in Jalaqsi town in Hiran region the Islamic courts union officials confirmed this position, declaring that they have distanced themselves from both groups on August 18,2008.

³⁰ Hassan Turki's bold comments on December 17,2006, when the Islamist militia commander asserted that "after Baidoa, Addis Ababa is next," referring to the seat of power for the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia, respectively.

³¹ Other agendas are either non-existent or less important. Ethiopia entered Somalia only when the ICU threatened to conduct its next prayer rituals in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital.

³² Christopher Clapham,"Regional Implications of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Dispute," in Conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa.Organised Jointly by CPRD and IAG, March 12-13,2007,Addis Ababa.

³³ In fact, all of a sudden, sponsoring a liberation front is becoming fashionable and is as some say the only growth industry in Eritrea.

³⁴ Classified reports show that to achieve this goal, the Ethiopian opposition groups were moved from their bases in the Western lowlands of Eritrea to the Denakil Depression. And, in recent months arms and soldiers are being smuggled to Somalia via Djibouti.

³⁵ Recently however tension is emerging between the two camps impacting on their relations with the hardline Islamists and the war in Somalia. The major trigger being the death of Sheikh Ibrahim who was the spiritual leader of the front, at the end of June, complicating the relations between the ONLF fighting force and the Islamic Courts Union militia, particularly the al-Shabab.

³⁶ Statement from the Eritrean foreign Ministry. Quoted by *Peter Martell* ASMARA, April 22, 2007 (AFP)

³⁷ Discussions with UN officials in Newyork,July 23,2007.

³⁸ The author had prepared a detailed analysis on the issue in a memo he wrote at the UN "the UN's Somalia Position on Trial" August 2007.

³⁹ Amisom troops from Uganda and Burundi totaling 2,200 are already present in Somalia. Nigeria's 850 troops will make it the third country to fulfill the promise to send peacekeepers to Somalia.

⁴⁰ Discussions with diplomats and military officials, Addis Ababa

⁴¹ For Ethiopia, a country which until recently remained the major proponent of the building block approach, to become a party to the project of imposing the TFG and creating the Somali state with the idea of bringing order to Somalia from the top down is just incomprehensible.

⁴² It is quite possible and worrying that what has haunted the imagination of Ethiopian leaders may have become even bolder now than before the war.

Another serious threat to the North-South peace process, and which will be considered here, is that posed by the conflict in Darfur. While there is only a minimal danger of the conflict spilling over the southern border at this time, it does pose a threat to the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the peace process. That was made graphically clear by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attack on Omdurman on 10 May and the 14 July announcement by the Prosecutor General of the International Criminal Court (ICC) of his intention to seek warrants for the arrest of President Omar Beshir for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide for the actions of his government in Darfur.

Lastly, this analysis will consider the two related issues of the national census that was held in late April and early May 2008 and the national election which is to take place in early 2009. With war afflicting much of Darfur, no resolution on north-south borders, the continuing presence of large numbers of southern IDPs in the north and refugees outside the country, and a host of other difficulties, the holding of the census was problematic and its results will inevitably be highly controversial. The census is considered critical to the holding of the CPA stipulated elections which politicians are becoming increasingly focused on. However, the many problems involved in holding free and fair elections mean that it is doubtful that they will advance the peace process or lead to the realisation of the promise of a democratic transformation, and instead could prove highly destabilising.

Peace Process in Perspective

Within months of the outbreak of the north-south civil war a number of efforts were made by Sudanese authorities and groups in the international community to resolve the conflict, but they failed. These failures laid the basis for IGAD's engagement, but the road to that initiative first involved the creation of a suitable mediation mechanism, and it is significant that in the early period the countries of the region showed little enthusiasm for this effort. This is per-

remains the best means to achieve a comprehensive peace in Sudan.

After a review of these issues the analysis will consider some of the present challenges to the IGAD peace process. It is not the intention to consider the developments and challenges in the peace process in a comprehensive manner as that is being done elsewhere,¹ but to identify a small number of those deemed most critical. This review will focus on two broad categories – security and political issues – although often in practice they cannot be clearly separated. One of the biggest security concern and threat to the peace process is posed by the NCP refusal to accept the ruling of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). This has led to a number of battles this year between the SPLA and the Misseriya and in May and June between the SAF and the SPLA directly. This dispute, however, is part of a bigger conflict over determining the north-south borders and involves the crucial issue of ownership of Sudan's valuable resources, but little progress has been made.

Other security problems also threaten the peace process. While the Juba Declaration of January 2006 brought the SAF-aligned South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF) over to the SPLA, two and half years later many of its fighters have not been integrated and they pose a threat to security of civilians while the failure of the officers to assume ranks in the SPLA is producing divisions in the SPLA leadership. The year began with hopes that a GoSS brokered peace agreement between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) would end the conflict, but at the time of writing that remains in doubt. Other security related issues that will be commented upon include the continuing failure of the Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) to become integrated, fully operational, and effective. Also causing alarm is the failure of the SPLA to carry out any DDR, and instead both it and SAF are reported to be increasing their military capacity.

Ethiopia Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict”

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Connecting Conflicts in the Horn of Africa: the Ethiopia-Eritrea Dispute and the Somali Conflict

This paper looks at security interdependence among the countries of the Horn of Africa and specifically the linkages between the Ethiopia Eritrea dispute and the conflict in Somalia. In doing so, it seeks to develop the concept of the Horn of Africa as a Regional Security Complex¹. It starts by identifying the common characteristics of conflict and other features of the regional security system, highlighting the ways in which interactions *between* the states support and sustain the conflicts *within* the states in a systemic way. It then outlines the key developments in the Ethiopia Eritrea dispute and the Algiers peace process before turning to the Somali conflict. The paper goes on to illustrate one case of how security interdependence works in the region by examining how Ethiopia and Eritrea's conflicting interests in Somalia have fuelled instability. It concludes with some observations about the limited potential for outside countries to solve the Ethio-Eritrea conflict and suggests that IGAD might usefully seek to insulate the Somali conflict from the harmful spill over from the Ethio-Eritrea conflict.

Characteristics of Conflict in the Horn of Africa

The first feature of conflict in the Horn is its prevalence: there have been consistently high levels of violent conflict throughout the region for the best part of the last century and before. Conflict has occurred at every level – within states, between states, among proxies, between armies, at the centre and in the periphery. This appears to have created habits of war, including reliance on the use

of force to achieve political goals, that in turn contribute to the persistence of violence conflict.

Another common factor is a very poor record of governance throughout the region. Democratic accountability has been largely absent. There is a history of regime change through violent rather than peaceful means, reinforced by a culture of militarism. While conflict takes different forms according to local conditions and traditions, armed rebellion of one sort or another is always high among the options for dealing with political grievances.

Poor governance has in turn spawned conflicts arising from problems of centre-periphery relations. These are associated with patterns of inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government. The root of many of the internal conflicts can be traced to substantial communities experiencing economic marginalisation and political exclusion. Because exclusion so often mirrors ethnic, racial or clan fault lines, social identity has been politicised and mobilised around ethnic and national differences to contest not just “who gets what” within the state but to challenge the shape and form of the political community itself.

Ethnic politics became the dominant mode in the region after 1991. In particular, Ethiopia’s ethnic federation provides an alternative framework for managing a large, ethnically diverse population. However its introduction has not appreciably reduced the incidence of conflict in the region. And there remain countervailing visions, not only in Ethiopia but also in all the other countries of the region, about how the state should be constituted and what the state as a community represents.

In the Horn, the basis of statehood has been under constant challenge for at least three generations. The painful and violent process of state formation and disintegration is evident in the dynamics of Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and the South and Somalia and Somaliland. There are deeply contested views of the “self” that

view is that both parties must share responsibility for the non-implementation of the Algiers Agreement. Their respective interactions within the framework of the Algiers mechanisms - the EEBC or UNMEE – were conducted with Newtonian⁴⁵ precision, always ensuring that in response to any proposition or initiative they should arrive in opposite positions.

In the circumstances, a search for alternative mechanisms to bring about peace and security between the two states is unlikely to yield much. Besides which, the term “alternative mechanism” has been anathema to Eritrea ever since it was used by Ethiopia in its appeal to the UN Secretary General against the Boundary Commission ruling in September 2003. Along with other innocent sounding terms (“final and binding”, “enter into dialogue about demarcation”) it acts as a dangerous tripwire for the unsuspecting mediator. This is a conflict in which the war of words is very carefully crafted.

Earlier in my paper I noted Buzan and Waever’s observation that outside powers cannot, even if heavily involved, usually define, de-securitize or re-organise a region that functions as a Regional Security Complex. This is abundantly evident in the Horn where in-grained patterns of conflict are deeply etched in the minds of the leaderships. In relatively strong states like Ethiopia and Eritrea, securitisation⁴⁶ is very much the preserve of top military and intelligence circles, two sets of actors who, in this case, know and understand each other all too well. It is beyond reasonable doubt that Eritrea believes that any discussion (or compromise) regarding the border poses an existential threat to her security. It is equally beyond doubt that Ethiopia holds it essential to her national security that prior actions are taken (by Eritrea) before the boundary ruling can be implemented.

The stalemate is a stable one, resting on the solid foundations of Ethiopia’s superior military capability (and stated willing to use it should Eritrea attempt to change the status quo by military means). For it to alter would require an extraneous change of circumstances (within either country or within the region – the possibilities are

shown up some potential risks inherent in the newly emerging norms concerning the right of African intervention. For all practical purposes, Ethiopia has unilaterally fulfilled the role of guarantor and protector of the TFG. Eritrea's objections to Ethiopia's role in Somalia have put them at odds with most of the other regional players. Eritrea has suspended its participation in IGAD, deepening its isolation. All these political factors, dominated by the underlying rift between Ethiopia and Eritrea, greatly restrict IGAD's ability to operate as an inter-governmental forum for regional co-operation or to engineer the new regional security order that the region so clearly needs.

§§§

That ends my account of the Ethio-Eritrea dispute and the Somalia conflict, illustrating, I hope, how the current border stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea has a consequential link to the prevailing lack of peace and security in Somalia. The Inter Africa Group kindly added a further element to my terms of reference, indicating that my paper would explore alternative mechanisms to bring about peace and security between the two states and assess the potential contribution of the international community in this regard.

Let me first recall the very sound advice that Professor Christopher Clapham offered at last year's conference on the Current Peace and Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa, when he pointed out to would-be peacemakers "No workable solution can be based on the aspiration that local actors might be induced to behave differently, or to think differently, from the way in which they do at present. There is no possibility whatever of establishing trust between two states (and in particular two leaderships) between which this has totally and irreparably broken down."

My first observation, therefore, is that Ethiopia and Eritrea seem determined to go on as they are in relations of extreme hostility towards one another. While appreciating the diplomatic verve with which each blames the other *exclusively* for the current stalemate, my

should do the determining and disputed versions of whether and how "self determination" can be achieved within – or beyond – existing territorial boundaries.

The discourse on self-determination drove the Eritrean rebellion against rule from Addis Ababa for 30 years and framed the conflict in Southern Sudan for over three decades. After the 1974 Revolution, Ethiopia's ruling elite paid lip service to the Leninist version of self-determination and vestiges of the Leninist view can still be traced among the foundational principles of EPRDF political organisation in Ethiopia. In the 1960s and 1970s, Somali governments pressed their irredentist claims against Ethiopia and Kenya in the name of self-determination. Somaliland now argues its right to secede in the same terms. However, traditional nationalists in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia have qualms about the application of self-determination and its potential as a technique for state fragmentation or divide and rule.

Because of the implicit (or explicit) possibilities of new state formations emerging from conflict in the Horn, many of the essentially domestic conflicts have foreign policy implications². The advancement of (regional) foreign policy through proxy forces in neighbouring countries has been the "normal" pattern of relations for decades³. This entrenched system of mutual intervention has proved highly resilient and has survived radical political reconfigurations, including changes of regime. Hostile neighbours generally act as enablers and multipliers of conflict with each country's troubled "periphery" serving as its neighbour's back door – with plentiful opportunities for trouble making. In this context foreign policy, especially regional foreign policy, becomes an intimate part of the government's strategy for internal stability.

Examples include Ethiopia's support for Southern Sudanese rebels, matched by Sudan's support for Eritrea's independence war; Somali support for rebels in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent the Eritrean and Oromo rebellions, matched by Ethiopia's support for Somali rebel groups working against the former

government or (latterly) on their own account. The new state of Eritrea was a vigorous practitioner of intervention during its own independence war, building alliances with (then) Ethiopian rebel groups (plus Oromo and Somali groups). Since gaining independence in 1993 Eritrea has given active support to rebellions in South and Eastern Sudan, as well as Darfur. Ethiopia and Eritrea have both been drawn into Somalia's collapse.

A final layer of complexity is the tendency of the countries in the region to seek out opportunities to align themselves with global agendas. This is another persistent trend and has featured in the politics of the Horn of Africa throughout the colonial era, through the Second World War and into modern times. First the Cold War and now the "War on Terrorism" have gained local resonance, fostering new alignments in which regional conflicts - rooted in local politics - become amplified as proxy conflicts of global powers. The clearest recent example of this was Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in late 2006. This was carried out in the name of the global war on terrorism and earned Ethiopia the sympathy and support of the US and the wider international community. However, the more compelling reasons for the intervention were local ones and can be traced to deep-seated problems of regional security.

The conflicts of the Horn share not only common characteristics but also common patterns of interaction. The regional dynamics may usefully be considered as a Regional Security Complex.

Context: Regional Security Complex

The Regional Security Complex is a theoretical construct developed in the study of international relations. Two contemporary theorists, Buzan and Waever, have drawn attention to the rising salience of the regional level in the structure of international security⁴. They have developed the (analytical) concept of the Regional Security Complex (RSC) as a substructure of the international system, operating with some autonomy within the over arching power struc-

so rampant that one can say, with regret, that war and destruction has been the hall mark of the IGAD sub-region."⁴⁴ The result is a regional system of insecurity in which the tradition of mutual interference makes constructive inter-governmental relationships very difficult.

Africa's emerging security architecture gives pride of place to sub-regional institutions to deal with conflict prevention and conflict management, including peace support operations. As an institutional model this is developing reasonably well in other regions of Africa, particularly those that possess a dominant local power, namely SADC and ECOWAS. IGAD's prospects for achieving anything similar are seriously hampered by the context of regional rivalries in which it operates.

IGAD as an institution has worked at conflict resolution in Somalia. The Mbgathi peace process was held under its auspices and the organisation supported its outcome in the shape of the TFG, which it recognises as the legitimate government of Somalia. This position has inhibited IGAD from taking a lead to ameliorate the conflict in South and South Central Somalia that is a directly related to the establishment and installation of the TFG. As the position of the TFG became more parlous, culminating in the establishment of the Islamists in Mogadishu during 2006, so IGAD's rhetorical support for the TFG as the "legitimate" government of Somalia amplified.

By the same token, IGAD shares responsibility for the intervention in Somalia. IGAD's earlier commitment to back the TFG in January 2005 provided valuable diplomatic cover when Ethiopia removed the Islamic Courts and installed the TFG in its place at the end of 2006. AMISOM's mandate evolved from an intended IGAD intervention (IGASOM) that was explicitly designed to protect the government. When the government itself appears to be a key part of the problem, there are significant challenges to performing a neutral peace support function. Similarly, Ethiopia's intervention to install the TFG was carried out to protect its national security interests rather than to stabilise Somalia. As such, the operation that has

This underpins the twin pillars of Eritrea's foreign policy – isolationism, combined with opportunistic support for any armed insurgents opposed to Ethiopia. In this fashion, the failure to solve the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute has contributed directly to the conflict in Somalia, as it has to the conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

For Somalia, nearly four years since its inception, the creation of the Transitional Federal Government and the circumstances in which it was installed have proved to be more conflict generating than conflict solving. It has given rise to external military intervention and a related insurgency in Mogadishu the violence of which has surpassed anything that had been happening among Somali factions for the previous decade. The TFG has had no impact on the self-governing region of Somaliland and has made little evident difference to Puntland. The Bay and Bakool region - centred on Baidoa - may have derived some benefit from hosting the TFG and its parliament and enjoying the protection of Ethiopian forces.

In many ways the Somali conflict has moved beyond the conceptual framework – a power sharing deal among clans – that informed the Mbagathi conference. Ethiopia is now an intimate part of the conflict in a way that it was not before. The United States is an active protagonist in the conflict too. The insurgency has spread well beyond Mogadishu and has also been internationalised, with different external players vying for influence over its direction and its philosophy. Although the language of international terrorism catches the most international attention on Somalia, in reality regional drivers continue to play the most significant part in the conflict.

Regional Peace and Security Mechanisms

The Horn of Africa, as a regional sub-system, experiences such persistently high levels of conflict that it presents itself as the very opposite of a security community.⁴³ IGAD's Executive Secretary, Dr Attalla Bashir, has noted that “actual and potential conflict are

ture of the international political system as a whole⁵.

Political relations among the countries of the Horn clearly demonstrate autonomy from the overarching power structure of the current uni-polar international system, just as they showed their autonomy during the Cold War. As a contemporary example, Ethiopia and Eritrea immediately abandoned their strategy of encirclement of Sudan – a policy actively sponsored by the US – when the conflict between them erupted in 1998. Despite its overwhelming global power, the US failed in its efforts to reconcile two nations that it regarded as allies in the region. In practice, Ethiopia and Eritrea both give priority to the conduct of their regional quarrel, forcing the US to take sides.

Regional Security Complex Theory offers an analytical and explanatory framework for security related developments, potentially useable in any region of the world. Regions, in this context, are defined by the relative intensity of security interdependence among a group of units and security indifference between that set and surrounding units. While the Horn of Africa is not truly sealed from other regions (and Sudan particularly has vital interactions beyond the Horn proper) the intense and frequently hostile interactions among states within the region appear qualitatively different to the relationships they enjoy with countries beyond it. A further characteristic of the RSC is that its units should display high levels of security interdependence across a wide spectrum, including economic and environmental security. This is also the case for the Horn.

Two sorts of relations define the structure of an RSC. These are firstly power relations, which determine the level of polarity, and secondly relations of amity and enmity, which provide the socially constructed dimension of the structure. For the Horn, power relations could be characterized either as a bi-polar system (around the pillars of Ethiopia and Sudan) or a uni-polar system (excluding Sudan) in which Ethiopia plays a hegemonic role. (Tension between these two potential sets of power relations may indeed help to account for the perennial regional instability that can be observed.)

The formation and operation of an RSC is not just a mechanical reflection of the distribution of power. It hinges on political constructs of amity and enmity dependent on the actions and interpretations of actors. Thus, the character of an RSC is deeply affected by its history and patterns of conflict within it normally stem from factors indigenous to the region. Although “penetration” can occur when outside powers make security alignments with states within an RSC, Buzan and Woever postulate “outside powers cannot (even if heavily involved) usually define, de-securitise or re-organise the region”⁶. This has undoubtedly been the experience of external powers that have attempted to achieve peace and reconciliation in the Horn of Africa. (It is an issue that will be revisited in the conclusions of this paper.)

Buzan and Woever themselves are cautious about the evidence for the emergence of Regional Security Complexes in Africa and suggest that for most African states patterns of alliance and rivalry remain weakly drawn⁷. While alliances between states and insurgent groups in another country are common (and seen as a spillover of domestic instability) interstate wars are still rare and interstate alliances almost non-existent⁸. But the concept of the Horn as an RSC has considerable analytical value. It offers a wider perspective than the dominant models of conflict analysis used for Africa. Too often these analyses focus on state building and/or power-sharing solutions and pay insufficient attention to the regional dynamics of destabilization. Equally, the historical context and political process of securitisation within a region are vital components for conflict analysis.

Within this complex set of regional relationships two quite separate conflicts have occurred: the Ethiopia Eritrea dispute and the Somalia conflict. At the analytical level these two conflicts appear to have almost nothing in common beyond a degree of geographical proximity. The Ethiopia Eritrea conflict was a short, intensely violent, interstate war fought ostensibly over a territorial boundary between two large and disciplined armies. For the duration of the

Eritrea appears no less committed to the Algiers Agreement and continues to affirm its desire to uphold the integrity of the Agreement. For them, the problem is Ethiopia’s failure to honour its undertakings over the border decision and demarcation. Eritrea’s position is that they entered into the Agreement in good faith and agreed to submit their competing territorial claims to arbitration – as they had done in a territorial dispute with Yemen. They accept the delimitation decision, indeed President Issayas has recently said that there is no border issue and the border dispute is resolved, not unresolved.⁴² Eritrea expected support from the international community to see the decision implemented. Now that the Boundary Commission has completed its work, Eritrea considers that Ethiopia’s presence in territories awarded to Eritrea is a violation of the Algiers Agreement. Meanwhile, the Algiers Agreement upholds the important principle of the two countries co-existing as separate and sovereign states which remains the condition to which they aspire.

The conflict has had a profound impact on how Ethiopia and Eritrea relate to each other and how they each relate to all the other states of the region. It is this latter effect that has proved so profoundly destabilising for the region, above all in Somalia. Since 1998 Eritrea has placed at the centre of all its calculations strategies designed to weaken Ethiopia politically, whether domestically or in its regional goals. This has led it into a series of regional entanglements, principally with non-state actors, for which the guiding principle has been “my enemy’s enemy is my friend.” They have been played out against a background of Ethiopia asserting itself as an increasingly hegemonic power in the region, buttressed by the firm support of the US.

Against the background of its past incorporation and the long years of struggle, Eritrea’s fear of Ethiopian domination is very real. Ethiopia’s misgivings about the boundary ruling and the failure to implement it plays on these fears and perpetuates the sense that Eritrea is standing alone against a powerful and well-connected adversary.

Nur Adde. Prime Minister Meles said in January that the new TFG line up was likely to be more effective than the previous one and noted, as progress, the fact that the TFG was “reaching out to moderate members of the ICU for a commitment to resolve problems by peaceful means.”⁴¹ “ However, Meles also insisted that the biggest achievement was that of preventing a take over by “the Taliban of Somalia” and noted that Eritrea had given shelter to international terrorists such as Sheikh Aweys. He said Ethiopia would not disengage militarily in Somalia until AMISOM had achieved a substantial deployment.

Where each conflict stands

To summarise the state of play on the Ethio-Eritrea dispute and the Somali conflict respectively. Eight years on there are no discernible signs that the Algiers Agreement can provide the framework for Eritrea and Ethiopia to reach a permanent, peaceful settlement. This is despite consistent and fairly concerted effort on the part of the international community.

The Algiers Agreement exists in a state of arrested implementation. Despite the fact that its two key instruments - the EEBC and UNMEE – have been wound up, the agreement has not been abrogated. Ethiopia’s official position is that the Algiers Agreement still stands and generally serves the interests of both parties. Colonial treaties are the correct basis for settling the boundary. Ethiopia has accepted the border decision (unambiguously since March 2006) and now seeks a mechanism for translating the decision on the ground. If Eritrea would only entertain dialogue it would be possible to achieve not only demarcation but also normalisation of relations. On this basis the Algiers Agreement continues to provide the framework within which Ethiopia and Eritrea should manage their relationship. It commits both parties to use peaceful and legal means to resolve their disputes, to reject the use of force and to abide by international norms. It gives them the comfort of having recourse to the UN Security Council.

war, external intervention was minimal. In contrast, the Somalia conflict has been a long, slow process of state collapse, a prolonged civil war fought out among poorly armed clan militias over 18 years. External intervention in this conflict is rife and continues to draw in players from within and beyond the immediate region. Another significant difference is that the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is currently in a ‘no war, no peace’ limbo whereas the war in South Central Somalia is an escalating conflict of growing dimensions. No shot has been fired between the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies for over 8 years. In Somalia, without a discernible frontline, major incidents of organized violence occur on a daily basis among a range of armed groups in several parts of the country.

An account of each of the two conflicts is provided as background to an exploration of how the two connect.

The Ethiopia Eritrea conflict

The war that broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 erupted suddenly. The two countries had only recently achieved a “civil divorce” that had established Eritrea as an independent state in 1993. To the outside world and to their respective domestic audiences, the two regimes appeared to be on excellent terms. The underlying causes of the conflict had to do with shifting power relations between former allies, growing economic rivalry and competing local nationalism. It had complex causes rooted in the historical relations between the two Tigrinya communities North and South of the Mareb River and between the two liberation fronts, EPLF and TPLF that arose from these communities. The relationship foundered on the opposing ways in which they each construed the national identities of Eritrea and Ethiopia⁹.

As a backdrop to the conflict, a number of irritants had emerged to damage relations between the two countries including some serious economic rivalry. This was exacerbated when Eritrea launched its own currency, the nacfa, in November 1997. The introduction of

the new currency had two key knock on effects. One was that the un-demarcated border between the two countries, which had previously had no effect on economic life, suddenly became a real trade barrier. The other was that Ethiopia started to divert some of its trade to Djibouti, which in turn hit Eritrean revenue from port fees and charges¹⁰. Until 1998 Ethiopia and Eritrea successfully managed the problems inherent in having an un-demarcated border and had handled on informal channels such minor incidents that arose. But local administrations continued to rub up against each other and the Eritrean authorities had been irritated over the distribution of a map of the Tigray regional state that appeared to extend into their territory¹¹. A Boundary Commission had been appointed in 1997 and was about to hold its second meeting at the time when the Badme incident sparked the war.

In May 1998 a small border incident was mishandled and erupted out of control. Eritrean forces moved into the Ethiopian administered village of Badme on 12 May following a shooting incident between local militia and an Eritrean border patrol on 6 May. Ethiopia's Prime Minister summoned Parliament next day. The House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Eritrean aggression, calling for their withdrawal and stating Ethiopia's right to defend its territorial integrity. This was interpreted in Eritrea as a declaration of war.

Intense diplomatic efforts were launched to prevent the war being pushed to its logical conclusion, including a proposal that the two sides should withdraw to positions held before the outbreak of conflict and seek a neutral ruling on the location of the boundary that they would both accept. However, it proved impossible for the sides to agree on the terms of withdrawal. Initially, Ethiopia accepted the proposal and Eritrea rejected it. After the 1999 round of fighting Eritrea moved to acceptance and Ethiopia raised objections over the details. Ethiopia maintains that it only resorted to force after it had exhausted all peaceful means to resolve the conflict. Over the next two years there were three intense military campaigns that cost the lives of an estimated 80,000 combatants. Fighting end-

ing iye clans and associated with *al Shabaab*. However, the larger group operating in Mogadishu is known as *Muqaawama* (the Resistance) and has been characterised as primarily a nationalist resistance opposed to Ethiopia's military presence.³⁹

Fracturing of Somali alliances

The exceptional levels of external intervention in the Somali conflict (both regional and international) have done little to dilute the fissiparous tendencies so characteristic of Somali politics. The TFG is currently split between the associates of President Abdulahi Yusuf and those of Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, known as Nur Adde.⁴⁰ The ARS is split between the followers of Sheikh Aweys, who remains in Asmara, and those of Sheikh Sharif, who has moved to Djibouti. The armed resistance is implicitly divided between *al-Shabaab* and the *Muqaawama*. Each pairing represents the division between hardliners and moderates. Thus Nur Adde, Sheikh Sharif and the *Muqaawama* would all like to reach a political accommodation under which Ethiopian forces would leave the country. Nur Adde's stated goal is to end the conflict in Mogadishu and thereby create the conditions for Ethiopian forces to depart. This is the basis for the Djibouti Agreement initialled on 9 June (but yet to be formally signed at time of writing).

Apart from the manifold difficulties of reaching a political agreement to achieve this, each party faces potentially lethal opposition from their own side. The fragmentation makes it difficult for Ethiopia or Eritrea to effectively pursue their own interests in Somalia, but equally their involvements can have a crippling effect on the potential among any set of Somali actors to negotiate a political agreement. A further layer of complexity is added by unilateral US measures such as the designation of *al-Shabaab* as a terrorist organisation in February and the assassination (in a missile strike) of one of its leaders, Aden Hashi Ayro, on 1 May 2008.

Ethiopia has not opposed the conciliatory efforts of Prime Minister

was visiting Ethiopia at the time. However participants at the conference maintain that a key outcome was persuading the Islamic Courts to join forces with mainstream Somali nationalists opposed to the Ethiopian presence.³⁵ The Political Programme of the Alliance did not contain the language of militant Islamism. Questions remained, however, over the precise relationship between the political leadership of the Alliance and the active insurgency that was gaining momentum in Mogadishu. Operating from exile in Asmara made it difficult for them to demonstrate their relevance.

Eritrea was starting to have to pay the price for shunning the US over the border dispute. They gradually became identified as the main external backer of Islamic *jihadists* in Somalia. In April 2007 US Assistant Secretary Frazer said Eritrea had not been playing a constructive role in Somalia and continued to fund, arm, train and advise the insurgents.³⁶ With Ethiopia facing growing problems in Somalia and in the Somali region, US attitudes towards Eritrea hardened. In August 2007 Frazer said that the US was considering putting Eritrea on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, saying, “we have tried our best to act with restraint with Eritrea. We cannot tolerate their support for terror activity, particularly in Somalia.”³⁷ President Issaias has called such accusations “a deliberate distortion of facts” and insists that Somalia’s Islamic courts represented “the beginning of a process that could have led Somalia to be more stable and sovereign”.³⁸

The Courts leadership was always a diverse group but it did include an element of militant Islamists. The most readily identifiable of these were its armed wing - *al Shabaab* - who initially took the lead in the insurgency against the TFG and Ethiopia. The population of Mogadishu endured conditions akin to civil war as the insurgency gathered pace throughout 2007. Major Ethiopian-led security operations in March/ April and October/November caused widespread destruction and triggered massive displacement. (UN sources estimate that up to 60% of Mogadishu’s 2 million population has fled.) The TFG and Ethiopia blamed the insurgency on a regrouped and reorganised Islamist threat based on renegade Haw-

ed in June 2000 after Ethiopian forces dislodged Eritrean forces from border positions they had seized in 1998 and started to advance inside the country.

The Algiers peace agreement of 12 December 2000 formally ended the war. It rested on the notion that border demarcation would permanently solve the conflict. The Algiers Agreement provided for the establishment of a neutral Boundary Commission with a mandate “to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law.”¹² The two sides agreed in advance that the decision of the Commission would be final and binding and would be followed by ‘expeditious’ demarcation.

Early in 2001 a 3,800 strong UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), was installed to oversee the demilitarized border area while the Boundary Commission came up with its findings. When the Boundary Commission announced its Delimitation Decision on 13 April 2002 it produced a boundary line that fell to the East of Badme, placing the town, therefore, just inside Eritrea.

Politically this was problematic for a number of reasons. Badme had symbolic importance because it was where the conflict had started. It lay South of the TSZ in territory that was under firm Ethiopian control. The legal team had not deemed Ethiopia’s administration of the town to override the evidence of colonial treaties. The ruling required Ethiopia to give up territory that had only recently been won back in a costly conflict that was not of their making. On the other hand Eritrea had fought long and hard to establish the case for its independence, principally on the basis of its existence as an Italian colony. As a new state, territoriality featured very large in how Eritrea defined itself. This doomed any prospect for compromise or negotiation. Eritrea, in any case, had the letter of the law on its side because both sides had agreed at Algiers that the ruling would be final and binding.

Ethiopia appealed to the Boundary Commission, arguing that errors

numerous) which either caused them to make common cause in face of another threat or altered existing calculations about risks and rewards attached to renewed use of force to achieve political goals. The evidence of the last few years is that Eritrea and Ethiopia are quite capable of not returning to war, despite facing each other with full military preparedness.

In the circumstances the “potential contribution of the international community” in solving the conflict is unlikely to be very substantial. The processes available to Ethiopia and Eritrea within the framework of the Algiers Agreement were at the top end of what the international community has to offer in such circumstances. The two nations had at their disposal the services of some of the world’s most respected international legal authorities and a professional UN Peacekeeping operation, operating at a budgeted cost of \$1.5bn since its inception. The international community has the added problem of establishing its *bona fides*, for it appears, for a variety of extraneous reasons, to have favoured Ethiopia’s position. Eritrea blames the international community, particularly the United States, for failing to hold Ethiopia to the legal position on the boundary. This has fostered Eritrea’s isolation and encouraged Asmara to take reckless action against Ethiopian interests wherever it can, with very damaging consequences for regional security.

Overall, the chances of devising a formula directly to unlock the Ethiopia Eritrea confrontation are remote. What could be worth attempting are steps to insulate the Ethiopia Eritrea conflict more effectively so that its risks and dangers are confined to relations between the two countries and do not multiply and inflame other difficult political problems in the region. The only institution that could reasonably attempt to do this is IGAD, which does have the mandate for regional peace and security in the sub-region. The obvious focus of its efforts should be Somalia, where the prospects for reconciliation and peace building have been made significantly more difficult by the additional strains of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and where the peace process IGAD itself sponsored has undoubtedly gone awry.

elaborated this strategy in order to advance its objective through the blood of the Somalis.” Meles concluded by saying that Ethiopia had achieved its main objective and the next focus would be “the return of our forces and strengthening our on-going struggle against poverty.” Promising to withdraw Ethiopian forces as soon as possible he called on the international community to deploy urgently a peacekeeping force to avoid a vacuum when Ethiopian forces withdrew.³³

The consequences of Eritrea’s improved access to the Ogaden during the period of the Courts rule became evident in April 2007. Demonstrating a wholly new level of capability, the ONLF mounted an attack on a Chinese run oil exploration site, killing 74 people. There are indications that a large group of Eritrean trained ONLF forces went into the Ogaden before the fall of the ICU to form the backbone of the ONLF forces.³⁴ A major counter-insurgency operation was launched in response to the attack and widespread restrictions imposed on parts of the Ogaden region.

It is a deep irony that such a strictly secular state as Eritrea could find itself as a key supporter and supplier of Islamist forces in Somalia. Eritrea denies any military involvement but justifies political support for the Islamic Courts by representing them as a body defending the sovereignty and independence of Somalia against foreign occupation by Ethiopia. During 2007 Eritrea became a meeting place for different strands of the Somali opposition. Leading figures of the Islamic Courts established themselves in Asmara and joined forces with other (secular) opponents of the transitional government. Their key demand was the unconditional withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somali territory. In September 2007 a major gathering of the Somali opposition was hosted in Asmara, resulting in the formation of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS).

One of the approximately 200 delegates at the Asmara conference was Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. His presence in Asmara drew hostile comment from US Assistant Secretary of State Frazer, who

was explicitly mentioned in the justification for intervention. The Ethiopian Prime Minister said, “The *jihadists* in the Union of Islamic Courts, in collaboration with Eritrea, have already invaded Ethiopia smuggling in rebel groups whom they trained and armed .. to destabilise and create upheaval in the country.”³⁰

Clashes began on the frontline between the two sides near Baidoa in late December. The asymmetry in numbers and capability between the combined Ethiopian-TFG forces and the loosely integrated Islamist militias soon became clear. On 28 December 2006 Ethiopian and TFG forces entered Mogadishu unopposed as the Courts military and administrative presence vanished. The US appeared to bless the operation, delivering a missile strike close to the Somalia Kenya border, supposedly against fleeing remnants of the Courts militia. In the event, Ethiopian forces delivered the TFG into Mogadishu without encountering the Eritrean troops alleged by the Sanctions Monitoring Group to be present in the country. However there were consistent reports that the Islamic Courts did have military advisers from Eritrea³¹ and that in the course of 2006 Eritrea served as a major conduit, if not a direct supplier, of huge quantities of arms for their military wing, *al Shabaab*.

Reporting back to the House of Representatives on 2 January 2007, Prime Minister Meles made it clear that Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia was directed against both radical Islamists *and* their Eritrean supporters. He said “while planning and executing this counter-offensive, the government identified as enemies only the extremist leadership of the UIC, extremist terrorists from different countries and those soldiers of the Eritrean Government who have been cooperating and assisting with the coordination of these groups.” He said events had disproved Eritrean government predictions that an Ethiopian intervention in Somalia would result in their getting bogged down in a quagmire³². Characterising the war as one against “the forces of destruction and mayhem, guided by the Eritrean government”, he said it was “evident that the Eritrean government is prepared to fight Ethiopia until the last drop of blood of the people of Somalia. The Eritrean government

A degree of neutrality is required for any effective conflict resolution efforts. Notwithstanding Ethiopia’s chairmanship of IGAD, the lead would need to be given to IGAD member states that are not directly involved in these inter-locking conflicts (Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Sudan). (If Uganda and Djibouti are too caught up to help chart a way forward perhaps IGAD members could call for support from African countries further afield.) If it is to demonstrate that is part of the solution and not simply entangled in the problem IGAD, as an institution, could do three things:

- Find a way to bring Eritrea urgently back into the regional diplomatic fold. Eritrea’s isolation and exclusion is a hindrance to stability.
- Engage more critically with Somalia’s TFG and decide what it expects from it in terms of peace and reconciliation. (The UN SRSG Ould Abdullah has already shown where progress can be made. IGAD member states could work on the regional factors to help him to deliver.)
- Work more creatively to establish conditions that would enable Ethiopian troops to leave Somalia, as intended, and secure commitments from Eritrea to stay out of Somali alliances.

In order to succeed, IGAD members would need to be scrupulously even handed in their dealings with Ethiopia and Eritrea and to engage with a range of Somali stakeholders beyond the TFG. These efforts would not achieve a settlement of the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. But they could help to ameliorate the conflict in Somalia that is currently the cause of the greatest human suffering and the largest threat to the long-term stability of the region.

Endnotes

The warm words for Ethiopia's Peace Plan helped to expose Eritrea's growing diplomatic isolation. For Eritrea, "immediate dialogue" was precisely what they were *not* prepared to start in advance of border demarcation by the Boundary Commission in line with the Algiers Agreement. Evidence was stacking up that their demand for the international community to compel Ethiopia to comply with its legal obligations was not gaining any traction. Eritrea therefore started to develop a set of new strategies in relation to its dispute with Ethiopia and ways to secure satisfaction on the border. This seemed to mark a turning point in Eritrea's attitude, which became apparent towards the end of 2005.

One of the strategies was to apply direct pressure on UNMEE. In October 2005 the Eritrean government announced restrictions on road travel and a ban on helicopter flights, measures that directly impinged on UNMEE's ability to fulfil its mission. Eritrea also demanded that all European and North American staff be withdrawn from UNMEE. Eritrea correctly calculated that these actions would gain attention – albeit negative attention. In November 2005 the Security Council passed Resolution 1640 threatening economic sanctions against Eritrea unless it reversed its restrictions on UNMEE. The Resolution also demanded that Ethiopia allow the demarcation of the border without further delay. Neither side complied.

Alongside exerting pressure on UNMEE, Eritrea also began to deploy troops and heavy equipment into the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Politically this signalled a gradual reassertion of Eritrean sovereignty in the designated demilitarised zone. Although the presence of Eritrean soldiers in the TSZ contravened the July 2000 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA), which was part of the Algiers Agreement, the outside world was powerless to prevent it. Ethiopia quickly sized the advantage and used Eritrea's presence in the TSZ to turn the argument about compliance with Algiers on its head. Thereafter, Ethiopia could cite Eritrea's violation of the CHA to explain its own non-compliance with demarcation of the bounda-

The Courts were ill equipped to respond to the mounting challenges. They were seriously divided on the diplomatic position and negotiations with external players, including the TFG and their Ethiopian backers. The UN Security Council Resolution 1725 of December 2006 authorising the deployment of an AU peacekeeping mission heightened tensions and encouraged the military 'hawks' (not just *Al-Shabaab*) to think there was an international conspiracy against them. Radical elements of the Courts leadership seized the initiative and gave the Ethiopians a week's ultimatum to leave Somalia or face forcible expulsion.

The UN Sanctions Monitoring Group was meanwhile reporting "the rampant arms flows to TFG and ICU [Islamic Courts Union], the two principal contenders for power in central and Southern Somalia."²⁸ Ethiopia and Eritrea were identified as the supporters of the TFG and ICU respectively, although the report also alluded to "other formidable organised groups of combatants inside Somalia, adding another layer of complexity and instability to an already unpredictable security environment." The report of 22 November 2006 also highlighted "the distinct possibility that the momentum towards a military solution inside Somalia may spill over into a direct State-to-State conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea."²⁹ (UN monitors were under the impression that there were 6-8,000 Ethiopian troops on Somalia's borders and 2,000 Eritrean troops with the Islamic Courts.)

Ethiopian intervention

Ethiopia had already moved forces into Somalia to protect the TFG. The government also took steps to prepare their domestic legal position for an intervention. In October Ethiopia said it was "technically at war" with the Islamic Courts. On 30 November Prime Minister Meles told the Ethiopian Parliament of a "clear and present danger" from Somali Islamists. Parliament passed a resolution authorising the Government to take "all legal and necessary measures" against an invasion by the Islamic Courts. Eritrea's role

akin to the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ethiopia was influential in helping to propagate this view²⁶. Within the region, opinion became polarised over whether this was a ‘popular’ uprising or a *jihadist* bid for power. It is still unclear if Islamic radicals dominated the Islamic Courts leadership or set their agenda in the way that Ethiopia and the US suggested.²⁷ The organisation was not fully ‘tested’ as a political front before its collapse.

Ethiopia was extremely wary of the new developments, which threatened to take Somalia’s politics in a new direction where their own influence would be greatly diminished. They were particularly dismayed to see Sheikh Aweys occupying such a prominent position in the Courts leadership. An added cause for concern was Eritrea’s involvement with key figures in the new administration in Mogadishu, which greatly improved Eritrea’s potential access to the Ogaden. Ethiopia, acting on a request from the TFG, promptly inserted a military force (officially described as military trainers) to shore up the transitional government’s position in Baidoa. Some of the Hawiye members of the TFG and its parliament were keen to negotiate with the Courts and three sets of talks took place during the latter half of 2006, brokered by the Arab League and supported by both Kenya and the Europeans. Ethiopia also had contacts with the Courts during this period. But the opening for reaching an agreement between the two groups proved very short-lived.

Ethiopian and US assertions of a threat from the Islamic Courts opened up the possibility of a direct military intervention. The dominant theme in US policy was to avoid Somalia becoming a haven for international terrorists. Sheikh Aweys had been designated in 2001 under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 for his association with Al Qaida, based on his Al Ittihad activities. Western intelligence agencies started to assert with growing conviction that non-Somali terror suspects were sheltered in Mogadishu by elements of the Courts leadership. The TFG traded on the degree of international legitimacy and recognition they possessed and Ethiopia was able to frame its interventions in Somalia as a form of support to the legitimate government.

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A third strand of Eritrea’s new strategy did not emerge publicly straightaway. It involved Somalia and marked the point where regional dynamics far from the Ethio-Eritrea border came into play. First, Eritrea began to step up support for dissidents inside Ethiopia based on the time-honoured formula of “my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Eritrea’s particular targets were the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), both of which were engaged in low-key anti-government activity in the East of Ethiopia. Reports in 2005 of the Somaliland authorities capturing a group of ONLF fighters being infiltrated back into the Ogaden from training in Eritrea were evidence of their growing involvement.

In the course of 2005 and 2006 events inside Somalia started to unfold in ways that gave Eritrea more opportunities to challenge and confront Ethiopia’s regional ambitions. The Somali Peace and Reconciliation process had ended in December 2004 with the emergence of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), led by President Abdulahi Yusuf, a long-term ally of Ethiopia. The TFG lacked the critical levels of support needed to establish itself inside Somalia and relied heavily on Ethiopian support. Powerful interest groups, particularly the Islamic Courts of Mogadishu, who opposed the TFG and the assertion of Ethiopian interests in Somalia, were the natural allies of Eritrea. Against the backdrop of a stalled peace process, the stage was set for a regionalisation of the Ethio-Eritrea conflict.

In 2006 the US spearheaded a fresh round of diplomatic activity on the Ethio-Eritrea dispute. Although it appeared to be in Eritrea’s interests to get the process moving again, President Issayas spurned contact with the Assistant Secretary of State, Jendayi Frazer and refused to allow her to visit the border. Frazer went instead to Ethiopia where she held talks with Meles and visited the disputed frontier. Her remarks there about the difficulties of demarcation were interpreted in Asmara as pro-Ethiopia and Eritrea’s tone thereafter

became increasingly hostile towards the US. It is not impossible that US policy in Somalia – which involved financing Mogadishu warlords in the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) against Eritrea’s newfound allies in the Islamic Courts – contributed to Eritrea’s growing distrust and hostility towards the US.

The EEBC and UNMEE wind up

With US encouragement, the Boundary Commission held two meetings in the first half of 2006, and tried to introduce technical experts into the process. Eritrea was normally a staunch supporter of the Boundary Commission but refused to attend a third meeting in June 2006 and denounced the whole US initiative as “pro Ethiopian”. President Issayas charged the US with putting pressure on the Boundary Commission and trying to wrest the case from its jurisdiction. He concluded that the US administration was vouching for Ethiopia’s defiance of international law¹⁵. The Boundary Commission made a last ditch attempt to bring the two sides together in September 2007. Ethiopia insisted that any progress on demarcation required the prior departure of Eritrean forces from the TSZ and the meeting ended without any progress. Concluding that the two sides were unable to create the conditions required for physical demarcation to take place, the Boundary Commission announced on 30 November 2007 that it had fulfilled its mandate. In place of demarcation, the Commission officially presented maps to all the concerned parties, including the UN Cartographic Unit, showing a complete set of coordinates for the emplacement of boundary pillars representing the 2002 Delimitation Decision.

Eritrea has acknowledged as final and valid the coordinates specified by the Boundary Commission. It has settled for virtual demarcation and accepted border demarcation on the map as the final step in reinforcing the Commission’s ruling of April 2002. President Issayas has said “The border issue in its legal, political and technical aspects has concluded, thus marking the culmination of the Algiers Agreement the remaining sole task is the unconditional

According to UN Sanctions Monitoring Group reports²² Eritrea had by 2005 established links with two key Somali Islamist figures, Sheikh Yusuf Indohadde and Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Eritrea was alleged to have provided them with arms and they in turn reportedly facilitated the infiltration of trained ONLF fighters into Eastern Ethiopia from Somali territory. The ONLF’s stated goals are for self-determination, possibly including secession, of the Ogaden. They firmly reject being labelled as Islamists and are known to have had difficult relations with Al-Ittihad groups that operated in the Ogaden region. Eritrea is judged to have exercised some influence on the ONLF in discouraging the development of Islamism as a guiding philosophy within the organisation²³.

The situation in Somalia changed suddenly in mid 2006 with the rise to power of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu²⁴. The six months during which the Courts ran the city were marked by an unprecedented improvement in security. This induced some heartfelt optimism about the prospects for a genuine recovery, particularly amongst the Hawiye population of the South whose experience of misrule and extortion by warlords had been especially acute and protracted. However, frictions soon became apparent between the ‘moderates’ led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the ‘radical’ Chairman of the Shura, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The introduction of conservative social policies was unpopular and caused divisions between leaders of *Al-Shabaab*, the militant armed wing of the organisation, and important officials of the Islamic Courts. The constituent parts of the courts movement were not particularly integrated with individuals freely making policies and statements without reference to the wider organisation.

Close observers of the Somali political scene recognised that the Courts were, in part, a political platform for Hawiye clan interests. Some noted that parallels could be drawn with the evolution from clan based arrangements to administrative structures that had already occurred in Puntland and Somaliland²⁵. But to the outside world, the mid 2006 appearance of the Islamic Courts as the sole authority in Mogadishu looked like the start of an Islamic revolution

been associating with Eritrea. However he eventually settled on the appointment of Ali Mohamed Gedi as Prime Minister. Gedi selected a government that was representative of all the clans and a lengthy government list was approved by parliament in early 2005.

The external mediators and the backers of the Somali peace process expected the TFG to lay the groundwork for a federal system of government including the re-establishment of political, administrative and security institutions. A new constitution was to be drawn up and elections held for a new government to end the transitional period in 2009. In reality the TFG, like the TNG before it, suffered from such fundamental problems of legitimacy that it was unable to establish itself inside the country. Abdulahi Yusuf realised the problem. As soon as he had been inaugurated as President he went to Addis Ababa and issued a call to the African Union to provide 20,000 peacekeepers to help him establish his authority.

IGAD agreed in January 2005 to authorise the deployment of an IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia to assist the TFG to establish peace and security. Meanwhile, a fairly large section of the Somali parliament that had elected Abdulahi rebelled against the idea of foreign peacekeepers. By March 2005 the TFG and the parliament were split into two hostile camps over the issue. The TFG group loyal to Abdulahi Yusuf moved from Kenya to Jowhar later in 2005 and then settled in Baidoa. There were no signs they could expand their support base or negotiate their establishment in the capital. Ethiopia remained the key backer of Yusuf's faction while those opposed to him inevitably started their own search for external allies.

Ethiopia and Eritrea compete in Somalia

By this time Eritrea was facing up to the impossibility of getting its border with Ethiopia demarcated. It became active in Somali politics principally as an arena for confronting Ethiopia and started to develop links with anti Ethiopian militants in Mogadishu who were soon to gain prominence as leaders in the Islamic Courts.

withdrawal of the invading TPLF regime's forces from sovereign Eritrean territory¹⁶.

Ethiopia, on the other hand, regards the demarcation coordinates as invalid as they are not the product of a demarcation process recognized by international law. It has described virtual demarcation as a "legal nonsense" and maintains that border demarcation cannot be recognised unless the pillars are posted on the ground. Ethiopia insists that, despite its earlier misgivings, it has now accepted the Boundary Commission Delimitation Decision. Meles told parliament in July 2007 that Ethiopia thought the border ruling was wrong, but accepted it, and was ready and willing to discuss implementation of the ruling¹⁷. However, Ethiopia also argues that the integrity of the TSZ is necessary in order for demarcation to proceed and that Eritrea's violation of the TSZ and its actions against UNMEE have rendered demarcation practically impossible.

UNMEE faced increasingly severe restrictions from Eritrea that steadily undermined its ability to perform its monitoring function. Force levels were progressively cut down to reach 1,700 in April 2007. The operation limped along but Eritrea's tightening of fuel restrictions in December 2007 made its position untenable. UNMEE's operations were suspended in February 2008 when the bulk of the forces left Eritrea to return to their home countries. When the mandate for UNMEE's renewal came up in July, the UN Security Council bowed to the inevitable and unanimously agreed to terminate the operation with effect from 31 July. Commenting on UN Security Council Resolution 1827, Ethiopia has expressed its regret that Eritrea was not condemned for its actions against UNMEE and that the Security Council has ignored the obstacle that Eritrea poses to peace and security in the region and its role in preventing resolution of their border conflict on the basis of the Algiers Agreement¹⁸. Eritrea said simply that the termination of UNMEE's mandate was long overdue.

In conclusion, the Algiers Agreement has not created a permanent

settlement between Ethiopia and Eritrea and after eight years seems unlikely to do so. The two mechanisms created at Algiers to help the two sides reach a permanent peace - the Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission and UNMEE – are both now disbanded. The two countries have not returned to war and recent statements following the termination of UNMEE give no hint that they intend to do so¹⁹. But their enmity continues to fuel instability elsewhere in the region, above all in Somalia.

The Somali conflict

State collapse in Somalia has been a fact of life in the Horn of Africa since the end of Siad Barre's dictatorial rule in 1991. The country had been a very fragile state for several years before then. Despite many externally brokered attempts at mediation, as well as an unsuccessful UN Peacekeeping Operation (UNOSOM II) in the early 1990s, Somalia's clan based political dynamics consistently worked against the re-establishment of a central government. The only peace agreements that developed any permanence were those that emerged from local processes involving lengthy reconciliation meetings among the Somali clans themselves, usually at regional level.

Through these multiple peace processes Somalia had by about 2000 become fragmented into a number of different political configurations, many of which satisfied the basic requirements of peace and stability. The most advanced of them was Somaliland, which declared its independence from the rest of the country in 1991 and started to build political institutions for managing relations among the different clans in the territory. Puntland also established a broad political consensus among the Mijjerteryn clans in the North East. By the late 1990s both Somaliland and Puntland had established administrations that fulfilled most of the functions of government.

South Central Somalia was different and remained deeply divided. There were fundamental problems left over from the 1991-2 conflict when nomadic clans overran and dispossessed the farming

that followed) was a consuming preoccupation for both countries for the four years from 1998 to 2001. It was during this period that the UN supported the Arta conference, hosted by Djibouti, which produced a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia, headed by President Abdiqasim. The TNG enjoyed early support from the business community in Mogadishu and might well have contributed to the political stabilisation of South Central Somalia. However it suffered from numerous internal weaknesses.

Abdiqasim lacked recognition from some key Mogadishu warlords, several of whom had links with Ethiopia. Abdiqasim's authority was also emphatically rejected in the stable areas of Puntland and Somaliland where Ethiopia had established good working relations with the authorities. The TNG was perceived to be friendly towards the Arab world. Ethiopia soon began to express concern about its Islamist leanings and went about orchestrating opposition to it, working hand in hand with Abdulahi Yusuf and other warlords. This helped to ensure that by the end of its three-year mandate in 2004 the TNG had failed to establish itself. The IGAD led reconciliation process that led to establishment of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was initially conceived as a reconciliation conference between Abdiqasim's TNG and its Ethiopian-backed opponents, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf. By the end of the long drawn out conference in Mbgathi there was no trace of the TNG: Somalia was to make a fresh start under the TFG.

Ethiopia's hand in Somalia was greatly strengthened by the outcome of the 2004 Mbgathi Peace Process and the emergence of their key Somali clients at the head of the new transitional government. In October 2004 Abdulahi Yusuf was elected President of the TFG. Some observers took Yusuf's election to be a result of Ethiopia's manipulation²¹ – a claim that Ethiopia strongly denies. In fact, the Hawiye warlords who took part in the peace conference were hopelessly divided and fielded two presidential candidates against Yusuf, enabling him to snatch the majority of votes. Yusuf needed a leading Mogadishu man, from a Hawiye clan, to ease his acceptance in the capital. His first plan was to select Hussein Aideed, who had

interest therefore in seeing a friendly regime installed in Somalia to counteract Al Ittihad. At the political level they made common cause with various “secular” warlords, Abdulahi Yusuf chief amongst them, who were opposed to Al Ittihad for clan political reasons. Ethiopian forces also took direct military action to destroy Al Ittihad camps in the Gedo borderlands in 1996/7 where they reported the presence of “foreign fighters” in Ittihad camps. Thereafter, Ittihad disbanded as an armed force. Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, who emerged as a prominent figure in the Islamic Courts leadership, was a leader of Ittihad.

Up to 1998 Eritrea was supportive of Ethiopia’s position in Somalia. This changed as soon as the Ethio-Eritrea conflict broke out. Eritrea’s strategic goals were to do with Ethiopia rather than Somalia and arose from the old logic that the best way to weaken its adversary was to ally itself with anti-government rebel movements operating in Ethiopia’s periphery. They took steps to resuscitate old linkages between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and rebel forces that had existed during the Mengistu period. In this context, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) were the “natural allies” of Eritrea once their relationship with Ethiopia turned sour.

In addition, Eritrea had to face the problem of identifying allies in the shifting sands of Somali politics to help channel support to anti-government forces operating in the East of Ethiopia. After 1998 they struck up a short-lived relationship with one of the Mogadishu warlords, Hussein Aideed,²⁰ who was then head of the Somali National Alliance (SNA). Aideed reportedly ferried some Oromo rebels into Somalia. Consequently, in 1999, Ethiopia backed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army to drive Aideed’s forces out of Baidoa, which had been held by the SNA for the previous four years. By 2000 Aideed had opted for an association with Ethiopia and closed the OLF office in Mogadishu.

The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (and the political fall out

communities who lived between the Juba and Shabelle rivers. Hawiye clan politics in the South had degenerated into warlordism, especially in Mogadishu where competing clan factions vied for control of business opportunities. The countervailing trend to the divisions of clan politics was a potent mix of political Islamism and pan Somali nationalism with potential to impinge on the large areas of Ethiopia and Kenya inhabited by ethnic Somalis. Although political Islamism had potential appeal throughout the country, in practice it tended to develop more strongly in the South as political instability and commercial warlordism (in the name of sub-clans) became ever more deeply entrenched.

Ethiopia’s involvement

At international level the politics of Ethiopia and Somalia have been entwined with one another for generations. The break down of state and government in Somalia after 1991 created circumstances in which it was possible for Ethiopia to become much more closely involved in Somalia’s domestic political problems. In 1993 the AU awarded Ethiopia formal oversight of the Somali reconciliation process. Ethiopia’s efforts to achieve a political settlement were unsuccessful in the face of competing initiatives from Egypt, Yemen, Libya and others. The Arab countries wanted to protect and assert Somalia’s Muslim and Arab identity and sought to act as a counterweight to Ethiopian influence. The Somali faction leaders, who had little of the political authority they claimed, were adept at playing different external sponsors off against each other. They had little interest in establishing a government or rule of law that might compromise their untrammelled commercial activities.

In the 1990s Ethiopia faced an Islamist-inspired threat from (ungoverned) Somalia in the shape of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a radical armed movement advocating the establishment of Islamist rule throughout Somalia including the Somali-inhabited Ogaden (Region 5) area of Ethiopia. Ittihad conducted anti government operations in the Ogaden region and was responsible for several bomb attacks in Ethiopian towns, including the capital. Ethiopia had a serious